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The research focused on two aspects of political involvement among 
social	workers.	The	first	was	 the	direct	political	 involvement	of	 social	
workers on behalf of their clients, and the second, the social workers’ 
encouragement of their clients’ involvement in political activity. The 
main	purpose	of	the	research	was	to	identify	the	factors	that	explain	these	
two types of political involvement among social workers. The data were 
collected by means of a structured questionnaire from a research sample 
of 165 social workers in 50 social services departments in Israel. The 
findings	indicate	that	the	factors	of	the	community	(as	opposed	to	clinical)	
field	of	practice,	political	self-efficacy,	management	support,	low	level	of	
perceived	organizational	politics,	and	work	in	a	rural	setting	contribute	
most	to	the	explanation	of	political	involvement	of	social	workers.	The	
perception of political involvement as a professional activity did not 
explain	 its	prevalence	among	the	social	workers.	The	article	discusses	
the	theoretical	and	practical	implications	of	the	findings.
Key Words:  social workers, politics, involvement, clients
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Introduction
 The political involvement of social workers is essential 
because they work in a political arena. The environments 
in which social workers operate are characterized by power 
struggles and conflicts of interest; therefore, in order to 
promote change, they often have to influence the political 
system (Domanski, 1998; Patel, 2011; Vick, 2012). The political 
involvement of social workers is based on fundamental values 
of the profession such as commitment to social justice, equal 
rights, and fair division of resources and power (Rush & 
Keenan, 2014). Their task is to work within the political system 
to promote disadvantaged people and serve as their personal 
and collective advocates (DeFilippis, Fisher, & Shragge, 2009; 
Reisch & Jani, 2012). In their different positions, social workers 
are expected to function in the political system as mediators, 
agents of change, advocates, and lobbyists (Domanski, 1998). 
 In addition to direct political involvement, social workers 
are also expected to encourage their clients to participate in 
political activity. The aim of client involvement in the political 
process is to allow them to play a role in decision-making 
processes that affect their lives (Ohmer, 2007; Postle & Beresford, 
2005). Social workers also need to encourage clients to engage 
in politics because of the changes the clients are expected to 
undergo as a result of social work intervention programs, 
which are often associated with political processes (Saleebey, 
1997). Encouraging the political involvement of clients may also 
be a means of raising public awareness of their suffering and 
transforming their cases into general social issues that warrant 
social-community solutions (Mendes, 2007). 
 The ability of clients to influence the political system reflects a 
process of personal and community empowerment. It contributes 
to the ability of clients to progress from a condition of helplessness 
to one in which they have an impact on their own living conditions. 
Empowerment by means of political involvement contributes a 
shift from the margins to the center of society, where the clients 
have a voice, take initiative, and work on behalf of themselves and 
the collective. Political involvement empowers clients by bringing 
them together with others in the same situation, raising their 
critical awareness of institutions, and increasing their self-efficacy 
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regarding the generation of change (Author’s own; East & Roll, 
2015; Song, 2013; Wu, 2010).
 The present research examined the degree to which social 
workers participate directly in political systems and the degree 
to which they support their clients’ political involvement. The 
main purpose of the research was to investigate the factors that 
contribute to both these aspects of political involvement. As 
a first study on this subject, it encompassed a comprehensive 
examination of several personal characteristics (political self-
efficacy, perception of political involvement as a professional 
activity, and clinical or community field of social work practice), 
as well as several organizational-administrative characteristics 
(management support for political activity and the perceived 
organizational politics of the social services department) related 
to the political sphere. The research examined the relationships 
and relative contribution of each of these characteristics to the 
involvement of social workers in the political system and their 
encouragement of their clients’ political involvement.
Theoretical Background
Political	Involvement
 Political involvement is defined in terms of the power 
that citizens have to influence the conditions of their lives. It 
refers to a redistribution of the power that enables the have-not 
citizens to play a role in economic and political processes, so 
that they can participate in and influence the political system. 
Verba and others (1995) argued that political participation, that 
is, activities conducted by ordinary citizens in order to affect 
political outcomes, is the most important means by which 
citizens can make their interests and preferences known.
 Political involvement includes presenting the government 
with an agenda and obtaining a response to the relevant 
issues. The participants become players whose position must 
be considered (Cebolla-Boado & Ortiz, 2014; Verba, Lehman, 
& Brady, 1995). Political involvement also refers to activity by 
which the interests, aspirations, and demands of citizens have 
an effect on key figures in the government and on the decisions 
they make (Fennema & Tillie, 2001; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; 
Kerrissey & Schofer, 2013). 
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 The definition of the political involvement of social workers 
is similar, concentrating on the effort to influence the political 
system in order to promote the rights of disadvantaged social 
groups (DeFilippis et al., 2009; Domanski, 1998; Haynes & 
Mickelson, 2006; Reisch & Jani, 2012). The political involvement 
of social workers and their clients is aimed at improving 
their access to information, influencing policy, affecting the 
distribution of funds, implementing programs, and developing 
and introducing services. Social workers use different means to 
achieve these goals, such as advocacy, lobbying, negotiations, 
persuasion, disseminating information, and public protest 
(Chui & Gray, 2004; Domanski, 1998; Ritter, 2008). As noted, in 
this research we examined the direct political involvement of 
social workers on behalf of their clients and the degree to which 
they supported their clients’ political involvement.
The perception of political involvement as a professional activity
 As discussed in the introduction, there is much support 
for the political involvement of social workers, and there is 
also evidence that social workers are active in this respect 
(Domanski, 1998; Patel, 2011; Vick, 2012). However, in many 
cases, social workers view social and political activism as 
inappropriate for their professional practice. Some may view 
the political system as foreign and contradictory to the values 
of the social work profession. Social workers often see political 
involvement as an activity that is not objective, which involves 
unfair exploitation of the foci of power and is thus liable to 
distract them from the systematic work the profession requires. 
In fact, “politics” is often considered a dirty word, evoking 
an image of aggressiveness that clashes with the professional 
image of sharing and acceptance (Haynes & Mickelson, 2006; 
Mendes, 2007). Accordingly, many social workers avoid the 
centers of power in the community and prefer to focus on 
clinical therapy (Almog-Bar, Weiss-Gal, & Gal, 2015; Mendes, 
2007), the development of intervention methods, and research, 
all detached from the political arena (Reisch & Jani, 2012).
 A noteworthy aspect of this view is the objection of social 
workers to adopting intervention methods that they view as 
contradicting their perception of the profession (Lee-Treweek, 
1997), particularly when the methods seem to jeopardize the 
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professional process or values (Baines, 2004). In some cases, such 
resistance intensifies to the point of considering resignation 
(Abramovitz, 2005; Baines, 2008). Accordingly, social workers’ 
perceptions regarding the professional nature (or lack thereof) 
of political involvement are likely to lead to different levels of 
involvement.
 Accordingly, it can be expected that those involved in 
community practices will be more likely, compared with those 
involved in private-clinical practice, to participate in political 
activity and to encourage their clients to be involved politically. 
In community practice it is particularly important to understand 
the politics of the community and the broader environment; 
to become acquainted with stakeholders, who in many cases 
have different and conflicting aims, goals, and interests; and to 
work for changes in the political system (Checkoway, 1995; Das, 
O’Neill, & Pinkerton, 2015; Rubin & Rubin, 2008; Twelvetrees, 
1991; Weil, 1996). In this respect, community practice is not 
limited to intellectual and technical activities, such as analysis, 
consideration, and evaluation of information, but also—in fact, 
mainly—includes activities of persuasion, negotiation, and 
dissemination of information (Author’s own).
Political	Self-Efficacy
 The concept of self-efficacy is based on social cognitive and 
social learning theories. Self-efficacy refers to the individual’s 
evaluation of his or her ability to perform the actions required 
in order to deal with future situations (Bandura, 1986, 1997). 
Research on this subject has shown that self-efficacy contributes 
significantly to a wide variety of tasks, level of performance, 
persistence, attainment of aims and goals, and actions that 
involve challenges beyond common tasks (Dull, Schleifer, & 
McMillan, 2015; Wang & Zhang, 2016). However, it is important 
to note that a person’s general self-efficacy may vary across 
situations, and it is not an all-encompassing quality (Bandura & 
Jourdan, 1991). Self-efficacy is specific to each task or situation 
(Pintrich & Schunk, 1995). Therefore, in the present research, 
we examined political self-efficacy—people’s faith in their 
ability to influence the political system, perform political tasks, 
participate in politics, and generate change. Political self-efficacy 
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has been found to be one of the factors that affects the level of 
involvement in politics (Ritter, 2008; Verba et al., 1995).
Management Support
Management support of employees is critical to their 
motivation. Research has shown the importance and influence 
of the managers in organizations (Buick, Blackman, O’Donnell, 
O’Flynn, & West, 2015; Schult, Galway, Awosika, Schmunk, & 
Hodgson, 2013), particularly on the introduction of changes in 
the organization and its services (Harris & Ogbonna, 2002); the 
development of the organizational culture (Schein, 1992); and 
the mediation and coordination of conflicting requirements that 
arise from the external and internal environments (Fleming & 
Spicer, 2004). This also holds for the influence of managers in 
welfare organizations, who are likely to play a central role in 
shaping values and norms regarding political activity. Social 
workers employed in the social services are affected by the 
overall view of the management (Author’s own; Postle & 
Beresford, 2005).
Organizational	Politics
 Organizational politics is a unique aspect of the study of 
interpersonal relations in the workplace, and has been discussed 
extensively in literature on the motivation of employees (Author’s 
own; Vigoda-Gadot & Talmud, 2010). Organizational politics 
refers to terms such as “power” and “influence,” and to people’s 
ability to influence matters in favor of their goals (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1977). Organizational politics involves the promotion 
of personal interests that conflict with the interests of the 
organization or of other employees (Meisler & Vigoda-Gadot, 
2014). Organizations characterized by organizational politics are 
guided less by professional, technical, or scientific considerations, 
and more by interactions of negotiation and persuasion (Gummer, 
1990). Organizational politics are expressed when members of an 
organization identify foci of power and exploit them to obtain 
personal support or to realize programs or policies that they see 
as desirable (Author’s own, 2011; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989).
 When organizational politics are prominent in a social services 
department, the social workers are more likely to participate actively 
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in the political system in order to achieve their professional tasks; 
in order to achieve their goals, they need to focus their actions on 
influence and negotiation; for the same reason, they are likely to 
encourage their clients to take an active part in the political system. 
Hypotheses
 The theoretical literature gives rise to the following 
hypotheses:
• A positive correlation will be found between  
 the perception of political involvement as   
 professional and: (a) the political involvement  
 of social workers (as part of their professional  
 role) and (b) social workers’ encouragement of  
 the political involvement of their clients.
• Involvement in community (rather than clinical)   
 social work practice will contribute to: (a) the political  
 involvement of social workers and (b) social workers’  
 encouragement of the political involvement of
 their clients.
• A positive correlation will be found between political  
 self-efficacy of social workers, as well as: (a) their   
 political involvement and (b) their encouragement of  
 their clients’ political involvement.
• A positive correlation will be found between   
 management support of political involvement and   
 (a) the political involvement of social workers and (b)  
 the social workers’ encouragement of their clients’   
 political involvement. 
• A positive correlation will be found between perceived  
 organizational politics and (a) the political involvement  
 of social workers and (b) their encouragement of their  
 clients’ political involvement.
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Method
Sample
 The research was conducted among social workers employed in 
social services departments in Israel. About 50 of the country’s 123 
departments of social services were randomly sampled. The sample 
included 165 social workers. Two hundred and sixty questionnaires 
were sent randomly to the departments, depending on the size of 
each department (2 to 7 social workers in each); 165 were returned 
(63.46% response rate). The majority of respondents was born in 
Israel (90.3%), and most were women (84.2%). The average age of the 
respondents was 37.12 (between 24 and 54 years). More than half of 
the respondents held bachelor’s degrees in social work (63%), and 
the rest (37%) held master’s degrees (in Israel, a bachelor’s degree 
in social work is the minimum qualification for employment in the 
field). The majority of respondents were employed in the clinical 
field of practice (69.1%), and the others engaged in macro social 
work, that is, community or administrative work (30.9%). The mean 
length of time in the social work profession was approximately 
11.28 years (ranging from 1 to 36 years). Most of the respondents 
were employed in urban social services departments (61%) and the 
others in local or regional council departments (rural areas) (39%).
Research Instruments
 Political	involvement	scale. The measure of political involvement 
was based on the earlier work of Verba et al. (1995) and its translation 
by Gilboa (2000). The scale includes 14 items representing political 
activities. In correspondence with the research goals, two aspects 
of political involvement were examined. Regarding the first, the 
political involvement of social workers, the respondents were 
asked to note the degree of their political involvement as part 
of their professional work in each item presented. Regarding the 
second aspect, the social workers’ encouragement of the political 
involvement of their clients, the respondents were asked to mark 
the degree to which they encouraged their clients’ involvement 
in the activities represented by the respective items. In both sets 
of items, the ranking was graded on a five-point scale, where 1 = 
not at all, 2 = slightly, 3 = moderately, 4 = to a great degree, and 5 
= to a very great degree.
11Social Work and Politics
 Scale of perception of political involvement as part of the social 
work profession. The scale measuring the perception of political 
involvement was based on earlier research on social workers’ 
involvement in the recruitment of resources (Author’s own, 
2006), which was adapted for the present research. The scale 
includes 11 statements. The items represent two opposing views 
of political involvement: negative (it is not professional), such 
as “political involvement is an activity that dirties the hands 
of social workers,” “it’s an appropriate activity for politicians 
or other groups, but not for social workers” (reverse), and a 
positive (professional) view of political involvement as part of 
the profession, represented by statements such as: “politics is 
an activity based on professional knowledge in social work.” 
The respondents were asked to mark the degree to which they 
agreed with each of the statements regarding the political 
involvement of social workers as part of their professional 
work, on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly 
disagree). The reliability of the scale was α = 0.89. 
 Political	 self-efficacy	 scale. The measure of political self-
efficacy was based on the work of Verba et al. (1995), which 
was translated to Hebrew (Gilboa, 2000). The scale reflects the 
respondent’s inner belief in his or her ability to understand and 
influence political processes. The respondents were asked to 
rank their agreement with the items on a scale ranging from 
1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The reliability of the 
scale was α = 0.80.
 Management support for political involvement scale. The scale 
was based on an earlier measure developed to assess the 
general support of organizational directors (Zeitz, Johannesson, 
& Ritchie, 1997), which was adapted for the support for 
political involvement. The scale included 7 items, such as “the 
management guides the employees to participate in politics,” 
and “the management encourages employees to participate in 
activities related to political systems.” The respondents were 
asked to mark the degree to which each of the items was true 
for the management of their social services department (the 
department manager, team leader, or others who directed their 
departments), on a scale ranging from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 
(strongly agree). The reliability of the scale was α = 0.81.
 Scale	of	perceived	organizational	politics. The POPS questionnaire, 
based on earlier research (Ferris et al., 1989; Kacmar & Carlson, 
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1994), was translated to Hebrew (Vigoda, 2000) and used to assess 
the organizational politics of the respondents’ departments. 
Organizational politics was defined as the degree to which 
members of the organization perceive the organizational 
environment as political, unfair, and directed to promote the 
goals of the strong and influential. The respondents were asked 
to rank their agreement with each of 9 items on a scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). The reliability of 
the scale was α = 0.80.
 Questionnaire on personal details. The questionnaire was 
designed to collect the variables of personal and professional 
background, such as age, gender, marital status, education, 
professional experience, field of practice (clinical or community 
work), and location of the department (urban or rural).
Procedure
 After obtaining permission from the Ministry of Social 
Services and Social Affairs to conduct the research, a request was 
submitted to the managers of the social services department. All 
the managers agreed to participate in the research. Two master’s 
degree students of social work distributed the questionnaire in 
the departments. The questionnaire included a consent form to 
be signed by the social workers; among other things, it stated 
that they were not required to complete the questionnaire and 
that they could stop answering it at any point.
Findings
The Descriptive Variables
 The data presented in Table 1 indicate that the reliability 
of the dependent research variables, according to Cronbach’s 
alpha, ranged from α = 0.80 to α = 0.95. The mean of the variable 
of encouragement of political involvement by clients was higher 
than that of the social workers’ own political involvement (see 
Table 1).
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 To examine the contribution of the independent variables 
to the explanation of the dependent variables, we performed 
multivariate analysis. Two regressions were performed for 
each of the dependent variables (encouragement of the political 
involvement of clients, and the social worker’s political 
involvement). The background variables of education, length 
of time in the profession, type of social services department 
(urban or rural) were entered as control variables. In addition, 
the independent variables of main field of practice, political 
self-efficacy, perception of political involvement as professional, 
management support, and perceived organizational politics 
were also entered into the regression. 
 The background variables of gender and country of birth 
were not included, as there were not enough men or immigrants, 
and the t tests did not reveal any significant differences. The 
age of the social workers was not examined, because the 
Pearson’s correlation in the pre-test did not indicate a significant 
correlation (see Table 2).
Table 1: Reliability coefficients, means and standard deviations of
the research variables (N = 165)
Reliability
0.92
0.95
0.81
0.80
0.89
0.80
Variability
The social worker’s political 
involvement
Encouragement of clients’
political involvement
Management support
Political self-efficacy
View of political involvement
Perceived organizational 
politics
Mean
1.84
2.35
1.94
3.38
3.56
3.00
Standard
Deviation
0.80
0.99
0.73
0.86
0.74
0.70
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 The regression model of social workers’ political involvement 
was found to be significant (p < 0.001, F = 9.08), and to explain 29% 
of the variance. Field of practice provided the most significant 
explanation of variance in the social worker’s political involvement, 
followed by management support, perceived organizational 
politics (in a negative direction), and political self-efficacy.
 The regression model of social workers’ encouragement of 
the political involvement of clients was found to be significant 
Table 2: Multiple regression analysis of the relationship between the 
independent variables and the social worker’s political involvement
Education
Years in profession
Main field of practice
Rural or urban
social services
department
Political self-efficacy
Professional view of
political involvement
Management support
Perceived
organizational politics
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Direct political
involvement of the
social worker
.528
-1.642
4.248
-1.882
2.188*
.312
4.016**
-2.464*
.32
29.
9.08
t
.036
-.112
.304
-.129
.158
.021
.279
-.168
β
.058
-.013
.608
-.204
.142
.022
.297
-.182
B
-.790
-.629
4.072***
-2.222*
2.233*
-.056
2.038*
-2.348*
.25
21
6.48
t
.057
-.045
.306
-.160
.169
-.004
.149
-.168
β
-.114
-.006
.763
-.316
.189
-.005
.197
-.227
B
Support for political
involvement by clients
* p < .05, **  p < .01***,  p < .001 
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(F = 6.48, p < 0.001) and to explain 21% of the variance. Field 
of practice, that being involved in community practice, as 
compared with individual case work practice, provided the 
most significant explanation of variance in the social worker’s 
encouragement of clients to participate in politics, followed 
by perceived organizational politics (negatively), political self-
efficacy, type of social services department (rural or urban), and 
management support.
Discussion
 In this research we examined the factors that promote and 
deter the political involvement of social workers and their 
encouragement of the political involvement of clients. The 
research findings show that social workers encouraged their 
clients to be politically involved (according to their responses 
to the questionnaire) to more than a slight degree but less than 
a moderate degree, and that they personally participated in 
politics to less than a slight degree. One explanation for the 
finding that the social workers tended to encourage their clients’ 
involvement slightly more than they participated directly in 
politics might be associated with the generally accepted methods 
of social work, which focus on client involvement (Croft & 
Beresford, 2008; Seden & Ross, 2007) and client empowerment 
(Author’s own; East & Roll, 2015; Song, 2015; Wu, 2010). 
 The research findings regarding the minimal political 
involvement of social workers are consistent with earlier 
research that showed little involvement of social workers on the 
social-political level, and more concentration of involvement on 
the clinical level (Almog-Bar et al., 2015; Haynes & Mickelson, 
2006; Mendes, 2007). These findings, along with those of earlier 
studies, underscore the importance of identifying the factors 
that contribute to the political involvement of social workers 
and their encouragement of clients to participate in politics.
The	Perception	of	Political	Involvement	as	a	Professional	Activity
 The research findings show that, contrary to our hypothesis, 
the perception of political involvement as part of the social work 
profession did not explain the political involvement of the social 
workers or their support for their clients’ political involvement. 
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These findings contradict earlier research that indicated a 
correlation between professional perceptions and activity 
associated with the respective views (Baines, 2008; Lee-Treweek, 
1997). Perhaps the nature of the social worker’s role, which 
focuses on clinical activity, as well as the need to receive clients 
for individual therapy (Almog-Bar et al., 2015) prevents social 
workers from fulfilling their commitment to political activity. 
 These findings might also be explained by the dual loyalty 
of social workers in their organizations of employment. On the 
one hand, they are loyal to the profession and the code of ethics, 
values, and ideology of the profession, but on the other hand, 
they are loyal to the organization that employs them, in this 
case, the local government (Author’s own; Gal & Weiss-Gal, 
2013). Perhaps the social workers’ organizational affiliation, the 
demands and expectations of the organization, and the social 
workers’ loyalty to the local authorities hinders them from 
becoming politically active. Social workers in social service 
departments are employed by and are subordinate to the local 
authority or municipality, and are thus obligated to maintain 
the political stability of the system. In light of this situation, it 
would be interesting to conduct further research to examine 
the relationship of loyalty to the organization, on the one hand, 
and to the profession, on the other hand, with the political 
involvement of social workers and their support for their clients’ 
political involvement.
 Another explanation of the findings may be that those 
social workers who expressed a favorable view of political 
involvement, and particularly those with a very favorable view, 
might consider minimal political activity (especially due to 
discouragement by the organization) as inadequate, compared 
with those social workers who perceived political involvement 
as unfavorable. 
Working	in	Community	Practice
 According to the research findings, work in the field of 
community practice explained the political involvement of 
social workers, as well as their support for their clients’ political 
involvement, more than any other factor examined did. These 
findings are not surprising. 
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 Social workers who work on the community level, compared 
with those working on the individual and family levels, are 
more involved in politics as part of their jobs. Community 
workers direct their activity towards change in the overall 
system, including the community power structure, and this 
requires them to negotiate with the political system (Checkoway, 
1995; Das et al., 2015; Rubin & Rubin, 2008; Twelvetrees, 1991; 
Weil, 1996). It is also noteworthy that the findings show that 
community practice contributed not only to the personal and 
professional involvement of the social workers, but also to their 
encouragement of clients to participate in political activity. 
Political	Self-Efficacy
 The research findings indicated a contribution of political 
self-efficacy to the explanation of the social workers’ political 
involvement and their encouragement of the political involvement 
of their clients. These findings are consistent with cognitive-social 
theory, according to which self-efficacy affects people’s choices and 
the degree of effort they are willing to invest in given situations 
(Bandura, 1991), as well as their decisions regarding their degree 
of involvement in a given activity. Political involvement involves 
concrete political experience and familiarization with the complex 
political map, and it requires reciprocity and appropriate reactions 
to a variety of stakeholders. Political self-efficacy evidently 
contributes to the involvement of social workers in coping with 
complex tasks (Dull et al., 2015; Wang & Zhang, 2016). 
 Another possible explanation of the contribution of self-
efficacy to political involvement is related to the perception of 
politics as an activity that is foreign and not an unequivocally 
integral part of the field of social work. In this case, personal 
self-efficacy contributes to involvement in political tasks, even 
though they are not perceived as an integral to the profession.
Management Support
 The findings show that management support helped 
explain the political involvement of social workers and their 
encouragement of their clients’ political involvement. These 
findings are consistent with those of other studies that have 
highlighted the crucial importance of the manager in motivating 
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employees of an organization (Buick et al., 2015; Schult et al., 
2013). Similarly, social workers in social service departments 
are influenced by the overall view of management (Postle & 
Beresford, 2005). The findings might also be explained by the 
structure in which the research participants worked: such 
social workers are subordinate to local government authorities, 
which are led by influential elected officials, and they need the 
support of their managers to gain the legitimation of the leaders 
of the local governments.
 It should be noted that although the significance of the 
manager’s support was significant in explaining the degree to 
which social workers encourage their clients to participate in 
politics, this factor explained the direct political involvement of 
the social workers to a greater degree. Apparently, the social 
workers needed greater support from their managers in order 
to act directly. It appears that the social workers perceived the 
political involvement of clients (with their encouragement) as 
less threatening compared with their own direct involvement.
Perceived	Organizational	Politics
as	a	Barrier	to	Political	Involvement
 The findings of the present research reveal an opposite 
trend to that described in the research hypotheses, namely, that 
perceived organizational politics would be correlated with more 
extensive political involvement. That hypothesis was based on 
the reasoning that social workers in social services departments 
characterized by strong organizational politics would be more 
likely to take active roles in the political arena in order to 
achieve their professional tasks. However, it emerges that the 
perception of strong organizational politics actually hindered 
the political involvement of the social workers, as well as their 
encouragement of the political involvement of their clients. 
 Apparently, it is necessary to differentiate between a perception 
of organizational politics that reflect a tendency towards political 
action in order to achieve organizational and personal goals, 
and organizational politics that represent an inclination to 
engage in politics in order to achieve professional goals. In the 
present research, the perceived organizational politics reflected 
an organizational system aimed at gaining personal power for 
the social workers (and not professional power or power for the 
19Social Work and Politics
benefit of the clients), while the political involvement of the social 
workers (as examined in this research) reflected a professional goal 
of benefiting the clients. 
Work	in	a	Rural	Area	as	Strengthening	Political	Involvement
 In addition to the issues covered by the research hypotheses, 
the research findings also indicated that the social workers in rural 
areas were more supportive of their clients’ political involvement 
(but did not participate much in political activity themselves).
 One possible explanation of this finding may be the much 
greater proximity and access of citizens to the sources of power 
in the smaller rural communities. It seems that the access of 
the citizens in rural areas to the sources of power provided the 
social workers with a more secure foundation for supporting 
their clients’ political involvement. The proximity to the sources 
of power in rural communities is reflected in more social capital 
in rural compared with urban communities (Beaudoin & 
Thorson, 2004; Krishna & Shrader, 1999). The emphasis here is 
especially on linking social capital, based on the relationship 
of community members or clients with organizations that have 
power and influence beyond the community system (Aldrich & 
Meyer, 2015; Putnam, 2000). 
 Perhaps the social workers prefer to rely upon existing 
political ties to initiating and developing new political systems. It 
would be interesting to examine this subject in further research.
Limitations of the Research
Alongside the advantages of this research, some limitations 
should be considered. First, the research sample consisted of 
social workers in social service departments (the largest group 
of social workers in Israel) and did not include other professional 
groups. It would be interesting to expand the research on this 
issue to additional organizations and populations. It is also 
important to investigate the awareness of political involvement 
and political activism among national-level decision makers 
and the academic faculty members who train social workers. 
In addition, this research was conducted in Israel, and 
should be expanded to include additional countries, where the 
organizational and professional cultures relate differently to the 
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issues examined here. There are similarities and differences in 
the characteristics of political involvement in Israel and the U.S.. 
Israel and the United States are both democratic countries, but 
their respective political scenes are not the same. For example, 
the political activities in the two countries are motivated by 
different views regarding the welfare state. In the U.S., there is a 
clear neoliberal outlook, which focuses on the democratic value 
of the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they wish, with 
minimal intervention of society and the state. According to this 
view, individuals and groups in society should be allowed to act 
freely, based on their interests. Therefore, the intervention of the 
state in economic activity for the sake of the welfare of its citizens 
and realization of socioeconomic rights should be very limited. 
With regard to social workers in this context, it is important to 
note that state intervention focuses only on those who are weak 
and needy, who are unable to manage themselves or with the help 
of their immediate society without government intervention.
 In comparison, although Israel no longer represents the 
view of social democracy (the opposite of the view of the U.S.), it 
still bears some characteristics of that perspective. Accordingly, 
the political arena attributes great importance to the protection 
and realization of socioeconomic rights and to increasing social 
and economic equality by the state. The narrowing of economic 
and social disparity in society and promotion of social justice 
are given higher priority in Israel than in the U.S. Although 
there has been some retreat from this view in Israel in recent 
years, it is still stronger than in the U.S., in both the local and 
the national arenas. 
 Differences can be found in the political cultures of the 
two countries. For example, a critical culture in the democratic 
political arena in the U.S. sees the individual, not the regime, as 
sovereign. The element of individualism in Israel is weaker in 
comparison, and there is a constant expectation of citizens that 
the state will take care of them. In these respects and others, it is 
important to study the differences among countries regarding 
the topic of this research.
 It would also be interesting to expand the research to groups 
that supply resources to organizations and, especially, to clients 
who receive social services. Finally, it should be noted that the 
research was exposed to common method bias and common 
source bias.
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Tracing the Evolution of the
Tarasoff Duty in California
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Since	the	first	Tarasoff	decision	in	1974,	the	question	of	mental	health	
professionals’ “duty to protect” third-parties has been a topic of vigorous 
debate. The ensuing forty-three years witnessed considerable shifts in 
the statutory and legal landscape in the United States, including several 
significant	changes	 in	California	state	 law	over	the	past	decade	alone.	
In this historical review, I trace the evolution of the Tarasoff duty with 
a	specific	 focus	on	the	state	 in	which	that	duty	originated,	California,	
with the intention of elucidating the major policy, ethical, and practical 
questions that have followed in the wake of the Tarasoff decision.
Key Words:  Tarasoff, duty to protect, duty to warn
 Since the era of deinstitutionalization in the 1960s, imminent 
danger to self (i.e., suicide) or others (i.e., homicide) has emerged 
as one of the standard criteria for mandatory psychiatric inter-
vention in the United States (Ward, 2014). Whereas the duties of 
mental health professionals in California to suicidal clients have 
remained substantively unchanged since the 1967 passage of the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which mandated prompt risk assess-
ment and, if necessary, involuntary commitment, the question of 
the duties of mental health professionals to potential victims of 
violence other than their clients has been the source of consider-
able back-and-forth in state courts and legislatures. In fact, prior to 
the mid-twentieth century, it was not at all clear that clinicians in 
California had any (legal) obligation to individuals other than their 
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clients. For reference, the first mandatory child abuse reporting 
law in California, which applied only to physicians, was enacted 
in 1963 (Rady Children’s Hospital San Diego, 2012). 
 Due in part to an ever shifting statutory and legal landscape, 
as well as considerable inter-state variability, the duties of clini-
cians to potential victims continue to be a source of considerable 
confusion and an ethically contested subject. With these facts in 
mind, I seek to trace the historical evolution of the so-called “duty 
to protect” with a specific focus on the state in which that duty 
originated, California, and to elucidate the relevant policy, ethi-
cal, and practical questions that attend this duty.
 In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at the University 
of California, Berkeley, confided to his therapist that he intended 
to kill a woman he had previously dated, Tatiana Tarasoff. Pod-
dar’s psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, warned campus police 
that Poddar was experiencing an acute psychotic episode and 
recommended that Poddar be involuntarily committed on the 
grounds of being a danger to others. Poddar was briefly detained 
by campus police, but was released shortly thereafter and sub-
sequently desisted from treatment. Several months later, on Oc-
tober 27, 1969, Poddar carried out his plan, stabbing and killing 
Tatiana Tarasoff (for a more detailed discussion of the circum-
stances surrounding Tarasoff	v.	Regents, refer to Buckner & Fires-
tone, 2000).
 Following her death, Tarasoff’s parents sued Poddar’s thera-
pists, campus police, and the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia for, among other claims made by the plaintiffs, failing to 
warn their daughter that she was in danger. In 1974, in a deci-
sion now commonly referred to as Tarasoff	I	(Tarasoff v. Regents 
of the University of California, 1974), the California Supreme 
Court held that psychotherapists had a duty of care not only to 
their clients, but also to individuals who might be harmed by 
their clients. Specifically, Tarasoff	 I	held that therapists were obli-
gated to warn potential victims of dangers posed to them by the 
therapists’ psychotherapy clients. Failing to warn such victims 
would render therapists liable to civil judgment.
 Judge Mathew Tobriner, writing for the majority in Tara-
soff	I, concluded that “public policy favoring protection of the 
confidential character of patient-psychotherapist relationships 
must yield in instances in which disclosure is essential to avert 
danger to others; the protective privilege ends where the public 
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peril begins” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 
1974, section 2, paragraph 17). This statement encapsulates the 
central values tension at the heart of Tarasoff: at what point does 
a therapist’s professional and ethical obligation to maintain a cli-
ent’s confidentiality come into conflict with a compelling inter-
est to promote public safety, and, more to the point, how ought 
such conflicts be resolved? 
 Survey data collected by Givelber, Bowers, and Blitch (1984) 
highlight this conflict: out of the 2785 mental health professionals 
that they surveyed nearly ten years after Tarasoff	I, 45% of cli-
nicians who had breached confidentiality to communicate with 
a potential victim felt that they had violated their own clinical 
judgment by breaching confidentiality. This finding resonates 
with the widely held belief that confidentiality is essential to 
the practice of therapy (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Nevertheless, respondents overwhelmingly endorsed a re-
sponsibility to potential victims as a matter of professional and 
personal ethics. This speaks to the deep bind in which clinicians 
sometimes find themselves when working with dangerous cli-
ents. In Tarasoff	I, however, the court erred firmly on the side of 
public safety by clearly establishing a “duty to warn.”
 Prior to Tarasoff	I, no court anywhere in the nation had recog-
nized such a legal duty to warn the potential victims of a patient 
(Cohn, 1983). In the wake of Tarasoff	I, individual practitioners 
and professional organizations raised numerous objections to 
the court’s ruling, arguing that the duty to warn would jeop-
ardize the practice of psychotherapy by eroding the essential 
precept of confidentiality and contending that therapists could 
not reliably assess the likelihood of future violent acts by their 
patients (Quinn, 1984). Based on these and other objections, in-
cluding concerns about civil liability, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the Northern California Psychiatric Society, and 
other professional organizations filed an amicus curiae brief to 
challenge the court’s 1974 decision. In response, the California 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of agreeing to rehear the 
case, resulting in a second decision, known as Tarasoff	II	(Tara-
soff v. University of California Regents, 1976), being handed 
down in 1976.
 In keeping with the spirit of Tarasoff	I, the 1976 decision im-
posed upon psychotherapists in California a legal duty to protect 
third parties from harmful acts perpetrated by their patients, 
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even if doing so required the therapist to breach the patient’s 
confidentiality. Indeed, the court held that it was precisely be-
cause of the “special relationship” between therapists and cli-
ents that the therapists have “a duty to control the conduct” of 
their clients in cases in which third parties may be “foreseeably 
endangered” by their client’s conduct (Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 1976, section 2, para. 5).
 However, contrary to Tarasoff	I, the court ruled that discharg-
ing this duty to protect third parties did not necessarily require 
warning potential victims:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards 
of his profession should determine, that his patient presents 
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obli-
gation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim 
against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require 
the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending 
upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn 
the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the 
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps 
are reasonably necessary under the circumstances. (empha-
sis added; Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 
1976, para. 4).
Having moved from a highly specific ‘duty to warn’ to a more 
general ‘duty to protect,’ the decision in Tarasoff	II	allowed for 
increased flexibility on the part of the clinician. At the same 
time, the 1976 decision also increased the ambiguity with which 
clinicians now had to contend by providing only vague guide-
lines as to how clinicians were expected to discharge the newly 
imposed ‘duty to protect’ (Mills, Sullivan, & Eth, 1987). 
 Moreover, a provision in the 1976 decision specifically found 
that therapists could be held personally liable if they “should 
have” known that a patient was dangerous prior to that patient 
committing a violent act. Yet the court left unspecified the extent 
or content of the knowledge that the therapist would have needed 
to possess to subsequently be held liable or the steps that thera-
pists would need to have taken to protect themselves from liabil-
ity (section 2, para. 14). This ambiguity resulted in civil actions in 
which therapists were held liable for situations in which it would 
have been nearly impossible for the therapist to anticipate the 
specific injury or to have protected the injured third parties, such 
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as substance-related car accidents that occurred months after the 
driver was seen by a therapist (Pettis & Gutheil, 1993).
 At the same time, the initial concerns about breach of confi-
dentiality and the ramifications of such breaches for the practice 
of psychotherapy persisted in the wake of the 1976 decision. In a 
dissenting opinion in Tarasoff	II,	Judge William Clark highlight-
ed these concerns when he wrote that:
Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of 
psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty to warn imposed 
by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of 
psychiatry. Many people, potentially violent—yet sus-
ceptible to treatment—will be deterred from seeking it; 
those seeking it will be inhibited from making revela-
tions necessary to effective treatment; and forcing the 
psychiatrist to violate the patient’s trust will destroy the 
interpersonal relationship by which treatment is effected. 
(Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 1976, 
J. Clark dissent, paragraph 28)
Clark, channeling the concerns of many practitioners, was anx-
ious that by codifying an exception to patient-client confiden-
tiality, the court’s decision would have the unintended conse-
quence of dissuading potentially dangerous individuals from 
availing themselves of psychotherapy or from disclosing homi-
cidal thoughts and plans. 
 Clark’s sentiments were widely echoed by prominent mental 
health professionals, including by the presidents of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (Stone, 1976) and the American 
Psychological Association (Siegel, 1979). Max Siegel, then the 
president of the American Psychological Association, wrote of 
Tarasoff, “This was a day in court for the law and not for the men-
tal health professions. If the psychologist had accepted the view 
of absolute, inviolate confidentiality, he might have been able to 
have kept Poddar in treatment, saved the life of Tatiana Tarasoff, 
and avoided what was to become the Tarasoff decision” (Siegel, 
1979, p. 253). Siegel’s statement speaks not only to the abiding 
respect for the precept of confidentiality, but also to one of the 
tremendous difficulties in adjudicating Tarasoff cases: namely, 
that it is invariably possible to argue and nearly impossible to 
refute the counterfactual in which some set of actions taken or 
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not taken by a clinician (as opposed to the actions they actually 
took) might have saved a victim’s life.
 It should also be noted that although the court’s decisions in 
Tarasoff	I	and II applied only to California, the effects of those 
decisions reverberated nationally. As of 2012, a duty to warn or 
protect had been codified by legislative statute in twenty-three 
states and was present in the common law supported by judicial 
precedent in an additional ten states (Johnson, Persad, & Sisti, 
2014). Although a review of statutes and common law precedents 
in states other than California is beyond the scope of this article, 
it is certainly interesting to reflect on the extent of state-by-state 
variability, particularly as it relates to the challenge of adequate-
ly training and educating clinicians (refer to Johnson et al., 2014 
for a review of inter-state variability). 
 This challenge is undoubtedly magnified by the ever-chang-
ing and often conflicting legal landscape, even within a given 
state. A mere four years after Tarasoff	II, in a case involving the 
decision to parole a juvenile offender who had threatened to kill 
a neighborhood child upon his release, the California Supreme 
Court held that Alameda County “had no affirmative duty to 
warn Plaintiffs, the police, the mother of the juvenile offender, 
or other local parents” (a decision which Judge Tobriner dis-
sented) (Thompson v. County of Alameda, 1980). Meanwhile, in 
1983, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, whose appellate jurisdic-
tion includes California, went precisely the other direction and 
broadened the foreseeability criteria laid out in Tarasoff	in Jablon-
ski	by	Pahls	v.	United	States	(1983) (refer to Walcott, Cerundolo, & 
Beck, 2001 for a discussion of Jablonski).
 In 1986, in response to concerns about ambiguity and liabil-
ity that followed in the wake of the 1976 Tarasoff	II	decision, the 
California state legislature passed a statute that limited ther-
apists’ duty to protect and attendant liability to situations in 
which the patient communicated to the therapist an imminent 
threat to an identifiable victim, thereby clarifying that therapists 
could not be held liable for any and all future harmful actions 
committed by their current or former clients. Simultaneously, the 
1986 statute shielded therapists from any potential civil action 
that might arise due to breach of confidentiality, as long as they 
did so within the narrow confines of discharging their duty to 
protect as defined by the statute. 
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 Ironically, however, the 1986 statute introduced fresh am-
biguity by referring to a “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ. 
Code § 43.92, 1986), rendering unclear whether the legislature in-
tended to reintroduce a specific duty to warn akin to that which 
had been outlined in Tarasoff	I. Two years prior to the passage 
of the 1986 statute, Givelber and colleagues (1984) had found 
that over 90% of California clinicians believed that they were 
legally obligated to warn potential victims as a result of Tarasoff, 
so it is not difficult to imagine that the inclusion of the phrase 
“duty to warn” in the 1986 statute confirmed and reinforced this 
mistaken belief. That a misunderstanding of the court’s ruling 
in Tarasoff	II	was so pervasive in California at the time speaks to 
the need for clear communication of policy to stakeholders, es-
pecially in a case such as Tarasoff, in which the waters had been 
muddied by the court’s decision to rehear the case and amend 
their decision a mere two years after their initial, controversial 
(and therefore widely circulated) ruling.
 Fast forward seventeen years, and the ambiguity inherent in 
the 1986 statute was explicitly interpreted and codified as a duty 
to warn in the 2003 issuance of the simplified civil jury instruc-
tions (Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, No. 
503A and 503B, 2014), meaning that juries were being explicit-
ly instructed to apply a ‘duty to warn’ criterion in determining 
whether a clinician could be held liable in a Tarasoff cause of 
action (Weinstock, Vari, Leong, & Silva, 2006). At around the 
same time in 2004, a pair of appellate court decisions, Ewing v. 
Northridge	Hospital	Medical	Center	 and Ewing v. Goldstein, held 
that a specific duty to warn existed based on the ambiguous 
wording of the 1986 statute. In the Ewing decisions, the court held 
that therapists could be held liable if a serious threat to an iden-
tifiable victim was communicated to the therapist by the client 
or by one of the client’s immediate family members and the ther-
apist failed to warn the victim regardless of other protective actions 
taken by the therapist, such as alerting the police. The combined 
effect of these appellate decisions and the revised jury instruc-
tions was that, for a period of several years in California more 
than twenty-five years after Tarasoff	II, failure to meet the duty to 
warn was presumptive proof of negligence.
 In 2007, in response to the decisions in Ewing and Ewing, the 
state legislature was prompted to revisit the 1986 immunity stat-
ute. Although the legislature did insert language clarifying that 
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warning a potential victim was merely one of a set of actions by 
which the duty to protect could be satisfied, they elected to retain 
the phrase “duty to warn and protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92, 
2007). In light of past confusions, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
this attempt at clarification proved insufficient: in 2013, the state 
legislature updated the statute yet again, this time removing the 
phrase “duty to warn” altogether (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92, 2013). 
As part of the 2013 revision, and in order to forestall additional 
misinterpretation, the legislature felt moved to explicitly lay out 
their intent: “It is the intent of the Legislature that the amend-
ments made by the act adding this subdivision only change the 
name of the duty referenced in this section from a duty to warn 
and protect to a duty to protect” (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92(d), 2013). 
 Alongside these legislative actions, the California Judicial 
Council revised the civil jury instructions in 2007 and again in 
2014 to clarify that therapists were not necessarily obligated to 
warn potential victims to discharge their duty to protect. The cu-
mulative effect of these changes to the immunity statute and the 
jury instructions is that if a therapist chooses not to warn, but in-
stead pursues an alternative course of action, their actions must 
be affirmatively proven to have been negligent for the therapist to 
be held personally liable. Still, there remains considerable room 
for interpretation by judges, juries, and clinicians in the current 
statute. As one example, what precisely constitutes a “serious 
threat” of physical violence as opposed to an unserious threat? 
 It is within this shifting and ambiguous landscape that the 
legacy of Tarasoff	v.	Regents	of	the	University	of	California	continues 
to be contested to this day. Alan Stone, the former president of 
the American Psychiatric Association who had lambasted Tara-
soff	II	in 1976, conceded in 1984 that the duty to warn was “not 
as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of psychotherapy as 
it once seemed to critics like myself” (Stone, 1984, p. 181). Yet as 
recently as 2014, Donald Bersoff, himself a former president of the 
American Psychological Association, described Tarasoff	as “per-
haps the most notorious case in mental health law” (Bersoff, 2014, 
p. 461). In insisting that Tarasoff	was “bad law, bad social science, 
and bad social policy,” Bersoff emphasized, as previous critics 
had, that the legal obligations imposed by Tarasoff,	particularly 
obligations to warn third parties, might have the consequence 
of reducing the likelihood that patients would disclose violent 
urges and increasing the likelihood of desistance from therapy, 
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thereby “making it impossible to work through the threat of vio-
lence” (Bersoff, 2014, p. 461). 
 Douglas Mossman (2009) has offered a parallel critique of 
the Tarasoff	doctrine as “a legal mechanism whereby society as-
signs mental health professionals the duty of reducing the risk of 
violence, with the threat of tort liability representing the profes-
sionals’ incentive to accede to the duty” and has argued that vio-
lence prevention through effective psychotherapy, as opposed to 
violence prediction, should be the focus of mental health profes-
sionals (p. 112). Whereas Givelber and colleagues (1984) found 
that clinicians were startlingly confident in their own ability 
to predict violence, there is ample empirical evidence that cli-
nicians’ judgment in this domain is suspect (Large & Nielssen, 
2017; Mossman, 2009). One aspect of Mossman’s (2009) critique 
of Tarasoff	that is particularly striking, yet directly in line with 
the court’s reasoning in Tarasoff	 that therapists have a ‘duty to 
control,’ is that the duty to protect positions mental health pro-
fessionals squarely as agents for social control, which may come 
into conflict with social justice values (see also Gurevitz, 1977).
 What about the functional consequences of Tarasoff? To date, 
no empirical analyses have specifically addressed whether 
acutely homicidal clients who receive and remain engaged in 
therapy are, in fact, less likely to act on their homicidal inten-
tions than similar clients who desist from therapy. It does ap-
pear to be the case, however, that psychosocial interventions 
for violence and aggression can be effective, which supports 
the broader notion that reducing barriers to adequate treatment 
receipt and keeping violent clients engaged in therapy are im-
portant therapeutic goals (McGuire, 2008; O’Brien & Daffern, 
2015; Sher & Rice, 2015). This would seem, in turn, to substan-
tiate Bersoff’s concerns about violent clients avoiding or desist-
ing from therapy because of Tarasoff-related concerns. Unfortu-
nately, there is minimal empirical evidence to assess whether 
Tarasoff has actually affected clients’ engagement in therapy in 
this way.   
 In a recent analysis, Edwards (2010) suggested that duty to 
warn laws may actually increase the rate of homicides, which 
Edwards attributes to mental health professionals being more 
reluctant to provide services to potentially violent clients as a re-
sult of duty to warn obligations and to clients being less willing 
to disclose after becoming aware of the limits to confidentiality. 
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This contention is not in line with Givelber and colleagues’ 
(1984) finding that clinicians who viewed themselves as bound 
by the court’s holding in Tarasoff	did not report being less will-
ing to treat dangerous patients or being more willing to termi-
nate treatment. Moreover, clinicians who viewed themselves 
as legally bound by Tarasoff	were considerably more likely to 
report having taken concrete steps, such as warning potential 
victims and notifying the police, when they deemed their clients 
to be at serious risk of harming another person than clinicians 
who viewed themselves as ethically, but not legally, obligated to 
protect potential victims, suggesting that Tarasoff	was having its 
intended effect of binding clinicians to a duty to protect (Givel-
ber et al., 1984).
 Although the moral-ethical question of whether an increased 
willingness to warn is desirable is ultimately beyond the scope 
of this review, it is interesting to note that, in at least some cases, 
Tarasoff	warnings may unintentionally be leading directly to the 
criminal prosecution of individuals with mental illness in Cali-
fornia. Issuing violent threats is a criminal offense in California, 
and police may opt to pursue criminal charges if such threats 
are brought to their attention (Weiner, 2003). Violence risk as-
sessments conducted by mental health professionals have also 
come to play an increasingly prominent role in multiple aspects 
of the workings of the criminal justice system since the Tara-
soff	decisions were handed down (Buchanan et al., 2012) (for more 
on the ethics of violence risk assessment as it relates to Tarasoff, 
refer to Mossman, 2006). Such cases highlight the delicate and 
occasionally perilous balance that clinicians are forced to strike 
between confidentiality and their obligations to their clients on 
the one hand and their duty to protect on the other, as well as 
the intersection between mental health professionals and law 
enforcement officers in applying Tarasoff. 
 In a similar vein, a survey of police desk sergeants conduct-
ed by Huber and colleagues (2000) in Michigan and South Car-
olina, both of which have duty to warn statutes, found that few-
er than a quarter of the police stations in question had specific 
policies related to Tarasoff	warnings and hardly any of the desk 
sergeants personally had knowledge about the Tarasoff	case, al-
though nearly half reported that their station had received at 
least one such warning from a mental health professional. Huber 
and colleagues also observed considerable variability in desk 
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sergeants’ responses to hypothetical questions (e.g., if a warning 
was received, would the potential victim be notified?), suggest-
ing that not only clinicians, but also law enforcement agencies 
ought to be formulating responses to and raising awareness 
about Tarasoff	(Huber et al., 2000).
 Forty-plus years after Tarasoff	I, if there is one thing on which 
Tarasoff’s proponents and critics agree, it is on the far-ranging im-
pact that Tarasoff	has had on mental health policy. To wit, Douglas 
Mossman (2006) declared that “no court ruling has had a broader 
or more enduring impact on day-to-day mental health practice… .
Thirty years after its promulgation, Tarasoff	remains, to mental 
health professionals, the most influential ruling in mental dis-
ability law” (pp. 524-526). As evidence of its far-reaching effects 
on mental health policy, one need only consider the fact that Tara-
soff	not only motivated corresponding legal action and legislation 
in states across the country, but also shaped thinking about other 
contexts in which health professionals may have a duty to protect 
third parties, such as the controversy surrounding whether phy-
sicians ought to warn the partners of HIV positive patients (for 
a detailed discussion, refer to Burke, 2015). Simultaneously, Tara-
soff	prompted numerous and vigorous discussions of the ethical 
obligations of mental health professionals and reflections on the 
importance of confidentiality as a central tenet of clinical work. 
 With respect to the actual practice and provision of mental 
healthcare in the state of California, Tarasoff, as most recently cod-
ified by California Civil Code § 43.92 (2013), has established that 
mental health professionals do have an affirmative obligation 
to take reasonable steps to protect third parties from a patient’s 
violence behavior, at least in cases in which the patient “has 
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physi-
cal violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims” 
(Cal Civ Code § 43.92(a), 2013). Although this obligation need not 
necessarily entail warning the intended victim, therapists who 
fail to discharge their duty to protect may be held personally 
liable. On the other hand, if, in discharging their duty to protect, 
the therapist does elect to communicate the threat to the victim 
or to a law enforcement agency, they are shielded from liability 
that might otherwise result from the breach of confidentiality. 
 This is the status of the Tarasoff	duty in California today; 
yet, given the number of alterations, both small and large, that 
have been made to the duty to protect in California over the last 
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forty-three years by the courts and the state legislature, it seems 
almost certain that mental health policy in this arena will con-
tinue to evolve over time, necessitating ongoing engagement by 
and education for mental health professionals practicing in the 
state of California, as well as consumers and law enforcement 
agencies.
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 There are approximately 11.3 million undocumented immi-
grants living in the United States (U.S.), representing about 3.5% 
of the total U.S. population (Krogstad & Passel, 2015; Passel, 
Cohn, Krogstad, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2014). About eight mil-
lion undocumented immigrants are part of the U.S. work force, 
making up about 5.1% of the work force in the year 2010 (Krogs-
tad & Passel, 2015). Although the number of undocumented im-
migrants in the U.S. has been stable over the past seven years, 
politicians and the media continue to portray the U.S. as being 
overrun and overwhelmed by undocumented immigrants who 
are criminals, take jobs away from “real” Americans, and are a 
drain on the U.S. economy (Becerra, Androff, Ayón, & Castillo, 
2012; Chavez, 2013). 
 The combination of an increase in fear and distrust of immi-
grants after September 11, 2001, as well as the Great Recession, 
has led to immigrants being used as scapegoats and blamed for 
causing the economic problems in the U.S., as well as a loss of 
traditional American culture (Chavez, 2013). As a result of this 
anti-immigrant rhetoric and fear of immigrants, numerous an-
ti-immigration policies and enforcement strategies have been 
enacted. During President Obama’s Administration, a greater 
emphasis was placed on border enforcement than removals of 
undocumented immigrants from the interior of the U.S. As a 
result, a record number of removals occurred under the Obama 
Administration, while the number of overall deportations de-
creased compared to previous administrations (Chishti, Pierce, 
& Bolter, 2017; Gonzalez-Barrera & Krogstad, 2014). The increase 
in immigration enforcement strategies at the federal level, as 
well as the implementation of restrictive immigration policies 
in several states, have negatively impacted immigrant commu-
nities in the U.S. (Arbona et el., 2010; Capps, Castaneda, Chau-
dry, & Santos, 2007; Hacker et al., 2011). 
 Americans perceive Latinos as often being subjected to dis-
crimination. Previous studies have found that perceived and 
experienced discrimination are related to negative health out-
comes including stress, anxiety, and depression (Edwards & 
Romero, 2008; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014). 
The current Trump administration’s immigration policies may 
serve to exacerbate the negative impact immigration policies 
and enforcement strategies have on Latino immigrant commu-
nities. As a result, Latino immigrants who viewed immigration 
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policies and enforcement strategies as discriminatory during 
the Obama Administration (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, & Motel, 
2011) may continue to view Trump’s policies as discriminatory 
as well. 
 Immigrants come to the U.S. with great optimism in search 
of increased freedoms and economic opportunities in order to 
provide better lives for themselves and their families (Raleigh 
& Kao, 2010). Unfortunately, Latinos, especially undocumented 
Latinos, may experience discrimination once in the U.S. because 
of the negative social and political discourse surrounding Lati-
no immigrants. Immigration policies and enforcement strate-
gies, which many perceive to discriminate against Latinos, may 
also negatively impact the hope and optimism of Latino immi-
grants living in the U.S. (Becerra, Androff, Cimino, Wagaman, 
& Blanchard, 2013).  
 Although anti-immigrant sentiment exists throughout the 
country, for over 15 years, Arizona has been at the center of re-
strictive immigration policies and enforcement strategies that 
specifically target Latino immigrants. Arizona has a popula-
tion of 6.9 million residents with over 2.1 million Latinos (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2016). Given the increased focus on immigrants 
and immigration enforcement by the Trump administration, 
as well as Arizona’s long history of anti-immigrant policies, it 
is important to examine the impact of immigration policies on 
Latino immigrants. The purpose of this study is to contribute to 
the knowledge base and existing literature by examining how 
perceived discrimination in the context of the recent immigra-
tion policies and enforcement strategies impacts participants’ 
lives and their confidence in a better future. 
Theoretical Framework
 This study utilizes the legal violence theoretical framework 
(Menjivar & Abrego, 2012). Violence is often defined as action 
motivated by the intent to cause harm (Jackman, 2002). How-
ever, violence can also have non-physical impacts such as loss 
of earnings, imprisonment, stigmatization, and exclusion, as 
well as negative psychological outcomes such as fear, anxiety, 
shame, and low self-esteem (Jackman, 2002). Structural violence 
describes how social structures can cause harm and negative 
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outcomes to certain populations, such as poverty and inequality 
(Farmer, 2003). 
 Legal violence builds upon the definitions of violence and 
structural violence to examine the impacts of laws and policies, 
which themselves are violent in their intention to cause legal 
harm with their immediate and long-term consequences. As 
Menjivar and Abrego (2012) argue, current federal, state, and 
local immigration policies, “…seek to punish the behaviors of 
undocumented immigrants but at the same time pushes them 
to spaces outside of the law” which makes undocumented im-
migrants accountable to the laws in the U.S., without legal pro-
tections or rights (p. 1385). Therefore, using the legal violence 
framework in this study enables the examination of the impact 
of restrictive immigration policies and enforcement strategies 
on Latino immigrants. 
Anti-Immigrant Policies
 The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor-
hoods Act, introduced as Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB1070), was 
signed into law on April 23, 2010 (Arizona State Legislature 
[ASL], 2010). It is considered one of the most punitive immigra-
tion policies enacted by any state in recent history (Archibold, 
2010). It effectively criminalized undocumented immigrants, 
making it a state crime (a misdemeanor) to not carry proof of 
legal residence and requiring law enforcement to detain any-
one they “reasonably suspect” to be undocumented and ask for 
proof of legal immigrant status. It also allows any resident of 
the state to sue authorities if they fail to enforce the law (ASL, 
2010). It further contained provisions penalizing state trespass-
ing and human smuggling, as well as the hiring, harboring or 
transporting of undocumented immigrants (National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2014). 
  SB1070 created a great deal national and international con-
troversy. Nevertheless, SB1070 had an impact on immigration 
legislation all over the country, as many other states adopted 
similar strategies to address the issue of immigration within 
their jurisdictions (NCSL, 2014). Since 2010, policies modeled af-
ter SB1070 were considered by the legislatures of about a dozen 
states, but only 5 states enacted them into laws: Alabama’s HB 
56, Georgia’s HB 87, Indiana’s SB 590, South Carolina’s SB 20 and 
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Utah’s HB 497 (NCSL, 2014). Since their passage, each of these 
laws has been contested in court and several of their provisions 
have been partially or totally blocked (NCSL, 2012). 
 Although those restrictive state immigration policies were 
blocked by the courts, President Trump was elected in large 
part for his anti-immigration rhetoric. Once elected, President 
Trump signed an executive order to begin construction of a 
border wall between the U.S. and Mexico, punish sanctuary 
cities, and speed up the deportation process of undocumented 
immigrants, all of which may contribute to increased fear and 
anxiety in Latino immigrant communities. President Trump’s 
focus on immigration enforcement and deportations has led to 
community raids, immigration detentions, and deportations. In 
February 2017, U.S. immigration officials raided homes across 
six states and arrested hundreds of immigrants, many with no 
criminal records (Rein, Hauslohner, & Somashekhar, 2017). The 
first few months of the Trump administration have led to an 
almost 33% increase in immigration arrests (Sands, 2017).
Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric
 Anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies to regulate immigra-
tion have been a part of American politics and public discourse 
since the first waves of immigrants arrived in the 19th centu-
ry (Katel, 2005). American attitudes towards immigrants, both 
authorized and undocumented, have been inconsistent over 
time, sometimes welcoming the contribution of immigrants to 
society, and at other times fearing that immigrant communi-
ties could have a negative impact on the country (Androff et 
al., 2011). Negative attitudes towards immigrants often revolved 
around fears that these groups would not assimilate to Ameri-
can society, which would erode the traditional cultural heritage 
of the country, or cause divisiveness and social conflict (Hun-
tington, 2004). Historically, anti-immigrant rhetoric often took 
overtly racist undertones that emphasized a fear that newcom-
ers might change American culture for the worse (Massey & 
Pren, 2012a). 
 Political groups that lobby against illegal immigration justify 
their position on the perceived negative consequences that undoc-
umented immigration brings to this country. Although empirical 
research has shown these positions to be largely incorrect, one of 
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their most common concerns is that undocumented immigrants 
hurt the economy by taking away jobs from American citizens or 
by accepting lower wages, thereby increasing unemployment lev-
els or decreasing household incomes, particularly among Amer-
icans who work in the low wage sectors of the economy (Becerra 
et al., 2012; Federation for American Immigration Reform [FAIR], 
2013a). Moreover, anti-immigrant politicians and activists incor-
rectly claim that the cost of providing public services (e.g., educa-
tion, emergency healthcare, or housing) to undocumented immi-
grant families is a significant drain on government budgets and 
diminishes the quality of the services provided to legal residents 
(Camarota, 2004; Congressional Budget Office, 2007; FAIR, 2013b; 
McDowell & Provine, 2013).
 Other anti-immigrant politicians and activists claim that 
undocumented immigration is inherently wrong because it is 
illegal and constitutes a crime (Androff et al., 2011). Some go 
even further, arguing that undocumented immigration is tied 
with other forms of illegal activity and organized crime, such 
as drug and sex trafficking, which eventually results in high-
er crime rates on American soil (Civitas Institute, 2014; Katel, 
2005). Hence, they view the increase of undocumented immi-
grants as a threat to public safety. Indeed, in its most extreme 
forms, anti-immigrant rhetoric “demonizes and dehuman-
izes” immigrants, promoting public animosity against them 
(Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2014).
Consequences of Anti-Immigrant
Policies and Rhetoric
How	Policies	and	Rhetoric	Impact	Perceived	Discrimination
  Undocumented immigrants are already marginalized from 
mainstream society due to their immigration status (Massey & 
Pren, 2012b). They live in social environments where they are 
often stigmatized, portrayed as deviant, and used as scapegoats 
to be blamed for numerous social problems (Sullivan & Rehm, 
2005). They may be called derogatory names (Southern Poverty 
Law Center [SPLC], 2007), sexually harassed (Fussell, 2011) or 
physically assaulted (SPLC, 2007). 
 Discrimination may also manifest itself in unfair or abusive 
treatment, as employers and others may exploit the immigrants’ 
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legal status to violate their civil, labor or human rights (Fussell, 
2011; SPLC, 2010; Sullivan & Rehm, 2005). In addition, awareness 
of anti-immigrant policies such as SB1070 has been found to be 
positively related to perceived discrimination from law enforce-
ment authorities, and this relationship was not moderated by im-
migrant generation (Santos, Menjívar, & Godfrey, 2013). 
 Anti-immigrant rhetoric inevitably affects the socio-politi-
cal climate in the communities where undocumented families 
reside (Trujillo & Paluck, 2012), exacerbating the stigmatization 
and discrimination that affect the lives of undocumented immi-
grants (Ayón & Becerra, 2013; Capps et al., 2007). Even when an-
ti-immigrant laws are not enforced or when they are redundant 
to existing laws, “the symbolism in the passage of these laws is 
potent enough to influence behaviors, perceptions, and a sense 
of self among those affected (directly and indirectly)” (Santos 
et al., 2013, p. 81). Moreover, those affected by anti-immigrant 
climates are not limited to undocumented immigrants them-
selves. Family members and friends, both documented and un-
documented, often experience the fear of having a loved one 
deported (Santos et al., 2013). 
Impact of Perceived Discrimination on Latinos 
Adult	Physical	and	Mental	Health	
 The relationship between discrimination and health is well 
documented in the research literature. In a meta-analysis of 
studies that assessed the relationship between perceived dis-
crimination and health outcomes, discrimination was associat-
ed with negative physical and mental health outcomes among 
diverse ethnic groups (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). In epi-
demiological studies with nationally representative samples of 
Latino adults, higher levels of perceived discrimination have 
been associated with deleterious mental health consequences, 
including higher incidence of depressive symptoms (Leung, 
LaChapelle, Scinta, & Olvera, 2014); substance abuse (Otiniano 
Verissimo, Gee, Ford, & Iguchi, 2014); PTSD (Pole, Best, Metsler, 
& Marmar, 2005); and suicidal ideation and suicide attempts 
(Perez-Rodriguez et al., 2014). 
 In a national study of adults, greater perceptions of dis-
crimination were related to 12-month and lifetime anxiety and 
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depressive disorders, whereas lower perceptions of discrim-
ination were related to lower risk of lifetime substance-relat-
ed disorders (Leong, Park, & Kalibatseva, 2013). Among Lati-
no immigrant parents, discrimination was associated with a 
higher number of depressive symptoms, even after adjusting 
for social support and immigration-related stressors (Ornelas 
& Pereira, 2011). Moreover, discrimination may be one of the 
mechanisms that explains the increased relationship between 
time in the U.S. and risk of psychiatric disorders among Lati-
no immigrants (Cook, Alegria, Lin, & Guo, 2009). Among Lati-
na immigrants, higher levels of discrimination were related to 
lower self-esteem (Panchanadeswaran & Dawson, 2011), greater 
acculturation stress (Bekteshi & van Hook, 2015), and lower use 
of healthcare services (Sanchez-Birkhead, Kennedy, Callister, & 
Miyamoto, 2010). 
 Discrimination has also been related to negative physical 
health outcomes, such as a higher incidence of chronic condi-
tions (Molina & Simon, 2013); pregnancy distress; lower infant 
birth weight (Earnshaw et al., 2013); lower self-rated physi-
cal health (Molina, Alegría, & Mahalingam, 2013), and worse 
health-related quality of life (Otiniano & Gee, 2011). Moreover, 
discrimination-related stress experienced by Latino immi-
grants has been found to be associated with disease risk factors, 
including elevated systolic blood pressure, reduced immune 
function (McClure et al., 2010), obesity, and higher fasting glu-
cose levels (McClure et al., 2009).
Children, Youth and Families
 In a systematic review of the literature of the impact of 
discrimination on children and youth, perceived racism was 
associated with negative mental health outcomes in most of 
the studies reviewed (Priest et al., 2013). Among Latino youth, 
perceived discrimination is associated with lower self-esteem 
(Smokowski, Rose, & Bacallao, 2009), as well as a higher inci-
dence of negative mental health outcomes, including substance 
use (Unger, Schwartz, Huh, Soto, & Baezconde-Garbanati, 2014), 
depressive symptoms (Chithambo, Huey, & Cespedes-Knadle, 
2014), and problem behaviors (Bogart et al., 2013). Discrimina-
tion also increased Latino adolescents’ risk of suffering PTSD, 
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even after adjusting for exposure to traumatic events (Perreira 
& Ornelas, 2013).
 The current social and political climate regarding Latino im-
migrants, as well as the new wave of immigration policies and en-
forcement strategies, both nationally and in Arizona, warrant fur-
ther examination of the impact of perceived discrimination among 
Latinos in the context of the current anti-immigrant climate.
Methods
Sample
 After gaining approval from the institutional review board 
of the authors’ university, data for this study were collected in 
the summer and fall of 2014 from a sample of 213 adult Latino im-
migrant respondents living in Arizona (See Table 1). Participants 
were recruited through social service agencies, churches, and 
faith-based organizations throughout Maricopa County. Partic-
ipants completed questionnaires in English or Spanish, depend-
ing on their language preference. There were 72 (33.8%) males, 
and 141 (66.2%) females. The mean age was 38; over 58% of the 
participants had less than a high school diploma/GED; and 53.1% 
reported their current financial situation as “average.”
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Table 1: Demographics
N
48
24
25
65
28
23
141
72
12
47
113
36
5
3
15
24
17
43
22
50
39
11
22
59
93
28
Variability
Age (years)
 18–25
 26–30
 31–35
 36–45
 46–55
 56 and older
Gender
 Female
 Male
Socioeconomic Status
 Very Bad
 Bad
 Average
 Good
 Very Good
Education
 None
 Some Elementary School
 Elementary School
 Some Middle School
 Middle School
 Some High School
 High School
 More than High School
Years in the U.S.
 Less than 5 years
 6–10
 11–15
 16–25
 More than 26 years
Percent (%)
22.5
11.3
11.7
30.5
13.2
10.3
66.2
33.8
5.6
22.1
53.1
16.9
2.3
1.4
7.0
11.3
8.0
20.2
10.3
23.5
18.3
5.2
10.3
27.7
43.7
13.1
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Measures
 Independent variables. The participants self-reported their 
gender, age, socioeconomic status, highest level of education, 
and years living in the U.S.. Perceived discrimination was mea-
sured using the Perceived	 Discrimination	 in	 the	 U.S.	 (PDIUS)	
scale, a 6-item scale that has been used in previous studies with 
Latino populations and has demonstrated good psychometric 
properties (Becerra, 2012; Becerra, Gurrola, & Wagaman, 2015). 
The PDIUS uses Likert responses (1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Dis-
agree, 3= Agree, 4= Strongly Agree) (See Table 2). The scale is 
composed of questions such as “Mexican immigrants are treat-
ed badly by people in the U.S.”; “Laws in the U.S. discriminate 
against Mexican immigrants”; and “Businesses in the U.S. dis-
criminate against Mexican immigrants.” Scores for the scale 
could range from 6 to 24, with higher scores indicating higher 
levels of perceived discrimination in the U.S. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the PDIUS in the current study was .81, with a mean 
score of 17.10 (SD = 4.20). 
 A principal components analysis (varimax rotation) was 
conducted to explore content validity. The analysis revealed 
that all 6 items emerged on one component with an eigenvalue 
of 1.0 or greater, which accounted for 57.04% of the standardized 
variance. Component loadings ranged from .70 to .87, and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
was .81. Rotation was not possible given that only one compo-
nent was identified. 
 Dependent variables. Participants were asked to respond to 
four statements regarding the impact of immigration policies on 
their lives. The statements they were asked to respond to were, 
“As a result of the current immigration policies: 1) I avoid immi-
gration officials; 2) My family has suffered; 3) My friends have 
suffered.” The response options were 1 = Strongly Disagree to 
5 = Strongly Agree. In addition, the participants were asked to 
respond to four questions regarding the impact of immigration 
policies on their confidence in a better future. Participants were 
asked to respond to the following questions: “As a result of the 
current immigration policies how much confidence do you have 
in a 1) better future for yourself?, 2) better future for your fami-
ly?, 3) better future for you children?, and 4) better future for the 
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children of today?” The response options were 1 = Very little 
confidence to 4 = A great deal of confidence. 
Analysis
 This study analyzed how recent immigration policies im-
pact participants’ perceptions of discrimination, as well as the 
impact on their lives and their confidence in a better future. 
Specifically, seven sets of ordinary least squares (OLS) linear re-
gression models were run to examine the relationship between 
perceived discrimination in the context of recent immigration 
policies and: (1) participants avoiding immigration officials; (2) 
suffering of the family; (3) suffering of friends; (4) confidence in 
a better future for themselves; (5) confidence their families will 
have a better future; (6) confidence their children will have a 
better future; and (7) confidence in a better future for the chil-
dren of today. All models control for gender, age, socioeconomic 
status (SES), highest level of education, and years in the U.S.
Results
 As seen in Table 2, model 1 [χ2(6, n = 207)= 31.199, p < .001], 
the participants were asked to respond to the following state-
ment: “As a result of the current immigration policies I avoid 
immigration officials.” The response options were 1 = Strongly 
Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The results indicated a signif-
icant and negative relationship between higher socioeconomic 
status (SES) levels and reporting avoiding immigration officials 
(B = -.033, CI(95%) = -.066, -.001, p < .05). In addition, participants 
with greater perceived discrimination reported avoiding immi-
gration officials (B = .162, CI(95%) = .128, .197, p < .001). 
 In model 2 [χ2(6, n = 207)= 22.913, p < .001], the participants 
were asked to respond to the following statement “As a result of 
the current immigration policies my family has suffered.” The 
results indicated a significant and positive relationship between 
greater perceived discrimination and participants reporting 
that their families have suffered (B = .403, CI(95%) = .251, .556, p < 
.001). In model 3 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 22.862, p < .001], the participants 
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result of 
the current immigration policies my friends have suffered.” The 
results indicated a significant and positive relationship between 
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a greater perceived discrimination and participants reporting 
that their friends have suffered (B = .404, CI(95%) = .252, .556, p 
< .001). 
As a result 
of recent 
immigration 
policies…
I Avoid Immigration 
Officials
My Family Has Suffered My Friends Have
Suffered
B CI (95%) B CI (95%) B CI (95%)
Gender .026
(.099)
-.170 .222 .025
(.093)
-.159 .208 -.025
(.093)
-.159 .208
Age -.009
(.057)
-.121 .103 -.018
(.053)
-.121 .086 -.018
(.053)
-.122 .086
SES -.033*
(.017)
-.066 .000 .021
(.016)
-.010 .052 .020
(.016)
-.011 .050
Education -.020
.066
-.150 .110 .050
(.062)
-.072 .172 .052
(.062)
-.076 .174
Year in US .084
(.070)
-.055 .222 -.085
(.066)
-.045 .215 .089
(.066)
-.040 .219
Perceived 
Discrimina-
tion
.162*
(.082)
.128 .197 .403***
(.077)
.251 .555 .404***
(.077)
.252 .556
R² .570 .490 .489
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p < .001
Standard errors in parenthesis
Gender (male = 0, female = 1)
Table 2
 As seen in Table 3, model 1 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 25.741 p < .001], 
the participants were asked to respond to the following ques-
tion: “As a result of the current immigration policies, how much 
confidence do you have in a better future for yourself?” The re-
sponse options were 1 = Very little confidence to 4 = A great deal 
of confidence. The results indicated a significant and positive re-
lationship between being female (B = 1.023, CI(95%) = .791, 1.254, 
p < .001), having a higher SES (B = .565, CI(95%) = .136, .994, p < 
.01), and a greater number of years in the U.S. (B = .867, CI(95%) = 
.636, 1.097, p < .001), with reporting greater confidence in a better 
future. In addition, participants with greater perceived discrim-
ination reported having significantly less confidence in a better 
future for themselves (B = -.668 CI(95%) = -.962, -.374, p < .001). 
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In model 2 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 38.876, p < .001], the participants were 
asked to respond to the following question: “As a result of the 
current immigration policies, how much confidence do you 
have that your family will have a better future?” The results 
indicated a significant and positive relationship between being 
female (B = 6.716, CI(95%) = 3.697, 9.734, p < .001), and having a 
greater number of years in the U.S. (B = .558, CI(95%) = .356, .759, 
p < .001). In addition, the results indicated that participants with 
greater perceived discrimination were significantly less likely 
to express confidence that their families will have better futures 
(B = -.901, CI(95%) = -1.158, -.644, p < .001). 
 In model 3 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 10.813, p > .001], the participants 
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result of 
the current immigration policies, how much confidence do you 
have that your children will have a better future?” The results 
indicated that female participants (B = 7.485, CI(95%) = 3.247, 
11.724, p < .001) and participants who had a greater number of 
years in the U.S. (B = .647, CI(95%) = .364, .930, p < .01) were sig-
nificantly more likely to express confidence that their children 
will have better futures. Participants who reported greater per-
ceived discrimination were significantly less likely to express 
confidence that their children will have better futures (B = -.712, 
CI(95%) = -1.073, .351, p < .001). 
 In model 4 [χ2(6, n = 207) = 21.057, p > .001], the participants 
were asked to respond to the following statement: “As a result 
of the current immigration policies, how much confidence do 
you have that the children of today will have a better future?” 
The results indicated that females (B = 4.857, CI(95%) = 1.331, 
8.383, p < .01), older participants, (B = .295, CI(95%) = .100, .490, 
p < .01), participants with higher levels of education, (B = 1.511, 
CI(95%) = .526, 2.496, p < .01), and participants with more years 
living in the U.S. (B = .370, CI(95%) = .134, .605, p < .01) were 
significantly more likely to express confidence that the children 
of today will have a better future. Participants with greater per-
ceived discrimination were significantly less likely to express 
confidence that the children of today will have better futures (B 
= -1.329, CI(95%) = -1.629, -1.028, p < .001). 
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Discussion
 The results of this study contribute to the understanding of 
the relationship between recent immigration policies and per-
ceptions of discrimination among Latino immigrants. Although 
this study had a relatively small sample size, the sample is of a 
hard-to-reach population; since many of the harsh immigration 
policies and enforcement strategies originate in Arizona, exam-
ining the impact of increased immigration enforcement is espe-
cially important. 
 The results of this study align with the legal violence frame-
work (Menjivar & Abrego, 2012) because this study examined 
the impacts of immigration laws and policies, and found that 
these laws are violent in that they intentionally cause legal 
harm with their immediate and long-term consequences. This 
study found that reporting higher levels of perceived discrimi-
nation was significantly related with avoidance of immigration 
officials as well as with higher levels of perceived suffering of 
family members and friends. In addition, the results indicated 
a significant relationship between participants with higher lev-
els of perceived discrimination and lower confidence in a bet-
ter future for the individual participants, for their families, for 
their children, and for the children of the future. These findings 
support previous research findings on the harmful effects of 
discrimination on Latino communities, including: a weakened 
sense of identity; increased levels of stress; worsened physical 
and mental health; socioeconomic difficulties; isolation from 
police; and withdrawal from communities, as a result of recent 
immigration policies (Capps et al., 2007; Chaudry et al., 2010; 
Hacker et al., 2011; Roehling, Hernandez Jarvis, Sprik, & Camp-
bell, 2010; Santos et al., 2013; Theodore & Habans, 2016). 
 Consistent with prior studies, Latino immigrants with great-
er perceived discrimination reported avoiding immigration of-
ficials, which may indicate that there is a lack of trust between 
immigration and law enforcement agencies and Latino immi-
grant communities (Barreto & Segura, 2011; Messing, Becerra, 
Ward-Lasher, & Androff, 2015). The high-profile case of Guada-
lupe Garcia de Rayos, who checked in with immigration officials 
as she had for over 20 years, but was detained and ultimately 
deported, may cause Latino immigrants to further avoid immi-
gration officials. Such avoidance and distrust has not only led to 
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a fear and unwillingness to report crimes and share information 
with policing agencies, but there is also the potential negative 
impact on law enforcement officers’ ability to properly perform 
their duties if effective police-community relations cannot be es-
tablished (Barreto & Segura, 2011; Becerra, Wagaman, Androff, 
Messing, & Castillo, 2017; Theodore & Habans, 2016). 
 Furthermore, a sense of safety is diminished if a victim of 
crime, regardless of immigration status, is unwilling to report 
the crime for fear that they or their loved ones will be targeted as 
a result of their immigration status. For example, women who are 
victims of domestic violence have dropped their cases or failed 
to appear in court for fear of detention and deportation (Glenn, 
2017). Instead of the desired effect of feeling safer with increased 
law enforcement involvement in communities, individuals feel 
less safe (Hardy et al., 2012; Theodore & Habans, 2016). 
 This study also found that reporting greater perceived dis-
crimination was significantly related to having lower confi-
dence in a better future for the individual, for their family, for 
their children, and for the children of today. These findings are 
important to consider, because immigrants come to the U.S. 
with great optimism in search of increased freedoms and eco-
nomic opportunities in order to provide better lives for them-
selves and their families (Raleigh & Kao, 2010), and losing hope 
and optimism for the future can have negative implications. 
Lower levels of hope and optimism have been found to have 
negative health implications (Bryant & Cvengros 2004; Yarches-
ki, Scoloveno, & Mahon, 1994). These negative health outcomes 
are exacerbated when a loss of hope and optimism are com-
bined with higher levels of perceived discrimination and a fear 
of deportation due to immigration status (Finch & Vega, 2003). 
The current anti-immigration policies and increased immigra-
tion enforcement strategies, including raids, detentions, and de-
portations, may create further mental health issues for Latinos 
living in the United States.
 Considering the heterogeneity existing among Latino immi-
grants, this study included several control variables that have re-
ceived limited attention in the literature examining perceptions 
of discrimination among Latino immigrants (Araújo & Borrell, 
2006; McClure et al., 2010; Molina & Simon, 201X; Otiniano et al., 
2014). In one model, having a higher socioeconomic status was 
related to a lesser likelihood of avoiding immigration officials, 
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and in another model, being female was related to greater belief 
in a better future. In regard to the former, higher socioeconomic 
status and avoiding immigration officials, despite the prevail-
ing social and political rhetoric that Latino immigrants and 
their children do not acculturate to the U.S., the results of this 
study support the notion that a growing proportion of Latino 
immigrants are achieving traditional American indicators of 
middle class status, such as incomes above the median, home-
ownership and employment in higher-paying occupations, 
which then leads to more positive outlooks on the future. In this 
sense, with increased social, political, economic, legal, and cul-
tural capital, Latino immigrants of higher socioeconomic status 
may be less fearful of avoiding immigration officials. 
 Being female and having more positive outlooks for a better 
future may indicate that the gender roles and power structures 
of Latino immigrants may shift once in the U.S. The effects of 
this empowerment can create a ripple effect, influencing great-
er personal autonomy and independence that enhances their 
spatial mobility and access to valuable social and economic re-
sources that can increase their confidence in theirs and their 
children’s immediate and future health and wellbeing (Pessar, 
2003). These results confirm the complexities that other studies 
have noted when investigating the relationship between dis-
crimination and health while accounting for the mechanisms of 
socioeconomic status (Araújo & Borrell, 2006; Molina & Simon, 
201) and gender (McClure et al., 2010; Otiniano et al., 2014). Giv-
en these findings, as well as the heterogeneity that exists among 
Latino immigrants, future research should examine the various 
characteristics and differences that exist between Latino immi-
grants and their perceptions of recent immigration policies, dis-
crimination, and confidence in a better future. 
Limitations
 In this study, there are several notable limitations that need 
to be acknowledged. Participants were only recruited from the 
state of Arizona; therefore, the results cannot be generalized 
to the larger Latino immigrant population beyond this sam-
ple. Thus, findings should be interpreted in the context of this 
study. The findings from this study were based on self-reported 
data, which restricts the ability to establish causal relationships. 
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Self-reported data also only included reports on perceptions of 
discrimination and confidence for a better future, but not actu-
al behaviors. The present study included asking questions that 
were not specific in differentiating aspects of a better future. 
Further studies examining the relationship between perceived 
discrimination in the context of recent immigration policies 
should gather more information on what is meant by a better 
future in addition to strengthening design methods that can go 
beyond perceptions to measures that capture behaviors. 
Implications	for	Policy	and	Practice
 The intersectionality between individual wellbeing and 
community engagement must be taken into account when de-
veloping effective interventions to serve those affected by recent 
immigration laws. Findings from this study, along with past lit-
erature, indicate the need for social workers to intervene with 
and on behalf of Latino immigrants and communities in the 
U.S. (Leong et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2013). Given the established 
literature on the effects of discrimination on individuals, fam-
ilies, groups, and communities, it is crucial that social workers 
and policy makers stand against policies that are discriminato-
ry. An inclusive environment can start with adopting cultural 
and institutional norms, policies and practices that are welcom-
ing and protect immigrants. Evaluating and understanding the 
impact of current immigration policies is pertinent for social 
workers working with Latino immigrants on an individual lev-
el and also at a systemic level. 
 The racial and discriminatory undertones of immigration 
policies perpetuate institutional systems of oppression and 
work against the core values of social work. Thus, social work 
professionals should continue to be vehemently engaged with 
communities on the ground level, as well as be involved with 
debates at the policy level. Social workers should collaborate 
with advocacy groups, think tanks, healthcare professionals, 
law enforcement, politicians, and other stakeholders to create 
immigration policy solutions that are grounded in social justice 
and human rights values. Instead of promoting legislation such 
as SB1070, more emphasis should be placed on policies like the 
DREAM Act. 
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 While working toward immigration policy solutions is val-
id, social workers should also educate members of the commu-
nity on the harmful impacts of existing immigration policies 
and/or the development and implementation of economically 
viable and politically feasible immigration policies. Social work-
ers should partner with immigration attorneys or other organi-
zations in assisting individuals in understanding their rights, 
especially in encounters with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system. 
 Social workers can also play an important role in training 
health and human service personnel and law enforcement per-
sonnel in working with Latino immigrants to improve com-
munity-police relations. Doing so will not only empower indi-
viduals to seek help if they become victims of crime, but also 
improve the safety in communities by protecting the ability 
to report criminal activity. The aim of this study was to con-
tribute to the existing literature by analyzing the impact recent 
immigration policies have on perception of discrimination and 
confidence in a better future among a sample of adult Latino 
immigrants in Arizona. We hope the findings from this study 
can serve as a foundation for future studies as well as a call to 
action for social workers, policymakers, health and human ser-
vice personnel, and law enforcement personnel to stand against 
discriminatory immigration policies.
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This study investigates whether and how support for welfare state ar-
rangements for the old relate to the stereotypes of the young and the old 
within	society.	It	is	hypothesized	that	the	social	status	that	these	groups	
have	in	society	affect	these	attitudes	through	different	mechanisms,	re-
lating	 to	 the	 deservingness	 criteria	 that	 citizens	 apply.	An	 empirical	
analysis	of	Round	4	of	the	European	Social	Survey	(including	50,009	in-
dividuals	from	29	European	countries)	shows	that:	(1)	the	social	esteem	
of	people	over	70	predicts	support	for	welfare	state	arrangements	for	the	
old;	and	(2)	the	social	esteem	of	people	in	their	20s	has	a	moderate	effect	
on	support	for	these	arrangements.	Hence,	there	is	 little	support	for	a	
generational	conflict.
Key words: population aging, welfare state arrangements for the old, age 
stereotypes, international comparison
 Most countries experience population aging (Lutz, Sand-
erson, & Scherbov, 2008). This demographic development can 
have societal consequences, and many have argued that the 
changing age composition of countries will have an impact 
on the welfare state in the near future (Castles, 2004; Galasso, 
2006). Oftentimes, this expectation focuses on the financial ba-
sis of the welfare state, since funding welfare state provisions 
becomes more difficult as the share of the population that de-
pends on it increases, while the relative number of contributors 
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decreases. Whereas the issues concerning the financial basis are 
highly relevant for the sustainability of the welfare state, pop-
ulation aging may also have social and political consequences, 
as it can ignite a potential conflict between different generations 
(Walker, 1990), which may be particularly the case if social pro-
visions are unequally distributed across age groups (Ozawa & 
Lee, 2011).
 This conflict between the young and the old may not only 
affect the ability of citizens to support each other, which is 
part of the financial sustainability of the welfare state, but also 
their willingness to do that, which reflects the social and po-
litical support required to sustain the welfare state (De Beer & 
Koster, 2009). If aging really intensifies the generational conflict, 
it should be particularly visible with regard to age-related wel-
fare state arrangements benefiting either the young or the old. 
Given that it is likely that the process of aging implies that a 
larger share of the population becomes dependent on such ar-
rangements, from a welfare state sustainability point of view it 
is particularly interesting to investigate welfare state arrange-
ments for the old. The present study addresses this issue. 
 The question of whether and why people support certain 
welfare state arrangements has been extensively studied in the 
field of welfare state attitudes (Svallfors, 2012). Although a lot 
of these studies focus on attitudes towards the welfare state 
in general, these mechanisms and conditions also provide an-
swers to the question why individuals would be in favor of spe-
cific provisions, such as arrangements for the old. The different 
perspectives that these studies have on welfare state attitudes 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in many cases they 
complement each other, leading to the following insights. 
 First, there are theories that mainly emphasize characteristics 
of the benefactor by investigating how individual factors such as 
self-interest, altruism, and people’s ideological positions relate 
to welfare state attitudes (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 
1997; Van Oorschot, 2002). The second set of theories focuses 
on the characteristics	of	the	beneficiaries by looking at the impact 
of factors such as deservingness criteria, beliefs about needi-
ness, and perceived levels of misuse of welfare state provisions 
on attitudes towards welfare state arrangements (Gilens, 1995, 
1999; Halleröd, 2004; Van Oorschot, 2006). A third approach ex-
plains welfare state attitudes by taking the relationship between 
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citizens	and	the	government into account, for example by focusing 
on levels of institutional trust and legitimacy in relation to wel-
fare state attitudes (Bay & Pedersen, 2006; Edlund, 2006; Levi 
& Stoker, 2000; Pettersen, 2002). And, a fourth set of theories 
examines how conditions in the social	context, such as welfare 
state regimes, social structures, and national level conditions 
affect welfare state attitudes and solidarity (Andress & Heien, 
2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1993; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; 
Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; Jæger, 2006; Janmaat & Braun, 2009; 
Koster & Kaminska, 2012; Larsen, 2008; Lipsmeyer & Nord-
strom, 2003; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009).
 Based on these prior studies, an explanation of people’s at-
titudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old includes 
factors such as the age of respondents (reflecting self-interest 
explanations), the opinion about elderly people (reflecting de-
servingness criteria), the extent to which people believe that 
the government can overcome generational conflicts (reflecting 
institutional trust), and the age composition of the country (re-
flecting relative positions of the young and the old). Together, 
these explanations provide a relatively complete picture of the 
conditions influencing attitudes towards welfare state arrange-
ments for the old. 
 Nevertheless, there is one part of the explanation that re-
ceived very little attention in the literature on welfare state at-
titudes. Taking into account that contributions to welfare state 
arrangements produce a collective good (Hart & Cowhey, 1977; 
Olson, 1971), the question is how support for such goods de-
pends on the relationship between the benefactors (the contrib-
utors). The literature about collective action acknowledges that 
the willingness to contribute to a collective good is related to 
the interdependence of the actors involved (e.g., Oliver, 1984) 
and this notion may be relevant for the explanation of welfare 
state attitudes, as well.
 Before theorizing how interdependence among benefactors 
affects attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old, 
one conceptual difference between the two research traditions 
should be clarified. Studies of collective action tend to concen-
trate on goods that benefit the whole group, meaning that they 
focus on situations of two-sided solidarity where benefactors 
and beneficiaries are not necessarily clearly distinguished (De 
Beer & Koster, 2009; Hechter, 1987). Welfare states, however, 
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also provide arrangements that do distinguish benefactors 
from beneficiaries, especially if those provisions benefit specific 
groups. This means that both one-sided and two-sided solidar-
ity are important in the production of such a collective good. 
What is more, welfare state provisions can be conceptualized as 
a combination of solidarity between different groups, namely 
(1) solidarity between the benefactors and the beneficiaries and 
(2) solidarity among the benefactors that produce the collective 
good (De Swaan, 1988). 
 Since the issue concerning solidarity between benefactors 
and beneficiaries has been addressed extensively in previous 
studies, the focus in the present study is on the second issue: 
the level of solidarity among the benefactors. It does so by ad-
vancing and testing a model that is closely related to the one 
presented by Rothstein (2001). In Rothstein’s model, support for 
the welfare state is conceived of as a combination of two social 
dilemma situations that the individual citizen faces, namely 
one dilemma concerning the trustworthiness of the govern-
ment (revolving around the question: “will the state deliver 
what it promised?”), and one concerning the trustworthiness of 
all other citizens (where the individual tries to answer the ques-
tion: “will fellow citizens contribute and not misuse the provi-
sions?”) (p. 222). The model presented in this study argues that 
the second dilemma in fact consists of two separate dilemma 
situations by making a distinction between groups of benefac-
tors and beneficiaries. In research about welfare state attitudes, 
this particular aspect of welfare state arrangements remained 
largely implicit.
 This analysis aims at extending the existing literature on 
welfare state attitudes, both theoretically and empirically. The 
first section develops a social esteem theory of solidarity to un-
derstand attitudes towards welfare state arrangements for the 
old. This theory is grounded in theories of collective action, 
assuming bounded rational actors that do not make their de-
cision in isolation but are influenced by the choices of others. 
These individuals are, for example, affected by social structural 
conditions such as norms, customs, and information (Ostrom, 
1998). The following two propositions underlie this theory: (1) 
individuals are willing to contribute to a collective good if they 
believe that others are willing to contribute as well; and (2) the 
perceived social esteem of a group benefiting from the collective 
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good provides information about the willingness of others to 
contribute to that collective good. The first proposition is based 
on the theory of contingent consent (Levi, 1997). While contin-
gent consent theory usually concentrates on levels of trust in 
fellow citizens and the state, the model proposed here focus-
es on a different mechanism that is formulated in the second 
proposition, namely the social esteem that citizens believe that 
fellow citizens assign to the group of beneficiaries. Hence, the 
emphasis is not on the trustworthiness of other citizens but on 
the informational cues that individuals receive concerning the 
likelihood that their fellow citizens will support a welfare state 
arrangement benefiting a specific group.
 Applying these propositions to the topic of people’s attitudes 
towards welfare state arrangements for the old leads to the pre-
diction that individuals are more in favor of such arrangements 
if they believe that fellow citizens assign a higher status to el-
derly people. This prediction is empirically examined by inves-
tigating how status perceptions about two age groups (people 
in their twenties and people of seventy and older) is related to 
people’s attitudes towards welfare state arrangements securing 
a reasonable standard of living for the old. The empirical data 
are taken from Round 4 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 
2008) and include information about 50,009 individuals in 29 
European countries.
Attitudes Towards Welfare State
Arrangements for the Old
Attitudes	Towards	the	Welfare	State	
 Welfare state attitudes reflect the opinions that citizens have 
towards welfare state arrangements. Two defining characteristics 
of these arrangements are that: (1) they are collective means to 
cover individual risks, requiring individual contributions; (2) the 
government organizes both the collection and the distribution 
of the financial resources. Hence, welfare state arrangements 
consist of formal institutional mechanisms to secure the rights 
and obligations of citizens regarding who pays what and who 
receives what. These two core characteristics distinguish welfare 
state arrangements from other means of risk management such 
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as private insurances (e.g., the market) and social support within 
communities or families (Bowles & Gintis, 1996). While private 
insurances consist of voluntary contributions from individuals 
using the market mechanism, welfare state arrangements rely 
on obligatory contributions that are collected through the tax 
system. And, while the organization of community and family 
support is to a large extent voluntary and informal, welfare state 
arrangements are formal institutions.
 The market, communities, and the government provide 
means to cover individual risks, as each of them produces a 
certain level of social protection. From a policy perspective, 
covering individual risks through the government is preferred 
if it leads to comparatively better outcomes compared to the 
market or the community (Koster, 2009; Lindbeck, 2006; Wil-
liamson, 1981). Once set in motion, the resulting policies can 
become path-dependent and self-sustaining over the course 
of time (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rothstein, 1998). In addition 
to the macro explanation of why governments try to correct 
market and community failures, the literature on welfare state 
attitudes takes a micro perspective by investigating to what ex-
tent and why citizens prefer government intervention to assist 
others rather than (or in addition to) using market or commu-
nity mechanisms, hence emphasizing the role of public opinion 
in the process of legitimizing social policies (Brooks & Manza, 
2006; Burstein, 1998).
 With regard to welfare state legitimacy, it is useful to make 
a distinction between universal and targeted arrangements. 
While the first kind of welfare state system relies on compar-
atively generous entitlements that are available for everyone, 
the latter consists of restricted arrangements that benefit spe-
cific groups (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Lewin & Stier, 2002). Based 
on a self-interest explanation of welfare state support, it may 
be assumed that a universal welfare state receives more public 
support than targeted arrangements as it satisfies the needs of 
more individuals. 
 Nevertheless, public support can diminish both in uni-
versal and in targeted welfare states, but for different reasons. 
Since universal provisions are more extensive, they are more 
costly and may therefore be harder to sustain. What is more, 
since they are based on a system providing support to a rela-
tively large share of the population, some groups can benefit 
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from them, even if citizens are not in favor of it. Thus, if these 
arrangements (also) benefit groups that are regarded as unde-
serving, public support for the universal welfare state may de-
cline (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). 
 In contrast, welfare state arrangements that are targeted at 
specific groups can create a stronger division between contrib-
utors and beneficiaries. Also, for targeted arrangements it holds 
that if the beneficiaries are regarded as deserving, the public 
will be in favor of such provisions. Nevertheless, since fewer 
citizens benefit from the provisions, overall support may be 
lower compared to universal provisions and needs to be more 
strongly based on other motivations than self-interest, as these 
provisions depend more strongly on the willingness of citizens 
to pay for provisions from which they do not directly benefit 
from themselves. As a result, public support for targeted wel-
fare state provisions can diminish if the distance between these 
two groups becomes too big.
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
 Clearly, welfare state arrangements for the old are neither 
universal nor targeted as such. These arrangements can be or-
ganized as universal provisions (meaning that every citizen 
above a certain age receives benefits) or can consist of targeted 
provisions (only the elderly poor receive benefits). Nevertheless, 
in both cases they are selective in the sense that they benefit 
one particular group in society at a certain point in time (“the 
old”), while they are paid for by another group (“the young”). 
Of course, when the welfare state arrangements are universal, 
chances are higher that the group of benefactors is entitled to 
receive the benefits as they pass a certain age limit, compared to 
the situation in which these provisions are only targeted at the 
elderly poor. 
 Even though this holds true, receiving these benefits in the 
future is not guaranteed for at least two reasons. First, it is not 
sure whether the benefactors will reach the required age. And, 
second, even if they do reach that age, it is not certain wheth-
er the same provisions will still be available. Both uncertainties 
mean that benefactors may contribute to a universal welfare state 
arrangement from which they do not necessarily benefit them-
selves. This means that welfare state arrangements for the old 
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imply that there is a distinction between benefactors and bene-
ficiaries, at least at the present point in time. And, the question 
that follows from this observation is why the benefactors would 
be willing to support the beneficiaries, given this distinction.
 As was outlined in the introduction, there are several ways of 
theorizing the willingness of benefactors to support the welfare 
state. Most of the existing approaches focus on the benefactor, 
or include factors such as characteristics of the beneficiaries, the 
government, or the wider social context. Adding these factors to 
the explanation makes the model more detailed, but it still does 
not fully account for the theoretical idea that the contributions 
of benefactors may be interdependent (Levi, 1997; Rothstein, 
2001; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). To do that, it is necessary to include 
and investigate the assumption that the willingness of citizens 
to support a certain group depends on the willingness of fellow 
citizens to support that group. This theoretical notion leads to an 
additional explanation of welfare state attitudes. 
 Instead of arguing that the welfare state requires solidarity 
between benefactors and beneficiaries, such a theoretical mod-
el states that solidarity among benefactors is also needed. As 
such, this conceptualization reflects the core of collective action 
theories, assuming that individuals do not make their decision 
in complete isolation. Instead, these theories show that the pre-
paredness of individuals to contribute to a collective good de-
pends on the (perception of) behavior and attitudes of others, 
for example, by emphasizing the role of interdependent choices 
(Granovetter, 1978, 1980; Oliver, 1984; Oliver, Marwell, & Teix-
eira, 1985), conditional cooperation (Fisbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 
2001; Frey & Meier, 2004), norm conformity (Ostrom, 1998, 2000), 
fairness (Arneson, 1982; Elster, 1989; Gould, 1993), and trust be-
tween individuals (Scholz & Lubell, 1998). 
Social Esteem and Solidarity
 These collective action theories focus on the social structur-
al conditions under which individuals are willing to contribute 
to a collective good. Usually, this applies to goods from which 
the contributors can benefit themselves once they are produced. 
This means that situations in which individuals are faced with 
the question whether or not to contribute may run the risk that 
others may free-ride on their contributions. As a result, in such 
75Chapter TitleAge Stereo ypes and Attitudes
a situation individuals are interested in gathering information 
about the behavior and attitudes of others; for example, they 
may try to monitor the actual contribution to the collective good 
of other individuals or find out whether others are trustworthy 
(Dawes, 1980).
 The situation is slightly different when regarding welfare 
state arrangements for the old as a collective good that is pro-
duced by one group in society while benefiting another group. 
The question that the individual contributors face in this situ-
ation is not so much whether the other contributors are trust-
worthy individuals, but it may be much more informative to 
know the opinions of other individuals about the group of 
beneficiaries. Therefore, if a person believes that fellow citizens 
have a positive image of the other group and believe that they 
are viewed as deserving, they may be expected to be more will-
ing to contribute to that collective good. As such, it is assumed 
that the collective good problem among the contributors can be 
solved indirectly; namely, individuals are willing to contribute 
if they believe that others will contribute as well. The social es-
teem of the group of recipients provides an informational cue 
for individual citizens about the likelihood that others will con-
tribute, and hence decreases the influence of concerns about 
those who are perceived as free-riders. In addition, the reputa-
tion of the beneficiaries may be upheld by norms of reciprocity 
and fairness that further increase the likelihood that each bene-
factor is willing to contribute. 
 From this theoretical argument, it follows that individual 
support for arrangements that benefit others is affected by the 
perception of benefactors about the esteem that others assign 
to the beneficiaries. The social esteem of the group reflects the 
reputation that a group has within society and provides infor-
mation about the likelihood that fellow citizens will be willing 
to support provisions from which that group benefits. These 
theoretical considerations lead us to the first hypothesis about 
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The higher 
the perceived social esteem of older age groups, the more support for 
welfare	state	arrangements	for	the	old	(Hypothesis	1).
 The first hypothesis states a direct relationship between 
the social esteem of the elderly and support for welfare state 
arrangements for the old. An additional hypothesis is derived 
from the theoretical model. Apart from assuming that a positive 
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perception about the social esteem of the old leads to stronger 
support for welfare state provisions for the old, it may also be 
expected that the esteem of other age groups should not be re-
lated to support for welfare state arrangements for the old. Ac-
cording to the theory proposed in this article, support for these 
arrangements is related to perceptions about the old, and not 
about the esteem of the young. What is more, it can even be 
expected that there is negative relationship between the social 
esteem of younger age groups and support for welfare state ar-
rangement for the old. 
 Given that the budget of governments is restricted, they will 
not have the means to offer extensive provisions to all age groups 
in society. This means that governments need to make choices 
about how to allocate their budget, and as a consequence, if the 
budget for the provisions of one age group increases, the bud-
get for another group decreases. Therefore, the benefactors may 
face a choice regarding their support for welfare state provisions 
for different age groups. This argument can be regarded as an 
extension of the median voter model applied to the provision 
of old age arrangements (Galasso, 2006; Hollanders & Koster, 
2011). According to this model, government spending on wel-
fare state arrangements for the old increases as the population 
ages. While this could mean that the overall level of government 
spending increases, this is often not the case. If it is not possible 
for governments to spend more, they need to reduce spending 
in other domains. This is not to say that the young cannot enjoy 
these provisions, but that they have to wait until they belong to 
the older age group. In that sense, the distribution of age-relat-
ed government provisions can also be seen as the outcome of 
a potential conflict between generations. Now, if the social es-
teem of younger age groups is high, the model predicts that the 
benefactors are willing to support welfare state arrangements 
favoring this age group. As it is not possible to support all age 
groups in society evenly, given budget restrictions, stronger 
support for the welfare state arrangements for the young results 
in less support for provision for the old. Hence, according to this 
model, more social esteem for the young should result in less 
support for welfare state arrangements for the old. The follow-
ing hypothesis reflects this expectation. The higher the perceived 
social esteem of younger age groups, the less support for welfare state 
arrangements	for	the	old	(Hypothesis	2).
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Methods
Data
 Data for this study come from the European Social Survey 
(ESS, 2008), which has been conducted every two years since 
2000. Round 4 of this international comparative survey con-
tains information that allows us to test the hypotheses. The to-
tal dataset investigated here includes the responses of 50,009 
individuals in 29 European countries.
Measures 
 The dependent variable of this study, support for welfare state 
arrangements for the old, is measured by asking respondents about 
their opinion concerning the following question: “How much 
responsibility do you think governments should have to ensure 
a reasonable standard of living for the old?” The answer catego-
ries range from 0 (meaning that the respondents indicate that it 
should not be the governments’ responsibility) to 10 (indicating 
that it should be entirely governments’ responsibility according 
to the respondent). Hence, a higher score reflects more support 
for welfare state arrangements for the old.
 The dependent variables in this study measure the respon-
dent’s perceptions of the perceived social esteem of people in their 
twenties (“the young”) and people over seventy (“the old”). These 
variables are measured as follows. Respondents are asked to 
what extent they think that most people in their country view 
members of the two age groups “as friendly,” “having high 
moral standards,” and “with respect.” These questions do not 
ask about the opinion that respondents have about these two 
groups, but instead measure how they think that their fellow cit-
izens see people in their twenties and those over seventy. Each 
of these questions is measured on a four-point scale, ranging 
from 1 (not at all likely to be viewed that way) to 4 (very likely 
to be viewed that way). As shown in Table 1, the six items can be 
reduced to two dimensions, namely one concerning the social 
esteem of people in their twenties and one measuring the social 
esteem of people over seventy. Two variables are constructed, 
one measuring perceptions about the social esteem of people in 
their twenties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79) and one measuring the 
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To take into account that people’s attitudes towards welfare 
state arrangements for the old may be influenced by other 
factors, the analyses controlled for the following background 
variables: gender (0 = male; 1 = female), the respondent’s age (in 
years), years of education, and the main activity of the respondent 
(a variable measuring whether the respondent is in paid work, 
education, unemployed and looking for work, unemployed and 
not looking for work, permanently sick or disabled, retired, 
community or military service, housework, looking after chil-
dren, or other). Furthermore, ideological position is controlled 
for by including a variable measuring left-right self-placement (0 
= left; 10 = right). Finally, since perceptions of social esteem may 
be related to people’s own views about the two age groups, two 
control variables were added measuring feelings about people in 
their 20s and feelings about people over seventy. These variables are 
social esteem of people over seventy (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73). The 
difference	 in	 social	 esteem is computed by subtracting the score 
on the first variable from the latter, hence indicating how much 
more esteem someone believes that those over seventy have 
compared to those in their twenties.
   Item       1    2
Social esteem of people in their 20s  
 Most people view those in their 20s as friendly 0.768 0.178
 Most people view those in their 20s as having 0.863 0.051
 high moral standards    
 Most people view those in their 20s with respect 0.843 0.103
Social esteem of people over 70  
 Most people view those over 70 as friendly  0.193 0.744
 Most people view those over 70 as having  0.023 0.836
 high moral standards
 Most people view those over 70 with respect  0.109 0.798
Eigenvalue      2.539 1.492
Proportion of variance accounted for                42.312     24.861
Cronbach's alpha        0.78   0.72
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Varimax rotation. Factor loadings > 0.30 in bold.
Table 1. Factor Analysis of Social Esteem Items
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measured by asking respondents the question: “Overall, how 
negative or positive do you feel towards people in their 20s/over 
70?” (0 = extremely negative; 10 = extremely positive). 
Method
 The empirical analysis takes into account that the data have 
a nested structure (individuals are nested in countries). To pro-
vide as much insight as possible, the data are analyzed with 
two different methods. First, an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression analysis is conducted. In this analysis, country dummy 
variables are included to take into account that the measures of 
individuals in one country are not independent. These dum-
mies are included in the analysis, but are not reported in the 
tables to save space. Second, the data are analyzed using multi-
level modeling (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). While this method can 
be used to investigate whether contextual effects at the national 
level explain individual support for welfare state arrangements 
(e.g. Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Jæger, 2006; Koster, 2010), 
it is also a means to take the nested structure of the data into 
account without explicitly focusing on these contextual effects. 
Because the present analysis aims at understanding how in-
dividual perceptions affect support for welfare state arrange-
ments, and not whether these national circumstances matter, 
no contextual effects were added to the model. Instead, by con-
ducting a multilevel analysis, it is acknowledged that responses 
from individuals living in the same country are not indepen-
dent from each other, without explicitly adding explanatory 
variables at the national level. A random intercept model was 
estimated using the MLwiN software package. MLwiN is spe-
cifically designed to perform multilevel analyses. It enables re-
searchers to fit different kinds of multilevel models. The Centre 
for Multilevel Modeling at the University of Bristol developed 
this software package. For the present analyses, version 2.24 
was used (Rasbash, Steele, Browne, & Prosser, 2005).
 In both regressions analyses, four models are estimated. An 
empty model is calculated that serves as a baseline to which the 
next model is compared (Model 0). This next model includes 
the control variables (Model 1). Then two models are calculated 
that include the variables testing the two hypotheses. In the 
OLS regression analyses, the adjusted R2 is used to assess the 
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explained variance of the variable. In multilevel models, it is not 
possible to calculate the explained variance. Instead, for each 
model the -2 log likelihood is estimated. The deviance (the dif-
ference between the -2 log likelihood of two models) indicates 
to what extent the fit of the model improves after including the 
variables. Because the dataset is very large, the significance lev-
els may be inflated. To deal with this, the significance level is set 
at p < 0.0001.  
Results
Descriptive Results
 Table 2 provides an overview of the mean scores on support 
for welfare state arrangements for the old, the perceived social es-
teem of people in their twenties, and the perceived social esteem 
of people over seventy per country. What is particularly notewor-
thy is that the mean level of support for government responsi-
bility for the old is relatively high (m = 8.49). This shows that, on 
average, people are in favor of the government taking action to 
secure the standard of living of the old. For each country in the 
sample, the average score on this variable is above the theoretical 
mean of the scale. The lowest levels of support for welfare state 
arrangement for the old are found in Switzerland (m = 7.23) and 
Germany (m = 7.60) and the respondents in Latvia (m = 9.29) and 
Ukraine (m = 9.39) are most in favor of the idea that the govern-
ment ensures a reasonable standard of living for the old.
 Comparing the average scores on the scales measuring the 
perceived social esteem of people in their twenties and social 
esteem perceptions about people over seventy, Table 2 shows 
that the social esteem of the older age group is perceived to be 
higher than the status of the younger age group (m = 2.20 for 
people in their twenties and m = 3.06 for people over seven-
ty). This difference is consistently found for all countries in the 
sample. Furthermore, the average perceived social esteem of the 
two groups varies across countries. The mean perceived esteem 
of people in their twenties is the lowest in the UK (m = 1.74) 
and the highest in Israel (m = 2.64). In Slovakia, perceived social 
esteem of people over seventy has the lowest value (m = 2.81), 
while in Hungary the perceived social esteem of this group has 
the highest value (m = 3.36).
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Belgium   7.87         2.14              2.95
Bulgaria   9.13         2.02              3.02
Switzerland  7.23         2.08              2.85
Cyprus   8.94         2.56              3.19
Czech Republic  8.22         2.27              2.82
Germany  7.60         1.91              2.92
Denmark  8.31         2.17              3.07
Estonia   8.66         1.97              3.04
Spain   8.84         2.43              3.28
Finland   8.43         2.27              3.20
France   7.94         2.26              2.95
Great Britain  8.53         1.74              3.07
Greece   8.92         2.52              3.25
Croatia   8.70         2.32              2.91
Hungary  8.79         2.00              3.36
Ireland   8.47         2.23              3.35
Israel   8.93         2.64              3.09
Latvia   9.29         2.37              3.05
Netherlands  7.73         1.98              3.14
Norway   8.66         2.19              3.20
Poland   8.60         2.25              3.05
Portugal   8.85         2.55              3.16
Romania   8.04         2.14              2.82
Russian Federation 9.22         1.84              2.86
Sweden   8.49         2.21              3.13
Slovenia   8.34         2.41              3.08
Slovakia   8.37         2.06              2.81
Turkey   8.22         2.48              3.15
Ukraine   9.39         1.90              3.07
Mean   8.49         2.20              3.06
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
(a) Item: “How much responsibility do you think governments
should have to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?”;
ranging from 0 (should not be the government’s responsibility) to 10
(should be entirely governments responsibility).
(b) Scale score; ranging from 1 to 4.
Table 2. Country Means of Support for Welfare State Arrangements 
for the Old, Perceived Esteem of People in their Twenties, and
Perceived Esteem of People over Seventy
Country
Russian Federation
Support for welfare 
state arrangements 
or the old(a)
Perceived social
esteem of people
in their twenties(b)
Perceived social 
esteem of people
over seventy(b)
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Regression Results 
 The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 3, 
and Table 4 contains the results of the multilevel regression. 
As Table 4 shows, 8 percent of the variation in support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old is due to differences across 
countries (Intraclass correlation = 0. 079). This means that coun-
try-level characteristics may play a role in understanding sup-
port for these arrangements, but most of the variance is due to 
variance within countries. The first models reported in Table 3 
and 4 investigate the effects of the individual-level control vari-
ables. The two analyses yield similar results. The size of the pa-
rameters differs only slightly (the only real difference appears 
in the model with the esteem variables; in the OLS regression, 
feelings about people in their 20s becomes significant, while it 
remains not significant in the multilevel regression). The OLS 
regression shows that about 6 percent of variation in attitudes 
towards welfare state arrangements for the old is explained by 
the control variables. The multilevel analysis shows that add-
ing these variables improves the fit of the model (Deviance = 
2,030.478; p < 0.0001). Both models show that support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old is higher among women, 
older people, those who are lower educated, and people who 
are permanently sick or disabled. People placing themselves 
on the right side of the political scale are less in favor of gov-
ernment responsibility. These outcomes are in line with previ-
ous research findings of general support for the welfare state 
(Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Gërxhani & Koster, 2012). Fur-
thermore, support for welfare state arrangements for the old 
is positively related to the feelings towards people over 70; the 
more positive feeling people have, the higher the support for 
these arrangements.
 The second models reported in Table 3 and Table 4 test the 
two hypotheses. These models investigate how support for wel-
fare state arrangements for the old relate to the perceived social 
esteem of people in their twenties and to perceived social es-
teem of people over seventy. The results from the OLS regres-
sion show that these two variables explain an extra percent of 
variance in welfare state attitudes towards provisions for the 
old (which is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level). The 
multilevel model (Table 4) shows that the fit of the regression 
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                    (1)                   (2) 
      b   (s.e.)    b (s.e.)
Female    0.100 ** (0.017)   0.110 ** (0.017)
Age    0.001 (0.001)   0.001 (0.001)
Years of education  -0.022 ** (0.002)  -0.021 ** (0.002)
Main activity      
 
 Paid work   0.005 (0.066)  -0.004 (0.066)
 Education  -0.110 (0.073)  -0.114 (0.072)
 Unemployed looking for work   0.148 (0.077)   0.133 (0.076)
 Unemployed not looking for work   0.152 (0.091)   0.156 (0.091)
 Permanently sick or disabled    0.268 (0.085)   0.256 (0.084)
 Retired   0.074 (0.070)   0.079 (0.070)
 Community or military service    0.227 (0.206)   0.223 (0.204)
 Housework, looking after children  -0.102 (0.071)  -0.112 (0.071)
 Other     ---    (---)    ---    (---)
Left-right self-placement   -0.034 ** (0.004)   -0.036 ** (0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s   0.019 (0.005)   0.027 ** (0.005)
Feelings about people of 70   0.199 ** (0.005)   0.165 ** (0.005)
     and older     
 
Perceived status people in their 20s     -0.046 ** (0.011)
Perceived status people of 70     0.285 ** (0.013)
     and older     
 
Intercept    6.715 (0.091)   6.899 (0.130)
      
Adjusted R2   0.060    0.071  
R2 change     0.011  
F Change                                                        190.011 **                             256.878 **  
        
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Unstandardized coefficients are reported
The models include country dummies (not reported)
*p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001
Table 3. OLS Regression Analysis of Support for 
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
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               (1)                  (2) 
    b    (s.e.)     b    (s.e.)
Female    0.065 **  (0.017)   0.074 **  (0.017)
Age     0.001  (0.001)   0.001  (0.001)
Years of education  -0.021 **  (0.002)   -0.020 **  (0.002)
Main activity       
 Paid work   0.002  (0.074)   -0.009  (0.072)
 Education  -0.090  (0.080)   -0.088  (0.078)
 Unemployed looking for work   0.100  (0.084)   0.093  (0.082)
 Unemployed not looking for work   0.081  (0.098)   0.092  (0.095)
 Permanently sick or disabled    0.261  (0.091)   0.255  (0.089)
 Retired   0.064  (0.079)   0.067  (0.076)
 Community or military service   -0.043  (0.211)   -0.029  (0.203)
 Housework, looking after children  -0.022  (0.069)   0.023  (0.076)
 Other      ---     (---)     ---    (---)
Left-right self-placement   -0.043 **  (0.004)   -0.045 **  (0.004)
Feelings about people in their 20s   0.005  (0.005)   0.016  (0.005)
Feelings about people of 70 and older   0.186 **  (0.005)   0.155 **  (0.005)
      
Perceived status people in their 20s   -0.064 **  (0.011)
Perceived status people of 70 and older   0.264 **  (0.013)
      
Intercept     7.352  (0.128)   6.829  (0.130)
      
Deviance                                                             2030.478 **                         433.970 **  
Variance country level   0.221     0.213  
Variance individual level   2.718     2.691  
Intraclass correlation    0.075     0.073  
Source: European Social Survey Round 4
n = 50,009 individuals in 29 countries
Empty model: -2log likelihood = 166277.870; Intraclass correlation = 0.079
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001
Table 4. Multilevel Analysis of Support for
Welfare State Arrangements for the Old
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model significantly increases after adding these two variables 
(Deviance = 433.970; p < 0.0001). Perceived social esteem of peo-
ple in their twenties is negatively related to support for welfare 
state arrangements for the old (b = - 0.046; p < 0.0001 and b = 
-0.064; p < 0.0001, respectively) and perceived social esteem of 
people over seventy is positively related to this welfare state at-
titude (b = 0.285; p < 0.0001; b = 0.264; p < 0.0001). These findings 
support the two hypotheses derived from the social esteem the-
ory of solidarity. First, support for welfare state arrangements 
for the old is positively related to perceived social esteem of the 
elderly. Secondly, levels of support are negatively related to the 
perceived social esteem of the young. 
Discussion and Conclusion
 The present study extends previous investigations of public 
attitudes towards welfare state arrangements. Besides the exist-
ing explanations that focus on characteristics of the benefactor, 
characteristics of the beneficiaries, the relationship between cit-
izens and the government, and the social context of individuals, 
the study presented here shows that the relationship between 
beneficiaries matters. The theoretical approach and empirical 
outcomes have a number of theoretical and practical implica-
tions that may be further expanded in future research.
 Theoretically, the proposed model has the following impli-
cations. First, it shows that the welfare state can be thought of 
as a number of collective action problems that need to be solved 
to generate support. While this has been previously noted, for 
example in the literature about contingent consent (Levi, 1997; 
Rothstein, 2001), the approach taken here differs from these ear-
lier accounts in one respect. The main addition to the previous 
work is that the collective action problem among citizens can be 
further elaborated by distinguishing the group of benefactors 
from the group of beneficiaries. As a consequence, the attention 
shifts from the social dilemma involving all citizens to the di-
lemma faced by the contributors to the collective good. 
 A second addition and extension concerns the approach of 
the relationships between citizens. While earlier accounts em-
phasize generalized trust, the model investigated in this study 
focuses on more specific information about the attitudes that 
fellow citizens have toward the group of beneficiaries. Instead 
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of concentrating on the deservingness criteria that citizens 
themselves apply (Van Oorschot, 2006), people also seem to take 
into account the criteria that their fellow citizens apply. At least, 
this is what may be derived from the social esteem model. 
 The empirical findings imply that future research on wel-
fare state attitudes (and attitudes towards government policies 
in general) need to be more specific about who is willing to con-
tribute to what and how informational cues can explain such 
solidarity. With regard to the existence of multiple social dilem-
mas, a further extension of Rothstein’s (2001) model may be re-
quired to fully capture the relevant relationships. Distinguish-
ing between the government, benefactors, and beneficiaries also 
means that it is not only the question whether the benefactors 
view the government as a trustworthy actor, but also raises the 
question of under what conditions the beneficiaries believe that 
the government will act in their best interest. Taken together, it 
is suggested that future work should investigate these different 
social dilemmas, as well as qualitative and informational as-
pects of the relationships between the different actors.
 There are several issues that could not be examined in the 
present study and that need to be addressed in future studies. 
One of the main assumptions of the model is that social esteem 
perceptions serve as informational cues to solve collective ac-
tion problems. Although this is also suggested in previous re-
search, other (additional or alternative) mechanisms play a role. 
For example, while the information argument holds that the 
costs for contributing decrease, this rational approach to soli-
darity can be complemented by arguments concerning imita-
tion or the customs that citizens follow within society. 
 What is more, additional research can examine whether in-
formation, imitations, and customs provide the basis for norms 
and sanctions that can further strengthen the willingness to 
contribute to a collective good. Determining which of these 
mechanisms explains the willingness to support welfare state 
arrangements requires other data than what was investigated 
here. These data can be gathered using a survey across coun-
tries like the one investigated here, but it is worthwhile to con-
sider other data-gathering techniques, such as (vignette) exper-
iments to distinguish the different mechanisms and investigate 
their relative importance.
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 This study started with the question of how to explain at-
titudes towards welfare state arrangements for the old. The in-
vestigation shows that, apart from the existing explanations, 
the social esteem of the elderly explains these attitudes. The 
practical implication of this finding is that, from the perspective 
of social policy, governments may have the means to generate 
support for provisions aimed at securing the living conditions 
of the old. While a common strategy would be to generate such 
support by emphasizing the value and importance of such pro-
visions, governments can also choose to focus on mechanisms 
that help to overcome social dilemmas. The feasibility of such a 
strategy is cannot be answered with the present study and re-
quires additional research examining the effectiveness of such 
interventions. From a social research perspective on welfare 
state arrangements for the old, the present study shows that the 
future of such provision not only depends on whether it serves 
the best interest of individuals, whether the elderly are viewed 
as deserving, and whether the governments is regarded legiti-
mate, but also on the social esteem of the elderly.
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Educational Attainment in Young
Adulthood, Depressive Symptoms, and 
Race-ethnicity: The Long-reach of
Parenting Styles in Adolescence
Brittany N. Hearne
Vanderbilt University
C. André Christie-Mizell
Vanderbilt University
Utilizing	four	parenting	styles	(authoritative,	authoritarian,	uninvolved,	
and	permissive)	and	two	types	of	educational	achievement	(years	of	ed-
ucation	completed	and	completion	of	a	college	degree),	we	investigated	
whether	mental	health	(i.e.,	depressive	symptoms)	mediates	the	relation-
ship	between	parenting	styles	in	adolescence	and	the	educational	attain-
ment of young adults. We further assessed whether the relationships 
among	parenting	 styles	 and	 educational	 attainment	vary	by	 race	 and	
ethnicity	 for	African	Americans,	Hispanics,	and	whites.	Compared	to	
youth	with	authoritative	parenting,	those	who	experienced	uninvolved	
or	authoritarian	parenting	were	more	likely	to	experience	depressive	af-
fect, and these symptoms of depression partially mediated the relation-
ship	between	parenting	and	educational	attainment.	In	terms	of	racial	
and	ethnic	differences,	African	Americans	and	Hispanics	with	authori-
tarian or uninvolved parents earn more years of education than whites. 
Authoritarian parenting made it much less likely for whites to complete 
college	compared	to	their	African	American	and	Hispanic	counterparts.
Key	words:		educational	attainment,	parenting	styles,	depressive	symp-
toms, race and ethnicity
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 High quality parent-child interactions are important to the 
educational progress of children (Israel, Beaulieu, & Hartless, 
2001). Parenting styles or strategies that include warmth and 
emotional support have been shown to boost educational goals 
and achievement among youth (Davis-Kean, 2005; Dornbusch, 
Ritter, Leiderman, Roberts, & Fraleigh, 1987; Steinberg, Elmen, 
& Mounts, 1989). However, less is known about the specific so-
cial psychological mechanisms that connect parenting styles to 
educational outcomes. On the one hand, quality parenting may 
directly impact educational achievement by encouraging the in-
ternalization of positive goal orientation and resilience in the face 
of educational difficulty (Davis-Kean, 2005). On the other hand, 
parent-child relationships may shape educational outcomes 
indirectly. For example, uninvolved parenting—characterized 
by little communication, indifference, and neglect—may leave 
a child feeling distressed and may lead to mental health prob-
lems (Radziszewska, Richardson, Dent, & Flay, 1996; Widom, 
DuMont, & Czaja, 2007). In turn, poor psychological adjustment 
or mental health may impede the ability of the individual to 
achieve educationally. 
 In this research, we consider whether the impact of parent-
ing during middle and late adolescence is directly connected 
to educational attainment in young adulthood or whether the 
influence of parenting is better understood as indirectly affect-
ing educational progress through mental health—specifically, 
depressive symptomatology. This investigation adds to the re-
search literature in two important ways. First, with the use of 
nationally representative, longitudinal data, we are able to trace 
the direct and indirect (through depressive symptoms) impact 
of adolescent parenting styles on educational attainment in 
young adulthood. We utilize data spanning nine years to allow 
for a careful evaluation of whether parenting styles during ado-
lescence reach into young adulthood and to assess the relation-
ship between parenting styles and educational outcomes for 
three racial groups: African Americans, Hispanics, and whites. 
 Second, we focus on depressive symptoms as a potential 
intervening mechanism between adolescent parenting and the 
educational achievement of young adults. This assessment adds 
specificity to the research literature seeking to understand the 
multiple pathways through which the parent-child relationship 
shapes youth’s immediate and future outcomes. In the period of 
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study—adolescence into early adulthood—under consideration 
here, the incidence of depressive symptoms dramatically in-
creases (Arnett, 2007). The result is that young adulthood can be 
one of the most stressful periods in the life course, with likely 
implications for all types of achievement, including education-
al attainment (Aquilino, 1999; Aquilino & Supple, 2001; Arnett, 
2000, 2007). Nevertheless, few studies have explored the extent 
to which parenting styles in adolescence increase or decrease 
depressive symptomatology and whether these symptoms im-
pact educational progress. 
Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
 Family social capital theory guides this study. Coleman 
(1990) defined family social capital as the relationships among 
social actors that “inhere in family relations and in communi-
ty organization and that are useful for the cognitive and social 
development of [youth]” (p. 300). Social capital facilitates inter-
action among individuals within networks, such as families, as 
well as the exchange of informal resources such as knowledge, 
social support, and obligations (Coleman, 1988, 1990). In the re-
search literature, family social capital is typically operational-
ized as the strength of ties between family members and the 
quality of the relationship between parent(s) and children (Par-
cel & Dufur, 2001). 
 Family social capital creates parent-child bonds that allow 
parents to effectively convey appropriate social norms to their 
children. In turn, children internalize the appropriate social 
norms and behaviors, which lead to more positive outcomes 
(Christie-Mizell, 2004; Christie-Mizell, Keil, Laske, & Stewart, 
2011). Furthermore, family social capital has been most asso-
ciated with authoritative parenting—i.e., a style that includes 
warmth, responsiveness, bidirectional communication, and 
firm control (Sandefur, Meier, & Campbell, 2006; Spera, 2005; see 
also Yang & McLoyd, 2015). This investment in the well-being of 
youth pays immediate returns (e.g., fewer behavior problems), 
but also includes later dividends as youth mature—including 
fewer depressive symptoms and greater academic success 
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(Christie-Mizell, 2004; Garber, Robinson, & Valentiner, 1997; 
Parcel & Menaghan, 1994). 
 Coleman (1988, 1990) outlined two additional forms of cap-
ital—financial and human capital—that are necessary for the 
development and deployment of family social capital. Financial 
capital encompasses economic resources such as income and 
wealth, while human capital is represented by parents’ educa-
tion and cognitive ability. These two forms of capital allow par-
ents to build social capital within the family (Brooks-Gunn & 
Duncan, 1997; Teachman, Paasch, & Carver, 1997). For example, 
parents who are well educated tend to have more stable incomes 
and experience fewer stressors in life, allowing them the oppor-
tunity to spend time with their children to build social capital. 
Children of parents with low financial and human capital have 
limited access to resources like health care, housing, and the 
provision of cognitively stimulating materials and experiences 
(Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). In turn, these parents are less likely 
to be able to invest in building social capital within the family 
(Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Coleman, 1988, 1990).  
Parenting	Styles	and	Family	Social	Capital	
 Authoritative parenting. The four parenting styles considered 
in this research are authoritative, uninvolved, permissive, and 
authoritarian. Authoritative parenting includes setting clear 
limits, engaging children in reasoning, and being responsive 
to their emotional needs (Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin, 
1983; Spera, 2005). This type of parenting is thought to best en-
courage and engage family social capital to the extent that it 
creates positive parent-child interactions (Coleman, 1988, 1990; 
Parcel & Menaghan, 1993, 1994). In fact, a number of research 
studies have found a positive relationship between authori-
tative parenting styles and higher student achievement (e.g., 
Gonzalez, Doan Holbein, & Quilter, 2002). Moreover, parental 
practices in line with authoritative parenting reduce the risk of 
depressive symptoms among youth by curbing involvement in 
non-normative behavior (Bolkan, Sano, De Costa, Acock, & Day, 
2010; Bulanda & Majumdar, 2009; Milevsky, Schlechter, Netter, 
& Keehn, 2007). Consequently, the absence of depressive affect 
may increase adolescents’ educational achievement (see e.g., 
McLeod & Fettes, 2007).
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 Uninvolved parenting. Uninvolved parenting (or indulgent 
parenting) is characterized by a lack of responsiveness to a 
child’s needs and emotional distance (Maccoby & Martin, 1983). 
Whereas authoritative parents will engage in conversations with 
their children regarding rules and expectations, uninvolved 
parents do not impose rules and expectations on their children 
(Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin, 1983). As a result of lax 
supervision and expectations, parents who are uninvolved cre-
ate less family social capital. In turn, children of uninvolved 
parents respond to their parents’ lack of warmth and attention 
with depressed affect and may become defiant in an attempt to 
elicit parental attention and involvement (Ge, Best, Conger, & 
Simons, 1996). These issues can intensify over time, leading to 
even poorer mental health and lower academic achievement. 
	 Permissive	parenting.	Unlike authoritative parents, permissive 
parents are less likely to interact with their children, and when 
they do communicate with their children, they are more like-
ly to allow their child to dominate the interaction (Baumrind, 
1989, 1991). Because of a lack of demands and expectations for 
the child, this style of parenting leads to a poor parent-child so-
cial ties and creation of lower levels of family social capital. Al-
though permissive parents provide emotional support, they are 
less likely to impose strict rules, preferring instead to promote 
independent decision-making and self-regulation of emotions, 
with avoidance of confrontation and discipline (Baumrind, 
1991). Permissive parenting has been associated with higher de-
pressive symptoms tied to lower self-regulation among youth 
(Maccoby, 1992; Radziszewska et al., 1996). Further, children 
of permissive parents often reject outside authority, which can 
lead to poor performance in school (Dornbusch et al., 1987). 
 Authoritarian parenting. Baumrind (1989) described authori-
tarian parents as neither warm nor responsive to their children. 
Authoritarian parents are strict, demanding, and tend to com-
municate demands and expectations through rules and orders 
(Baumrind, 1991). The lack of negotiation and explanations of 
rationale for rules may lead to fear and decreased family so-
cial capital (see Bolkan et al., 2010). Ozer and colleagues (2013) 
found that the strict control of authoritarian parents is related 
to higher levels of depressive symptoms. Moreover, the harsh 
parenting and control associated with an authoritarian style 
may harm academic achievement by building resentment and 
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inhibiting youth from taking ownership in school work (Baum-
rind, 1991; Ozer, Flores, Tschann, & Pasch, 2013). 
 Racial variations. Despite a fairly large body of literature re-
porting the advantages of authoritative parenting compared to 
other styles of parenting, these impacts have not been found to 
be uniform across race-ethnicity. For instance, some research 
shows that authoritarian parenting may not be as harmful to 
minority children compared to their white counterparts (Dorn-
busch et al., 1987; Jarrett, 1995; Radziszewska et al., 1996). The 
contexts in which racial and ethnic minorities are reared vary 
greatly compared to whites. Minorities are more likely to rear 
children in environments where single parenting is more com-
mon, housing is more likely to be in dangerous or higher crime 
areas, the family is more likely to face discrimination, and eco-
nomic resources are lower (Christie-Mizell, Pryor, & Grossman, 
2008; McLeod & Shanahan, 1993; Quillian, 2012, 2014; Sampson, 
Sharkey, & Raudenbush, 2008; Wight, Chau, & Aratani, 2011). 
These contexts and stressors may shape the impact of parent-
ing styles. Minority children, especially those who are econom-
ically disadvantaged, may require more direction and firmness 
to keep them safe (Lareau, 2002; McLoyd, 1990). Therefore, the 
current research will add to the growing body of literature 
seeking to show how parent-child relationships vary in impact 
on outcomes by race-ethnicity. 
 Other important factors. Beyond race-ethnicity, the extant 
literature around parenting, depressive symptoms, and educa-
tional attainment identify several other relevant factors, includ-
ing gender, family structure, region of residence, and religion. 
Females are more likely to experience psychological distress. 
Indeed, studies have found that, beginning in puberty, symp-
toms of depression, major depressive disorder, and dysthymia 
are twice as common in women as men (e.g., Leibenluft, 1999).
 Family structure, such as family size and living arrange-
ments, may also have an impact on children’s well-being. In-
creased family size has been shown to have a negative impact 
on children’s educational attainment, due to the depletion of 
resources within the family unit (Downey, 1995). Resources 
within the family are spread thin when there are more chil-
dren in the family, which may lead to weaker ties and increased 
depressive symptoms. Single parents are more likely to have 
fewer resources to share with their children, which may lead 
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to negative outcomes for children, such as poor mental health 
and decreased educational attainment (Amato, 1994; McLanah-
an, 1997; McLanahan & Sandefur, 2009). Although children may 
struggle when adjusting to a stepparent, there are benefits to 
having two parents in the home, such as financial and social 
resources (McLanahan & Sandefur, 2009). 
 Religiosity and one’s geographic region of residence have 
been shown to impact depressive symptoms for youth (Chris-
tie-Mizell et al., 2008; Petts & Jolliff, 2008) and educational attain-
ment (Muller & Ellison, 2001; Parcel & Dufur, 2009). Religious 
settings may offer social support and a resource for coping for 
youth and their parents, leading to decreased levels of depres-
sion (Kosmin, 2011). People that live in the South attend church 
more frequently than people in other regions of the country 
(Kosmin, 2011). Finally, regional and religious differences could 
affect the incentive to invest in education (Muller, 2001; Sander, 
1992).
Figure 1: Hypothesized relationships between central variables
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Summary and Hypotheses
 In this paper, we considered the relationships among par-
enting styles, depressive symptoms, and educational attainment 
as youth age from adolescence into young adulthood. Figure 
1 further illustrates the relationships tested here. There were 
three objectives for this study. The first objective was to deter-
mine the relationship between parenting styles and depressive 
symptoms. The second objective was to establish whether par-
enting styles and depressive symptoms are related to education-
al attainment for young adults. Finally, the third objective was 
to investigate whether race moderates the relationship between 
the parenting styles and educational attainment. These objec-
tives resulted in the development of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a-c: Compared to authoritative parenting, there is 
a positive relationship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive, 
and (c) authoritarian parenting and depressive symptoms.
Hypothesis 2a-c: Compared to authoritative parenting, there is 
a negative relationship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive, 
and (c) authoritarian parenting and educational attainment.
Hypothesis 3a-c: Depressive symptoms mediate the relation-
ship between (a) uninvolved, (b) permissive, and (c) authori-
tarian parenting and educational attainment (with authorita-
tive parenting as the comparison group).
 The purpose of these hypotheses is to examine wheth-
er mental health—depressive symptoms, in this case—is one 
mechanism that links earlier parenting styles to educational 
attainment in young adulthood. To test these hypotheses, we 
assess both years of educational attainment as well as whether 
the respondent has earned a college degree. 
 Our fourth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4a-b: Authoritarian parenting is less harmful to 
the educational attainment of a) African American and b) 
Hispanic youth, compared to whites.
 In this hypothesis, we focus on authoritative versus author-
itarian parenting and whether the impact of these two styles 
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varies by race-ethnicity. Existing research (see e.g., Chris-
tie-Mizell et al., 2008) suggests that African American and His-
panic parents may be more likely to take the stricter stances as-
sociated with authoritarian parenting. Therefore, with respect 
to educational attainment, we examine whether authoritarian 
parenting may not be as harmful for African Americans and 
Hispanics, compared to whites.
Data and Methods
Data
 Data for this investigation were drawn from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 Cohort (NLSY97), a longi-
tudinal study of the educational and labor market experiences 
of youth in the United States. The youth sampled were born be-
tween 1980 and 1984 and ranged in age from 12 to 16 by Decem-
ber 31, 1996. Data collection began in 1997 and the most recent 
round of interviews for the NLSY97 was done in 2013. The full 
NLSY97 sample consists of a nationally representative group 
of youth that have been interviewed annually since 1997, with 
over-sampling for poor and minority youth. 
Measures 
 Measures for this study were taken from the first (1997, 
baseline), sixth (2002), and tenth (2006) waves of the data. This 
pattern allows for our mediator (depressive symptoms, 2002) to 
occur subsequent to the independent variable (adolescent par-
enting style, 1997), but prior to the dependent variables (edu-
cational attainment, 2006). Over these three waves of data (i.e., 
1997 to 2006) collection, 317 respondents were missing on one 
or more of our study variables. In supplementary analyses, we 
utilized multiple imputation to recapture these respondents. 
The findings using multiple imputation did not differ signifi-
cantly from a complete cases analysis. Therefore, we present the 
complete cases analyses in the models below. Our final sample 
consists of 4,078 young adults, who were 21 to 25 years old in 
the tenth wave. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all 
study variables in the total sample. All analyses were weighted 
to correct for the oversampling of poor and minority youth. 
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	 Educational	 attainment.	 The main dependent variable was 
years of educational attainment and was measured in 2006. The 
mean of education for the sample is 13.65 years. Each respon-
dent’s education was also measured as a categorical variable 
splitting the sample between those who had earned a college 
degree (1 = yes), compared to those who did not. By the time of 
the final wave (2006) utilized in this study, 26% of the sample 
had earned a college degree.  
 Depressive symptoms, parenting styles, and race-ethnicity. De-
pressive symptoms, measured in 2002, is both a main depen-
dent variable and mediator in the analyses below. It is measured 
as a five-item version of the mental health inventory (MHI-5). 
The questions included how often, within the last month, the 
Table 1.  Weighted Means, Percentages, and Standard
Deviations for All Study
Variables    Mean /Proportions SD
Dependent variables   
Education (years)     13.65  2.55
Earned College Degree (1=yes)   .26  -
Depressive Symptoms: 1 (low) to 5 (high)  1.97  .64
Parenting	Styles  
Authoritative      .42  -
Uninvolved     .10  -
Permissive     .36  -
Authoritarian      .12  -
Race-ethnicity,	sex,	age,	and	post	high	school   
Black (1=yes)     .12  -
Hispanic (1=yes)     .11  -
Female (1=yes)     .49  -
Age       13.95  1.28
5 or fewer years post high school (1=yes)  .42  -
SES, family characteristics, region, and religion  
Family income ($10,000s)    5.81  4.85
Parents’ education (1=college degree)  .20  -
Reared in traditional two-parent home (1=yes) .63  -
Number of siblings (count)   2.35  1.28
Grew up in the South (1=yes)    .32  -
Never attended church (1=yes)   .16  -
 
101Chapter TitleT e Long-reach of Parenting Styles in Adolescence
respondent felt: (1) “nervous”; (2) “calm or peaceful”; (3) “down-
hearted or blue”; (4) “happy”; and (5) “so down in the dumps 
that nothing could cheer you up.” Each item ranged from 1 
(none of the time) to 4 (all of the time). The mean for depressive 
symptoms was 1.97, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .77. 
 Our measures of parenting styles and all control variables 
were captured in the baseline year (1997), when the adolescent 
respondents (ages 12-16) were interviewed to assess their par-
ents’ level of supportiveness and responsiveness. Researchers at 
Child Trends, an organization involved in the NLSY97 question-
naire design process, then combined the responses to produce 
a parenting style variable (Moore et al., 1999). More specifically, 
and in line with the relevant parenting literature, Child Trends 
researchers developed two items—one measuring parental 
supportiveness (i.e., responsiveness) and the other measuring 
parental strictness or permissiveness (i.e., demandingness). At 
baseline, when the respondents were 12 to 17 years old, they 
were asked how supportive each parent was on a 3-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (very supportive) to 3 (not very supportive). 
Then, with appropriate description, each respondent was asked 
to categorize each parent as either (1) strict or (2) permissive. 
The two-level variables were then combined to yield: uninvolved 
(permissive and not very or somewhat supportive), permissive 
(permissive and very supportive), authoritative (strict and very 
supportive), and authoritarian (strict and not very or somewhat 
supportive). This measure of parenting has been validated else-
where and utilized widely in the parenting literature (Baum-
rind, 1991; Maccoby & Martin, 1983). In this research, we utilize 
maternal parenting styles, which were available for the vast ma-
jority of respondents. Of the 4,078 total respondents, 404 (10%) 
had uninvolved parenting, 1,488 (36%) had permissive parent-
ing, 1,710 (42%) had authoritative parenting, and 476 (12%) had 
authoritarian parenting. We utilized authoritative parenting as 
the reference group in all analyses below.
 Race-ethnicity was a major independent variable. We creat-
ed dummy variables to distinguish among African Americans 
(1 = yes), Hispanics (1 = yes), and whites (1 = yes). Whites com-
prised 78% of the sample and were the omitted category for the 
analyses. Blacks were 12% of the sample and Hispanics were 
11% of the sample.  
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 Control variables. In the analyses below, we compared fe-
males to males (the omitted category). Household income was 
measured in dollars and the mean was $58,100. For this study, 
we coded income in quartiles to account for skewness in the 
original measure. We then compared the highest quartile to the 
three lower quartiles. Preliminary sensitivity analyses support-
ed this decision. Further, parent’s education was included as a 
dummy variable to capture whether one or both parents had a 
college degree. If one parent was missing on this variable, then 
only the other parent’s education was used. Of the total sample, 
20% reported that their parents have a college degree. 
 At baseline, the average age for the total sample was 13.95 
years. To aid in our estimation of educational attainment, we 
also divided age using dummy variables to compare those that 
were five or fewer years post high school during our final wave 
in 2006. Relying on auxiliary analyses (available upon request), 
this scheme was devised to account for respondents who had 
an adequate amount of time to complete college. That is, be-
cause we assessed the completion of a bachelor’s degree as one 
outcome, it was important to account for differences that would 
make this milestone more probable for some respondents com-
pared to others. In 2006, 42% of the total sample was five or 
fewer years post high school.  
 The number of dependent children per household was as-
sessed at baseline. The average number of dependent children 
for the entire sample was 2.35. Utilizing census designations at 
baseline, region of residence was reported as South (32%), North 
Central (30%), Northeast (17%), or West (21%). In our analyses, 
we compare those who live in the South to all others.
At baseline, respondents were asked how often they attended 
church in the past twelve months and the responses ranged 
from 1 (never) to 8 (everyday). We compare those who reported 
never attending (16%) to all others. We further compared indi-
viduals who reported being reared in a traditional two-parent 
home to other family structures (e.g., single parent home and 
stepparent household). Sixty-three percent of our respondents 
reported being raised in a two-parent household.  
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Analytic Strategy
 To test our hypotheses that depressive symptoms medi-
ate the impact of parenting styles on educational attainment, 
we utilize a series of regression models and proceed in four 
steps. First, we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression to establish that parenting styles are associated with 
depressive symptoms. Second, we estimate whether parenting 
styles impact both measures of educational attainment—years 
of education and earned a college degree. Years of education 
is estimated using an OLS regression and college degree (1 = 
yes) is calculated with a logistic regression. Third, we added 
depressive symptoms to the models for educational attainment 
to determine whether, and the extent to which, the impact of 
parenting styles is mediated. Finally, we estimated a series of 
interactions by race-ethnicity and parenting styles to test our 
contention that authoritarian parenting is less harmful to the 
educational attainment of African Americans and Hispanics, 
compared to whites. 
Multivariate Findings
 Table 2, Model 1 represent the regression model for depres-
sive symptoms. Both uninvolved parenting and authoritarian 
parenting were positively associated with depressive symp-
toms compared to authoritative parenting. Additionally, wom-
en were more likely to report higher levels of depressive symp-
toms, while those reared in two-parent homes reported lower 
symptoms of depression. 
 Models 2–3 of Table 2 are the findings for years of education-
al attainment. Compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved, 
permissive, and authoritarian parenting resulted in fewer years of 
education (Table 2, Model 2). Also, African American and Hispan-
ic youth reported fewer years of education, compared to whites. 
Women in our sample reported more education. Further, those 
respondents who are five or fewer years post-high school report-
ed fewer years of education. Conversely, those in the top quarter 
of high family income, those whose parents finished college, and 
those who grew up in a traditional two-parent home completed 
more education. Finally, respondents from a large sibling group, 
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those who grew up in the South, and individuals who never at-
tended church attained fewer years of education.  
 In Table 2, Model 3, we added depressive symptoms to our 
estimation of years of education and found that depressive 
symptoms in late adolescence and early adulthood were in-
versely related to educational achievement. Recall that one of 
the goals of this research was to test for mediation. The impact 
of uninvolved parenting (Sobel t-test: -3.27, p < .001) and author-
itarian parenting (Sobel t-test: -2.96, p < .001) on years of educa-
tional attainment of youth was partially mediated by depres-
sive symptoms. Mediation for permissive parenting was not 
possible because there was no association between permissive 
parenting and depressive symptoms (Table 2, Model 1). 
 Models 4–5 of Table 2 show the results of the logistic regres-
sion analyses for the probability of earning a bachelor’s degree. 
In Model 4, compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved, 
permissive, and authoritarian parenting were associated with 
lower odds of having completed a bachelor’s degree. Further, 
African Americans and Hispanics, compared to whites, report-
ed lower odds of earning a college degree. The young wom-
en in our sample reported higher odds of completing a bache-
lor degree. Age was positively associated with higher odds of 
earning a bachelor’s degree, while five or fewer years post-high 
school was associated with lower odds of obtaining a college 
degree. Moreover, those from high income backgrounds, those 
with parents who have college degrees, and those who grew up 
in traditional two-parent homes had higher odds of attaining a 
college degree. Respondents who reported many siblings and 
those who never attended church had lower odds of completing 
a bachelor’s degree.
   In Table 2, Model 5, we added depressive symptoms to our 
estimation of probability of earning a college degree. In late ad-
olescence and young adulthood, depressive symptoms resulted 
in lower odds of earning a bachelor’s degree. Moreover, depres-
sive symptoms partially mediated the impact of uninvolved 
(Sobel t-test: -2.34, p < .05) and authoritarian (Sobel t-test: -2.21, p 
< .05) parenting on the probability of earning a college degree. 
Mediation for permissive parenting was not possible because 
there was no association between permissive parenting and de-
pressive symptoms (Table 2, Model 1). 
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Table 3. Education (years) and Earned College Degree (1=yes) Re-
gressed on Selected Variables. NLSY97—1997 to 2006 (N = 4,078).
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 In Table 3, we explored whether the association between 
parenting styles and educational attainment varies by race-eth-
nicity. We were especially interested in whether authoritarian 
parenting was as harmful to the educational attainment of mi-
nority youth, compared to their white counterparts. Model 1 of 
Table 3 shows that the association between parenting and years 
of education was moderated by race-ethnicity. Figure 2 graph-
ically displays these interactions. Compared to whites, author-
itarian parenting had a positive impact on how many years of 
education were attained by African Americans and Hispanics. 
Notice in Figure 2 that the years of education was higher among 
African Americans and Hispanic youth who were accustomed 
to authoritarian parenting. For whites, years of education was 
highest among those with authoritative parenting. Interest-
ingly, and not predicted by us, uninvolved parenting was not 
as harmful to African Americans and Hispanics as it was for 
white youth. That is, compared to authoritative parenting, unin-
volved parenting lowered years of education more so for whites 
than for racial minorities in our study. Testing for moderation 
does not substantively change the other findings in the mod-
el. Respondents who were five or fewer years post-high school 
attained fewer years of education, while women earned more 
years of education than men. Those with high income, parent’s 
with college degrees, and youth reared in a two-parent home 
earned more years of education. Finally, more siblings, growing 
up in the South, no church attendance, and depressive symp-
toms resulted in fewer years of education.
 Model 2 of Table 3 shows that race-ethnicity moderated the 
relationship between authoritarian parenting and the proba-
bility of earning a bachelor’s degree. Figure 3 graphically dis-
plays these interactions. Authoritarian parenting, compared to 
the other styles, led to greater odds of earning a bachelor’s de-
gree for African American and Hispanic youth. Young African 
American adults with authoritarian parents were three times 
more likely than their white counterparts to earn a bachelor’s 
degree. Hispanic young adults with authoritarian parents were 
about two and a half times more likely than their counterparts 
to earn a bachelor’s degree.
 Similar to our prior estimation of the probability of earn-
ing a college degree, women and older respondents had higher 
odds of earning a college degree. Respondents who were five 
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or fewer years post-high school had lower odds of completing 
a degree. High family income in adolescence, parents with col-
lege degrees, and being reared in a traditional two-parent home 
led to higher odds of earning a college degree. Growing up with 
more siblings, the lack of church attendance, and depressive 
symptoms resulted in lower odds of earning a college degree.
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Discussion and Conclusion
 Using family social capital theory and its reliance on the 
centrality of parent-child bonds for predicting youth outcomes, 
we examined how parenting styles impact depressive symp-
toms and educational attainment for youth. Specifically, and as 
Figure 1 illustrates, we tested whether depressive symptoms 
mediated the relationship between parenting styles and edu-
cational attainment. Our study employed two measures of edu-
cational attainment: years of education and the odds of earning 
a college degree. Further, we explored whether race-ethnicity 
moderated the impact of parenting styles on educational at-
tainment. Four hypotheses were developed to accomplish these 
goals. We found support for hypotheses 1a and 1c—that unin-
volved and authoritarian parenting would be positively related 
to depressive symptoms. However, we did not find support for 
hypothesis 1b—that permissive parenting would be associated 
with depressive symptoms. 
 Although some authors (see e.g., Gelfand & Teti, 1990, or 
LaFrenière & Dumas, 1992) have speculated that permissive 
parenting leads to depressive symptomatology in children, that 
finding is not supported in this research. Consistent with what 
we found, Lamborn and her colleagues (Lamborn, Mounts, 
Steinberg, & Dornbusch, 1991) argued that permissive parent-
ing was not associated with depressive symptomatology ini-
tially because adolescents value self-reliance and the indepen-
dent decision-making that is often associated with uninvolved 
parenting (see also Steinberg, Lamborn, Darling, Mounts, & 
Dornbusch, 1994). However, we cannot rule out that over time 
permissive parenting may be associated with depressive symp-
toms as a consequence of bad decisions during adolescence and 
young adulthood. Future research should extend our study 
further into adulthood to more fully assess the relationship be-
tween permissive parenting and depressive symptoms.
 Consistent with hypotheses 2a–c, our results indicated that, 
compared to authoritative parenting, uninvolved, permissive, 
and authoritarian parenting were negatively related to educa-
tional attainment for youth. With respect to years of education-
al attainment, hypotheses 3a and 3c were supported: depres-
sive symptoms partially mediated the relationship between 
uninvolved parenting and educational attainment and the 
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relationship between authoritarian parenting and educational 
attainment. We did not find support for hypothesis 3b – depres-
sive symptoms did not mediate the relationship between per-
missive parenting and years of education. In terms of our other 
measure of educational attainment—i.e., the odds of earning a 
college degree—we also found support for hypotheses 3a and 
3c. Depressive symptoms did mediate the relationship between 
uninvolved parenting (H3a) and college degree completion, as 
well as the relationship between authoritarian parenting (H3c) 
and earning a bachelor’s degree.
 In our fourth hypothesis, we focused on authoritarian ver-
sus authoritative parenting and predicted that authoritarian 
parenting would be less harmful to the educational attainment 
of African Americans (H4a) and Hispanics (H4b). With respect 
to years of education, we found support for both hypotheses. 
African American and Hispanic youth who experienced au-
thoritarian parenting attained more education than those from 
authoritative homes. Conversely, whites’ education prospects 
were more harmed by authoritarian parenting, with those who 
were reared in authoritative homes earning significantly more 
years of education. One interesting and somewhat surprising 
finding was that African American and Hispanic youth who 
experienced uninvolved parenting were less harmed than their 
white counterparts. That is, whites who were from uninvolved 
homes achieved fewer years of education than either African 
Americans or Hispanics.
 Hypothesis 4 also received support in our prediction of the 
odds of completing a college degree. Authoritarian parenting 
was less harmful to both African Americans (H4a) and His-
panics (H4b). That is, African Americans and Hispanics from 
authoritarian homes had higher odds of completing a college 
degree than those from authoritative homes. For whites, the 
reverse was true. White youth from authoritative homes were 
more likely to earn a college degree compared to those whites 
who came from authoritarian families. 
 The findings in this study indicate that parenting styles 
have an impact on youth during adolescence and continue to 
have an impact into young adulthood in two ways. First, par-
enting styles during adolescence directly affect how much edu-
cation is attained in young adulthood. Second, parenting styles 
also exert influence on educational progress through mental 
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health. That is, excessively strict (i.e., authoritarian) or overly 
relaxed (i.e., uninvolved) parenting practices are detrimental 
to the mental health of youth as they progress into their early 
adult years. In turn, psychological maladjustment—depressive 
symptoms, in this case—impedes educational attainment. It is 
noteworthy that this pattern of mediation applies to both edu-
cational outcomes (i.e., years of education and odds of earning a 
college degree) explored in this study. 
 Further, consistent with research that has considered the im-
pact of parenting by race, authoritarian parenting strategies led 
to more years of education and a greater probability of complet-
ing a college degree for African American and Hispanic youth, 
compared to their white peers (McLeod & Shanahan, 1993). To 
be clear, our results do not indicate that an authoritarian par-
enting style should be the preferred method of parenting for 
minority children. Instead, the findings here suggest that au-
thoritarian parenting was not as detrimental for African Amer-
ican and Hispanic children as it was for white children, with 
respect to educational attainment. Similarly, and with respect 
to the relationship between uninvolved parenting and years of 
education, the educational achievement of African Americans 
and Hispanics does not suffer as much as that of whites. These 
findings suggest that the minority youth in our sample are bet-
ter able to adapt to, and academically excel with, uninvolved 
and authoritarian parents, compared to their white peers. 
 Although scholars have consistently argued that authori-
tative parenting is a superior form of parenting, the previous 
research has overlooked how these experiences may vary by 
race-ethnicity. The structural position (e.g., social class), as well 
as the day-to-day experience of African Americans and Hispan-
ics, may simply mean that these youth may be more adaptive 
to varying parenting styles. Other related research has shown 
that various forms of parenting (e.g., spanking—see e.g., Chris-
tie-Mizell et al., 2008) have different effects across the racial and 
ethnic groups studied here. The typical theoretical reasoning is 
that because the context of daily life differs for racial minorities 
(compared to whites), research utilizing largely white, middle 
class families may simply not apply to African Americans and 
Hispanics (Christie-Mizell et al., 2008; Lareau, 2002). That is, 
scholars should develop strategies that avoid imposing expec-
tations developed from studies that focus on white respondents 
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on racial and ethnic minorities; instead, research should contin-
ue to carefully differentiate between the consequences of par-
enting by race-ethnicity. 
 This study is not without limitations. First, only the report-
ed parenting styles for mothers were used here. While moth-
er-child data dominates this type of research, other studies 
also show the importance of considering paternal parenting 
contributions in conjunction with those of mothers (see e.g., 
Christie-Mizell et al., 2011). Second, this study may not tell the 
full story for respondents who may have to take time off from 
college or those that simply take longer to graduate. Recent re-
search shows that not only are adults taking longer to complete 
post-secondary degrees, but also that the factors (e.g., family 
and employment obligations) shaping completion of degrees 
vary as adults mature (Elman, Wray, & Xi, 2014). Third, this 
research is not generalizable to other groups beyond African 
Americans, Hispanics, and whites. It is quite possible the re-
lationships among parenting, mental health, and educational 
attainment vary for other groups not studied here. For example, 
Chinese American parents, similar to African Americans, are 
more likely to employ authoritarian parenting, but their edu-
cational outcomes and socioeconomic backgrounds are more 
similar to whites (Chao, 2001; Kim, Wang, Orozco-Lapray, Shen, 
& Murtuza, 2013). Therefore, the extent to which the patterns 
found in this research apply to Chinese Americans—or other 
groups, for that matter—is unknown.
 In conclusion, future research should continue to employ 
lon gitudinal data to further investigate the mechanisms that 
link parenting styles early in the life course to outcomes as 
youth age into adulthood. Such research elucidates how early 
relationships both directly and indirectly transform education-
al outcomes. For instance, had we simply studied the relation-
ship between parenting styles and educational attainment, we 
would have overestimated the direct influence of parenting 
styles. Instead, a focus on the mechanisms that link parenting 
styles to educational progress proved fruitful and revealed that, 
in addition to direct effects, part of the influence of parenting on 
education flows through mental health. To the extent that the 
extant literature has shown that parenting styles are linked to a 
variety of adolescent outcomes (e.g., self-esteem and social com-
petence—see e.g., Gonzales et al., 2002), other research should 
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continue this pattern of exploring how other potential media-
tors link the experience of parenting styles in adolescence to 
educational attainment in young adulthood. 
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The Welfare Subject in the
“One-stop Shop”: Agency in
Troublesome Welfare Encounters
Kjetil Lundberg
Uni Research Rokkam Centre
The purpose of this article is to investigate the agency of “welfare sub-
jects” in welfare encounters, situated in a “one-stop shop” reform con-
text,	thereby	providing	increased	theoretical	sensitivity	into	the	field	of	
welfare	encounters’	research.	Anchored	in	a	Norwegian	reform	context,	
this article analyses agency related to welfare encounters, including wel-
fare	subjects’	attempts	to	hold	NAV	(the	Norwegian	Labour	and	Welfare	
Administration)	accountable	to	help	them.	Shifting	agency	positions	are	
located, the lines of responsibility in the welfare encounters are found 
to be unclear, and there are indications that this may contribute to the 
production of destructive agency positions.
Key words: activation, agency, one-stop shop reform, welfare encoun-
ters, welfare subject
 One-stop shop reforms have been implemented in a number 
of welfare states in recent years. Scholars of political and orga-
nizational science interpret such reforms in light of service in-
tegration and accountability aims (Askim, Fimreite, Moseley, & 
Pedersen, 2011; Byrkjeflot, Christensen, & Lægreid, 2013; Chris-
tensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2013; Minas, 2014). Prior to and par-
allel to these reforms, a broad range of welfare states—liberal, 
conservative and social democratic—have reshaped their lan-
guage, philosophy and organization along the lines of individ-
ual responsibility, activation and participation (Berkel & Borghi, 
2007; Bonvin, 2008; Gubrium, Harsløf, & Lødemel, 2014; Handler 
2004; Johansson & Hvinden, 2007; Wright, 2012). As argued by 
several scholars, these two trends are inherently linked: While a 
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range of activation reforms in the 1990s were focused on chang-
ing policies and benefits, the ‘second wave of activation reforms’ 
represents a change in governance (cf. Lødemel & Moreira, 2014, 
pp. 1–2). The organizational reforms aim at putting the systems 
in better shape to deliver services. This is essential in order to 
succeed with neo-liberal activation policies promoting self-gov-
ernance, motivation and individual responsibility. 
 For the individual engaging in the welfare encounter, the 
ability to take responsibility, and to hold the system to account, 
requires rational and reflexive agency. However, people are 
not necessarily in a rational and reflexive subject position at all 
times. A particular body of literature pinpoints the complexi-
ties of agency related to the welfare subject as being relational, 
dynamic, differentiated, interconnected, interdependent, inter-
subjective and interactive (Wright, 2012; see also Greener, 2002; 
Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004). This literature holds potential for a 
grounded analysis of agency in welfare encounters. 
 How service users targeted for activation measures are deal-
ing with—or in—welfare encounters is a relevant aspect of social 
work and social policy. Situated in the context of the Norwegian 
NAV reform (labour and welfare reform), this paper analyzes 
agency positions in welfare encounters, related to encounters or 
sequences over some time that is attached with bureaucratic trou-
ble or tardiness.1 The empirical analysis focuses on coordination 
issues and accountability in NAV, from the standpoint of service 
users, and the production of situated agency in this setting. This 
article contributes to social work and policy research on welfare 
encounters by outlining the shifting positions of agency for peo-
ple targeted to become activated, situated within specific bureau-
cratic contexts of a one-stop shop reform.
 In what follows, I briefly present the context of the NAV re-
form in light of accountability and the “responsible citizens” 
discourse, and then outline a specific body of literature on agen-
cy which has been developed in the context of social policy and 
social work research. After presenting the study (including data 
and methods), the empirical analysis is presented in two parts 
and followed by a discussion of the themes explored. 
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Reform Justification, Accountability
and “Responsible Citizens”
 The NAV reform was adopted by the Norwegian parliament 
in 2005, and implementation began one year later, followed by 
ambitious reform aims on behalf of the welfare subject and the 
Norwegian employment rate, as well as major organizational 
changes (Lundberg, 2012). The reform included a merger of the 
employment services and the social insurance administration, 
two central organizations in the Norwegian welfare state, and 
the coordination of the new state-level organization with the so-
cial services on the municipal level (Andreassen & Aars, 2015). 
In the political process that led to reform implementation, a spe-
cific problem representation was mobilized and gained domi-
nance—that of the multiservice user, labelled the “shuttlecock” 
(kasteball) (Syltevik, 2013). The shuttlecock was a specific kind 
of welfare subject, who needed help from more than one of the 
former welfare organizations at the same time. 
 The three welfare organizations provided different “user 
logics” in the welfare encounter, and the image of the multi-
service user being shuttled back and forth without getting the 
required help became a powerful image for poor coordination. 
The welfare services were portrayed as incapable of providing 
relevant help, resulting in passivity and dependency. The solu-
tion mobilized was organizational reform through a new one-
stop shop in order to provide integrated, holistic and “seamless” 
service provision. The reform aimed to get people back to em-
ployment and to make the services more user-friendly, holistic 
and efficient (Christensen et al., 2013).
 Organizational scholars evaluating one-stop shop reforms 
(e.g., Askim et al., 2011; Byrkjeflot et al., 2013) see them as ap-
proaches for coordinating services and improving accountabil-
ity both vertically (upwards to central government and down-
wards to citizens) and horizontally (to partners). Accountability 
may be understood as a specific social relation: “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obli-
gation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). Sullivan (2003) states that 
the more contributors there are in public decision-making, the 
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more difficult it is to specify who is accountable. As Askim et 
al. (2011, p. 1454) point out in relation to one-stop shop reforms: 
“while creating opportunities for new forms of accountability, 
[they] also pose significant challenges in terms of knowing who 
to hold accountable for what.”
 These points are actualized when observing the organiza-
tion NAV. Behind the “shop,” there are a number of other units 
and bureaus taking part in the service production, including 
casework units, call centers, special units, and a number of pri-
vate contractors providing job training, motivation, and edu-
cational programs. During the organizational reform process, 
it became increasingly clear to authorities, welfare professions, 
service users, and the general public that this new organiza-
tional structure may produce fragmentation and co-ordination 
problems of its own (Christensen et al., 2013; Ekspertgruppen, 
2015; Lundberg, 2012).
 The one-stop shops in the welfare sector are strongly re-
lated to the implementation of activation policies, and may be 
seen as a part of the second wave of activation reforms (Gubri-
um et al., 2014; Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; Minas, 2014). The re-
forms aim to activate people into employment, partly through 
a range of liberal power technologies (Barnes, 2009; Mik-Meyer 
& Villadsen, 2012). Indeed, through the discursive apparatus of 
neo-liberalism, social policy contexts and governance reforms 
have been increasingly formed by discourses such as “modern-
ization,” “efficiency,” “empowerment,” and “individual respon-
sibility.” The “responsible citizen” is increasingly expected to 
share responsibility for delivering public policy objectives by 
participating in the design, management, and governance of 
services (Barnes & Prior, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2009a, 2009b; 
Patrick, 2014; Wright, 2012). These discourses influence public 
debates, policy making and social work practices in Norway 
and elsewhere (Jessen & Tufte, 2014; Johansson & Hvinden, 
2007; Kjørstad, 2005; Nilssen, 2014; Syltevik 2013). 
 As stated above, for individuals to be responsible actors—
and to be able to hold the one-stop shop accountable—requires 
rational and reflexive agency. In this paper, welfare subjects’ 
agency positions are analyzed within the context of welfare 
encounters during a one-stop shop reform accompanied by 
strengthened activation policies. In this regard, the concept of 
agency must be revisited. 
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Conceptualizing Agency
 Agency is a highly contested concept within the social sci-
ences. In the field of social welfare, many authoritative voic-
es have put forward an understanding of agency that is more 
moralistic than analytical (for an overview, see Deacon & Mann 
1999, p. 423). According to Barnes (2000), social theory has 
borrowed such concepts as agency and choice from everyday 
discourse, where actions are characterised as voluntary rather 
than caused. Agency is a concept commonly used to “character-
ize individuals as autonomous, purposive and creative actors, 
capable of a degree of choice” (Lister, 2004, p. 125). As Lister 
(2004) points out, there is a fine line between acknowledging 
people’s agency, including the capacity to make mistakes and 
bad decisions (as everyone does), and blaming them for their 
misfortune. In focusing on agency, there is also a risk of ro-
manticizing and idealizing. Within the research literature, the 
models of agency applied can be very different. Deacon (2004) 
highlights three distinct agency models: (1) choice-making in a 
quasi-market (cf. Le Grand, 2003); (2) moral subjects acting as 
interdependent and relational beings (cf. Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 
2004); and (3) choice-making relating to welfare dependency. 
For the purpose of this article, I am inspired by the related and 
overlapping agency typologies developed by Lister (2004) and 
Hoggett (2001), as these typologies are applicable to the context 
of welfare encounters, and their understanding of agency is 
carefully situated within structure. 
 Lister distinguishes between different types of agency, 
ranging from strategic to everyday agency and from personal 
to political/citizenship agency. She labels these different types 
of agency (relating to poverty) as “getting by,” “getting (back) 
at,” “getting out,” and “getting organized.” Hoggett distin-
guishes between different models of agency and warns about a 
“lop-sided model of agency which is insufficiently sensitive to 
the passionate, tragic and contradictory dimensions of human 
experience” (Hoggett, 2001, p. 37). People do not necessarily act 
rationally nor reflexively at all times. Inspired by Freud, Hog-
gett sees people’s self as split in multiple fractions. 
 In practice, then, people may have multiple selves. He pres-
ents a quadrant of four agency models (within the discussion of 
welfare subjects), one of which is Giddens’ (1984) reflexive and 
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successful actor (reflexive	subject). Reflexivity, as Giddens sees it, is 
a positive capacity that provides constructive agency. However, 
people can be highly reflexive and yet still feel powerless about 
their situation (reflexive	 objects). Hoggett also problematizes re-
flexivity and speculates whether all agency is reflexive, or rather 
that much reflexivity actually happens post hoc, after one has 
acted (non-reflexive	subjects). When people’s confidence, respect or 
esteem is attacked, they do not necessarily resist. The experience 
of powerlessness, resulting from poverty, marginalization and 
domination of various sorts may lead to depression and aggres-
sion being turned towards oneself (non-reflexive	objects).
 Both Hoggett (2001) and Lister (2004) underline that their 
types and models of agency should be seen as continuums of 
situations or events rather than personal character traits. They 
also add a distinction between first-order and second-order 
agency. First-order agency refers to playing the system or making 
limited change for oneself; second-order agency refers to chang-
ing the system (including political agency). Hoggett encourages 
a focus on second-order agency in social policy studies, while 
Greener (2002, p. 703) encourages a focus on first-order agen-
cy (game playing within clear rules) in welfare encounters “in 
an attempt to achieve at least some level of greater transpar-
ency and accountability in the administration of benefits.” In 
this article, I am concerned with individual/first-order agency. 
Nevertheless, agency should not then be seen as isolated from 
structure (Barnes, 2000). People act and make choices in various 
circumstances, and their actions may be grounded in a range of 
different identities, moral obligations, and moralities, and may 
also be constrained by external factors. It is therefore an import-
ant task for academics in the fields of welfare, social adminis-
tration, and social work to produce “a more nuanced account 
of agency as situational and variable, produced and negotiated 
through contextualized interaction” (Wright, 2012, p. 313).
The Research
 The objective of the research project was to explore service 
users’ experiences of their encounters (in a broad sense) with 
the new organization, NAV, during the reform process, thereby 
enabling an exploration of the reforming organization through 
these experiences. The research project aimed to cover insights 
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from service users who were in the center of NAVs mandate, 
which were targeted for activation measures and that the NAV 
reform was said to better address. Interviewees were recruit-
ed with assistance from two local NAV offices in two different 
municipalities which sent invitation letters to service users re-
ceiving rehabilitation allowances, sick leave benefits, and un-
employment benefits, and from the NAV unit “Intro og kval-
ifisering” (see Lundberg 2012 for more details). I interviewed 
29 people (22–66 years old) who were involved with NAV as 
service users and benefit recipients, and who had wide-rang-
ing backgrounds with regard to former employment, as well 
as social and medical history. All interviewees had mixed ex-
periences with NAV, and all interviewees had experiences that 
could be related to the reform process which was ongoing at 
the time of the interview. The majority of the interviewees were 
receiving vocational rehabilitation allowances at the time of the 
interview. This group turned out to be useful informants in the 
study because of the breadth and duration of their experiences 
with NAV, consisting of multiple encounters that highlighted 
the situated aspects of agency.
 Memory might be biased, and interviewees’ accounts may 
be self-protective or self-righteous to some degree. As Hoggett 
(2001) notes, much reflexivity may also happen post hoc. Indi-
viduals may or may not be able to reflect on their agency or 
the lack of such agency within specific contexts. These are valid 
points, but qualitative interviews are still often the most acces-
sible way of exploring lived experience.
 I began my empirical investigations by locating the problem-
atic of the everyday world of the actors that I was interested in 
studying (Smith, 1987). This is a methodological and analytical 
choice that privileges the individual informant’s point of view, 
and that affects my focus on the organization, which becomes 
more indistinct than, for instance, in mainstream organization-
al research analysis (see, e.g., Askim et al., 2011). By exploring 
the subjects’ experiences and points of view, fragments of the 
NAV bureaucracy and how the individual has acted towards 
the system are visualised.
 Interview transcriptions were analyzed in several stages. 
Anchored in thematic analysis, the study has resulted in pub-
lications on a number of subjects relating to welfare reform, 
individual–system relations, health/illness and work ethics and 
126 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
stigmatization (see Lundberg, 2012). In this article, I particularly 
focus on agency in welfare encounters. I have therefore chosen 
examples from the data in which I find purposeful to illustrate 
the situatedness, complexity and contextuality of agency posi-
tions. To give insights to the multiple elements of shifting and 
situated agency when dealing with NAV, the illustrations in this 
article are chosen from the experiences of service users who all 
have experiences with former administrations (to varying de-
grees), have been employed for years prior to their need for ser-
vices from NAV, and have faced multiple problems related to 
unemployment and illness. 
Navigating in a Fragmented System
 The individual—NAV relationships are contextual and there-
fore variable, but NAV has certain ways of responding to the in-
dividual request that imply accountability issues. A general ac-
count that many of the interviewees in the study shared was the 
image of NAV as being a chaotic and fragmented organization 
that was challenging to navigate. Although this was a theme with 
variations and nuances, one common experience concerned the 
shifting of caseworkers. Jonas turned to NAV after a combination 
of unemployment and a broken arm. In the process of deciding 
an appropriate form of activation, he experienced five caseworker 
changes. For people on benefits linked to demands for activation, 
contact with caseworkers may be crucial. For Jonas, it was critical 
to have an available caseworker to hold to account at this time. 
Post hoc, he reflects on the responsibility relationship regarding 
caseworkers and the system:
The last one didn’t have anything to apologise for because 
she didn’t even know I’d been waiting. All the Post-its stuck 
on top of the other Post-its saying, ‘Call him about a meeting’, 
that’s where the mistake was. (Jonas, 30s)
 Jonas’ experience indicates accountability issues linked to 
whom to hold accountable (Askim et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2003). 
However, the issue is more complex than the mere shifting of 
caseworkers at the local NAV offices. Most of the informants 
learned that their caseworkers were constrained by what 
happened at the regional casework units. This represented an 
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organizational change: In the former offices, the service users 
mostly dealt directly with the very same employees who pro-
cessed their cases. Ideally, this new internal division of labour 
in the “seamless” NAV system should not be a concern for ser-
vice users (Askim et al., 2011). However, for the individual deal-
ing with several caseworkers at the local NAV office, as well as 
several units in the system, it is often hard to know whom to 
hold accountable for what. 
 The individual–system relationship cannot be evenly bal-
anced. The individual welfare subject has more insights into 
his/her situation and needs than does the system, while the 
system has more insights into its resources and measures. In 
complex cases—which those involving activation often are—
information becomes a critical resource for the individual ser-
vice user. Hildegunn, a former teacher in her early 50s who 
suffered from serious illness, experienced the critical issue of 
poor information first hand. She was changing from sick-leave 
benefits to vocational rehabilitation, but her caseworker asked 
her to delay applying so that her health condition could be eval-
uated. Hildegunn was assured that she had time to wait, but 
when she finally applied, she got a letter from the NAV case-
work unit informing her that the casework process would take 
three months: 
When I received that letter, I just felt (…). I was just irate. First, 
it was just so disrespectful. I felt … how could they do such 
a thing? I had done everything properly. So I called them—I 
was calm and explained the situation to them. They told me 
that, well, that’s the way it is, it will take approximately three 
months. I asked what I should do when the sick-leave bene-
fits ran out, as I wouldn’t have a penny to live on. Nothing. 
Well, I could apply for social benefits, they said. Then, I got 
so angry. I had done everything properly in order to get what 
I was entitled to in time; this is not my fault, it’s their fault. 
(Hildegunn, early 50s)
 Hildegunn felt that she was treated with courtesy in her en-
counter with NAV on the phone, even though the employee at 
the call center could not help her solve her problem. She was en-
couraged to send a “service complaint” to NAV, which she did, 
although 18 months later, she still had not received a response. 
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Furthermore, she was referred to a different part of the NAV 
system—the social services, for immediate help. 
 Hildegunn was not eager to apply for social benefits, which 
she felt carried stigma and humiliation. She felt a lack of options 
in the situation, which was ultimately solved by way of a private 
loan from a family member. This aspect of “everyday agency” 
represents relational and interconnected agency (Wright, 2012), 
a resource obviously not available for all service users in sim-
ilar situations. Following Titterton (1992), Lister (2004, pp. 130–
131) sees personal, social and material coping resources as an 
unequally distributed yet important aspect of “getting by.” By 
viewing Hildegunn’s activation of family resources in this light, 
one can grasp the aspect of agency in this situation, although 
she described herself as being powerless in the situation. 
 One aspect of agency in welfare encounters relates to so-
cial goodwill from employees (Dubois, 2010). The issue of social 
goodwill is interesting, as it may depend on specific individual 
relationships. It also shows the negotiated and interconnected 
dimension of agency between service users and case-workers 
(Barnes & Prior, 2009; Wright, 2012). Aslaug, who was in her 50s, 
experienced a high level of service provision in her encounter 
with NAV. She even obtained the direct phone number of her 
caseworker in the casework unit so that she would not have to 
phone the call center if she had problems filling out her forms. 
This is a service imbued with certain exclusivity. Having been 
a caseworker in the public sector herself for many years, she 
understood “the language of administration,” as she put it. Her 
knowledge may be seen as a cultural coping resource (Lister, 
2004; Titterton, 1992) that helped her in the welfare encounter. 
 Social goodwill from caseworkers comes in several forms. 
One of the activation technologies deployed by NAV to serve 
people undergoing vocational rehabilitation is a standardized 
electronic “employment status form” (ESF), which service us-
ers have to submit electronically every two weeks. Einar, who 
was in his 40s, received benefits because of complex personal 
problems involving serious mental illness and difficulties deal-
ing with deadlines and money, which had resulted in a diffi-
cult financial situation. In periods of serious depression, Einar 
failed to manage the ESF, and so his benefits stopped. Therefore, 
his caseworker began to manage the ESF for him. At one point 
Einar’s caseworker was replaced. As a result, the ESF was not 
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submitted during a period where he was severely depressed to 
the point of rarely even getting out of bed. His benefits were cut 
and his bills went unpaid. Einar explains:
Suddenly the benefits stopped. (…) The last thing they told 
me was that I didn’t have to send in these forms, as I’d had 
problems with that. (…) I’d gotten a new caseworker without 
them letting me know, and she didn’t take care of it [admin-
ister his ESF]. And it took a while before I discovered it. (…) 
It was apparently a problem with communication in the NAV 
system, but I was the one who got burnt. (Einar, 40s)
 Einar suffered from depression at the time. This is a condi-
tion that Hoggett (2001, p. 47) describes as a “collapse of agen-
cy.” However, his first caseworker’s goodwill enabled Einar to 
be kept secure financially. This was an act with substantial con-
sequences for Einar’s life situation at the time, and illustrates 
the relational aspect of agency (Wright, 2012). 
Welfare Subjects as Customers, Salesmen,
Quasi-bureaucrats and Frustrated Citizens
 At the time when Jonas (introduced above) experienced fre-
quent caseworker changes, his case was at a critical point. For 
the purpose of illustrating the (sometimes) dynamic nature of 
agency positions, I will here focus on the step before, when he 
was granted vocational rehabilitation in the first place:
I had spent quite a bit of time online really, to check all my 
rights. And I knew those things well (…). It’s really very 
quick, all the consultations, but that’s because I had prepared 
myself so well, and that is what they said as well. I had read 
all my rights, everything I was supposed to do, up front. And 
I was a very pleasant customer for them … or user. Right? 
Plain and simple. And they told me so. (Jonas, 30s)
 The role Jonas describes taking on is very much in line with 
Hoggett’s (2001) “reflexive subject” and Lister’s (2004) “strategic 
agency.” Jonas describes himself preparing for the meeting and 
looking into what kind of agency he has in the situation, learn-
ing the codes of the system. Perhaps coincidentally, he even 
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describes himself as a customer, a term not commonly used in 
the Norwegian welfare policy context. Although not in a cus-
tomer role where he can choose between different providers in 
a market, his term of choice may reflect a mentality, a specific 
orientation towards the public services that may have helped 
him, as he does not feel any stigma, shame or embarrassment. 
On the contrary, he comes with high expectations of what the 
system can do for him. 
 While such expectations may illustrate a customer mental-
ity, or at least an ideal actor making choices in a welfare “qua-
si-market” (Le Grand, 2003), his behaviour may also be seen 
as taking the role of a salesman, as he explains, justifying and 
selling his case to NAV in order to get access to the services 
and resources he wants. This form of “making out” (Greener, 
2002; Hoggett, 2001) relates to an important aspect of account-
ability: the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his/her 
actions. Jonas expected NAV to do so. Although he faced diffi-
culties closing the contract with NAV, he managed to get what 
he wanted, namely the funding of two years of education at a 
private learning institution.
 Before getting the final approval from NAV regarding his 
choice of education, Jonas was faced with shifting casework-
ers who failed to prepare his case. In this situation, his roles as 
customer and/or salesman had shortcomings. He tried asking 
different units in NAV for help, including his local NAV office 
and the call center. He kept calling, and kept going down to the 
office, insisting on being helped. Newman and Clarke (2009b) 
have shown how subversion of identities (such as service user, 
consumer, activist, citizen) may be used by individuals in order 
to exert their power. Jonas’ change of strategy, then, demon-
strates the dynamic side of agency. 
 Acts of subversion in order to make the system adapt to 
them and their needs took several forms in the narratives of 
the participants in this research. Some interviewees told stories 
that involved engaging help from actors outside the NAV sys-
tem, such as their union, and in one case, a social worker at 
a hospital who helped by mobilizing a doctor to write a letter 
of recommendation to handle the individual’s request for vo-
cational rehabilitation as quickly as possible (Lundberg, 2012). 
These are acts of “getting by” and “playing the system” (Lister, 
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2004), reminding us of the sometimes interconnected and situa-
tional dimensions of agency (Wright, 2012). 
 Some of the interviewees also referred to situations where 
they tried to coordinate different units within the system. Case-
workers at the local NAV office might ask service users to con-
tact the casework unit for help. At a certain point, service users 
would try to make the different NAV units communicate with 
each other. In this case, they were trying to coordinate different 
“hands” in the system to work together. In doing so, they often 
referred to NAV’s written guidelines, which require a level of 
agency relating to a sense of bureaucratic competence and re-
flexive agency (Hoggett, 2001).
 Such acts may lead to taking positions as quasi-bureaucrats. 
Erna, a former teacher in her 40s, with a long career as a welfare 
subject in former and current welfare organizations, exempli-
fies this role clearly. She had learned a whole repertoire of tricks 
and skills to deal with the system, having experienced a variety 
of practices, including several bureaucratic errors that had led 
her into difficulties. I asked her if she thought it was difficult to 
manage the bureaucratic procedures:
No, I’m totally into that stuff, that’s no problem at all. It’s rep-
etition, repetition. However, that’s where they try to catch 
you: ‘Perhaps your documentation is not in order?’ Not at all. 
(Erna, 40s)
 Occasionally she had experienced a delay in the processing 
of her case because NAV had lost her documents. Therefore, she 
started to take a copy of all the papers she handed in to NAV, 
and when talking to NAV on the phone, she made notes and 
asked for the names of the people to whom she was talking. In 
this way, she developed a routine and acted according to the 
role of a quasi-bureaucrat. This represents a particular every-
day agency strategy developed from a particular bureaucratic 
context of the failings of the bureaucracy.
 At one point, Erna submitted a receipt to get a refund for a 
tuition fee. Eventually, she went down to her local NAV office to 
ask why she had not yet received her money. The employee at 
NAV said that they had not received any receipt:
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I take a copy of all papers I hand in to them. When I hand it 
in, I demand that they stamp it. They … (say) okay, but they 
don’t like it. And I say, ‘And ideally, I’d like your name, too.’ 
(laughs) One time I handed in a receipt for some tuition mon-
ey. (…) After a few weeks, I went down and I asked them why 
the money hadn’t come. And they asked me where I handed it 
in, because they couldn’t find the receipt. I handed it in here, I 
said, so you must have lost it. ‘Nothing gets lost here’, she told 
me. ‘Well, if you believe that, that’s fine’, I told her, ‘but you 
can have a new copy from me, with the NAV stamp on it.’ You 
should have seen her then. She got mad. (Erna, 40s)
 This example of the welfare subject acting as a quasi-bu-
reaucrat represents a form of agency that could be interpreted 
as “getting by,” which is not too different from the reflexive sub-
ject position Jonas assumed (analyzed above). However, in this 
case the welfare encounter takes place in a social context where 
Erna’s actions may also be understood as “getting (back) at” the 
system by beating it at its own game (Lister, 2004). The account 
shows a lack of trust and negative expectations regarding the 
system’s capability to manage Erna’s request, guided by expe-
rience. Her act makes NAV accountable by documenting their 
errors through the same textual devices that the system itself 
deploys in the management of its tasks. 
 As illustrated, these welfare subjects do not remain passive; 
they are active actors trying to solve bureaucratic issues and 
to make the system accountable to them. Some of them do this 
with greater success than others, and their agency positions 
may shift in different bureaucratic contexts. A number of more 
or less strategic attempts to activate NAV to be accountable in 
order to sort out bureaucratic errors are identified in Lundberg 
(2012). One interviewee described simplifying his case so that 
he would be treated more smoothly in the system, even though 
he knew he might be on the edge of the law in doing so. Anoth-
er interviewee reported that in order to get sympathy from his 
caseworker and perhaps a quicker processing of his case when 
his pension was mistakenly stopped, he lied about his current 
economic situation (Lundberg, 2012). Such moves may be mor-
ally questionable, but they may represent a rational action strat-
egy in the moment. 
 Einar, quoted above, felt a need to develop a relationship 
with his new caseworker in order to give her insight into his 
133Chapter TitleT e Welfare Subject in the “One-stop-Shop”
current (variable) health situation. Unfortunately, he had trou-
ble getting in touch with her:
I was told that I’d been assigned a new caseworker. And that 
caseworker, I’ve still never actually met her. I’ve been down 
(to the office) many times now; it’s been over a year. (…) I’ve 
asked, I’ve called, I’ve been down there several times and told 
them that I want to talk to her, I’ve sent letters and emails, I’ve 
emailed her superior and referred to the attempts that I’ve 
made to get in touch. And I’ve asked her to get in touch with 
me and … At one point; I heard that she was moving over to 
a different job, and that they thought that was why she hadn’t 
contacted me. (Einar, 40s)
 As indicated, these accounts, which highlight the position 
of the “reflexive object,” are common in the data. Furthermore, 
several interviewees tried to overrule their caseworker by ask-
ing the management at their local NAV office to assign a new 
caseworker. As service users do not have a formal right to 
change their caseworkers, this may or may not work, depend-
ing on the social goodwill of the management. Service users 
may also use their voice by making formal complaints. At one 
point, Erna sent a formal complaint to NAV’s complaint unit re-
garding failing casework procedures, loss of documents, and 
failure to process her case on time, as well as several experienc-
es of bad service. She sent a lengthy letter and was disappointed 
with the short, formal letter she received in reply.
 When welfare subjects feel that they repeatedly “hit a wall” 
within the system, there is the danger that over time, they ex-
perience a “failure of recognition” and frustration, which may 
lead to uncontrolled anger (Hoggett’s non-reflexive subject) or 
even mental illness, such as depression (Hoggett’s non-reflexive 
object). Erna sometimes struggled to control her anger:
I had high blood pressure and felt totally miserable, and I was 
short of breath and short tempered. So then I started to get 
back at them. I banged on tables and counters. (…) I remember 
that I told them (loudly): ‘Where is the merger? Where is this 
fantastic merger between you? Where is it? You’re more distant 
than ever before!’ (…) You’re in a very vulnerable situation and 
kind of fighting, sort of on the margins of society. I faced some 
kind of opposition to getting my rights. (…) It’s horrible to say 
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it, but I understand if someone goes berserk at the NAV office. 
I’d go so far as to say I understand the mechanism inside the 
human being when they finally… yes. (Erna, 40s)
 In the interview, Erna illustrated perhaps all four of Hog-
gett’s (2001) types. In the account above, she reflects on the long-
term consequences of suffering and “the real experiences of 
powerlessness” (Hoggett, 2001) after years of fighting a system 
that does not seem accountable to her. Her understanding of 
the mechanisms that make people snap or lose control of their 
emotions at the local NAV office indicates a painful realization 
of this point. 
 This point is relevant when evaluating threats and violence 
in welfare encounters. Since 2012, the Norwegian media and 
the national management of NAV have placed the problems of 
violence and threats from service users on the agenda, report-
ing an increase in threats and violence towards employees (e.g., 
Stavanger Aftenblad, 2013). In the summer of 2013 these issues 
also took a dramatic turn as a NAV employee died after being 
knife-stabbed on duty (Aftenposten, 2013). Threats and violence 
represent serious work environment issues for frontline work-
ers in work and welfare agencies. In the research literature on 
welfare encounters, violence from welfare subjects is interpret-
ed as a last resort for the underprivileged, as “the argument of 
those who have run out of arguments” (Dubois 2010, p. 167). 
Many of these actions also have a psychosocial dimension that 
can be understood as non-rational, “bad agency” (Hoggett, 
2001; Wright, 2012). 
Conclusion
  While the intentions of the NAV reform, one of the largest 
reforms in Norwegian welfare state history, were oriented to-
wards service integration, many service users experienced a 
reproduction of dysfunctions in the new organization (see An-
dreassen & Aars, 2015; Ekspertgruppen, 2015; Lundberg, 2012). 
Problems illustrated in this paper include shifting caseworkers 
and various systemic errors related to information flows and 
coordination issues. As stated in the introduction, the paper 
aims to answer how service users perceive challenges with 
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coordination and fragmentation, and what kinds of agency 
positions are produced or required in this setting. 
 In the welfare subject–welfare system relationship, the in-
dividual is accountable to NAV through a range of duties, and 
the system has a range of routines, techniques and resources 
to sanction the individual if he/she does not carry them out. 
Requests from service users are treated within the system’s ad-
ministrative and institutional frameworks, technologies and 
bureaucratic procedures. Service users may complain through 
NAV’s internal system, or they could make their voice heard 
in the media or by contacting politicians, ombudsmen or ser-
vice user representatives. As shown in this article, they also 
try to make the system accountable to help them by referring 
to official guidelines, by acting as coordinators and quasi-bu-
reaucrats, and by selling their case. An individual may take 
different and shifting positions in different situations, and the 
ability to do so is often required in order for the welfare subject 
to achieve favorable outcomes. Those who manage to contribute 
to constructive encounters leading to successful outcomes for 
themselves demonstrate agency as reflexive subjects. 
 Welfare encounters may be sites for social investments for 
some and sites for marginalization processes for others. As 
shown in the analysis, reflexivity is also needed in order to cope 
in simple in-the-moment situations in everyday welfare encoun-
ters. As I have illustrated, some of these coping strategies may 
turn into resistance. As Hoggett (2001) states in his seminal pa-
per, welfare institutions do not exist exclusively through the in-
teraction between individuals. The individual may experience 
the welfare state as a helping hand or as a closed fist. In that 
regard, the institutional apparatus of the welfare state under 
strengthened activation policies may contribute in producing 
“bad agency.” 
 The analyses in this article have shown tensions being re-
produced in the context of a one-stop shop reform linked to “the 
second wave of activation reforms” (Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; 
Minas, 2014). The empirical descriptions are in line with the 
findings of a recent and thorough report on NAV and its users 
(Ekspertgruppen, 2015). While the aims of providing integrated 
services and getting more welfare subjects into paid employ-
ment are yet to be realized, a straightforward answer to how the 
lessons from the NAV reform will influence Norwegian social 
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policy in the time to come is not easy to find. On a general level 
there is strong support for the Norwegian welfare model, but 
organizational reforms that are unable to fulfil their goals may 
clear the path for new answers to policy issues. 
 Recently, the lessons from the NAV reform have been mobi-
lized by the current (right-wing) government’s announcement 
of an implementation of more “flexible” labor legislation. One 
of the main policies in the new legislation will allow more, and 
longer, temporary employment contracts. These plans, which 
mark a shift in the Norwegian model, are backed by the argu-
ment that NAV is unable to help people with disabilities into 
employment (Arum, 2013). According to the proponents of the 
new policies, people with disabilities and people with scarce 
work experience will be able to get a foot in the door if employ-
ers can take them on temporarily, to try before they buy. In this 
way, failures of the NAV reform are mobilized to usher in policy 
changes in the neighboring policy field of labor legislation. 
 The lessons from the reform may also be used in other ways. 
Policy makers and other stakeholders aiming for quick solutions 
may announce welfare reforms more heavily grounded in sym-
bolic politics of individual responsibility. This discourse, linked 
to an agency model of choice-making related to welfare depen-
dency (see Deacon, 2004), may contribute to “othering” of under-
privileged groups (Lister, 2004) in order to push forward a less 
inclusive-oriented and more disciplinary activation regime. This 
may produce frustrated citizens and destructive agency posi-
tions. Therefore, in order to hold policy makers accountable for 
their decisions, they need to be reminded that the welfare state 
should function as a security net, even for those who are not ca-
pable of a rational, reflexive subject position at all times. 
Endnotes
1As elsewhere, the terms used to describe those targeted by welfare 
organisations are shifting away from, for example, “client” and “claim-
ant.” Currently in Norway, “user” is the politically correct term, in 
what is partly an effort to avoid stigma (Lundberg, 2012, 2013). The term 
“customer,” which is favored in, for example, Britain’s Jobcentre Plus, 
has never dominated in Norway. 
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Since its inception, social work has professed an abiding commitment 
to social justice. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the few professions to have 
maintained	such	an	obligation.	This	pledge	is	officially	inscribed	in	the	
Code	of	Ethics	of	the	National	Association	of	Social	Workers	(NASW).	
This	document	affirms	the	pursuit	of	social	justice	as	a	core	value,	not	
just for members of the Association, but also for social workers in gen-
eral.	However,	what	kind	of	social	justice	does	the	Association	advocate	
and how just is it? While answers to these questions are critical to the 
Association’s members and broader social work community, they are, 
without doubt, of vital importance to those whom social work seeks to 
serve.	This	paper	examines	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	principles	of	so-
cial justice subscribed to by the NASW.
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Is Social Justice Necessary?
 We have long sought to perfect justice (Sen, 2009). The jour-
ney so far has been slow and arduous, and it is apparent that 
a relatively large number of today’s pilgrims consider them-
selves to be comparatively no better off than their predecessors 
(Chomsky, 2017). Even by contemporary standards, many in the 
North, East and South would not deny that considerably more 
progress could be made to expand just economic, political and 
social frontiers. The promise of rights, entitlements, opportuni-
ties and resources for ordinary citizens, which were once held 
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by only a small, insular elite, have fallen far short of the ide-
al (Piketty, 2014). Nevertheless, the last man to proclaim that 
the destructive economic and political history of (il)liberalism 
was at an end, Francis Fukuyama (1992), was patently wrong. In 
fact, some have argued that the defense of liberal democracies 
in recent times poses just as serious a threat to civil liberty and 
human rights as has illiberal aggression (Grayling, 2010; Wal-
dron, 2012). Indeed, even Fukuyama (2014) has retreated from 
his earlier exuberance and conceded that political institutions 
in the U.S. are in decay, and as Zygmunt Bauman (2011) con-
tends, there is a real danger of Western nations descending into 
what has been coined “liberticide” (p. 20), i.e., the gradual and 
silent demise of personal freedom.
 Along the path from New York through Guantanamo Bay to 
Abu Graib and beyond, Westerners have become increasingly 
accustomed to accepting ever-diminishing degrees of freedom 
with equanimity. “We have forgotten the sad lesson learned by 
Martin Niemöller, the Lutheran pastor and victim of Nazi per-
secution,” writes Bauman (2011):
First, they took the communists, he mused, but I was not 
a communist, so I kept silent. Then they came after trade 
unionists, and as I was not a trade unionist, I said nothing. 
Then they came after Jews, but I was not a Jew … And after 
Catholics, but I was not a Catholic … Then they came for me 
… By that time there was no one left to speak up for anyone. 
(pp. 20–21)
 Greater justice remains an indispensable, though distant, 
ambition. The fact that justice must be vigorously pursued is 
a major reason for the continuing relevance of social work. In 
pursuing justice, and its more recent offshoot, social justice 
(Barry, 2005), a profession like social work must confront the 
vexing question: What does social justice require? This paper 
examines the official response of the National Association of 
Social Workers (NASW), and asks: What model of social justice 
does it proclaim, and is it just enough? The paper clarifies the 
nature and scope of the model of social justice subscribed to by 
the Association, and contends that it must be certain that it rep-
resents the most robust, comprehensive and generous scheme 
possible. Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice offers such a possibility. 
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To fully comprehend the gravity of the NASWs response, a cur-
sory survey of theories of social justice is first in order.
A Sense of Social Justice
 A sense of justice is, according to John Rawls (1971), an innate 
capacity and natural proclivity. Nevertheless, as Marc Hauser 
(2006) explains, while each of us is endowed with a moral faculty, 
i.e., a capacity that enables us to automatically generate seem-
ingly universal, albeit often unconscious, judgments concern-
ing justice, this is subject to parametric variation in respect to 
culture, circumstance and time. If this is so, then, regrettably, 
our sense of justice and capacity to act on it is by no means uni-
form. Moreover, we can simply choose to ignore our more just 
insights in the quest for personal gain (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). 
History reveals the litany of grave injustices that attest to the 
powerful impulse towards the satisfaction of self rather than 
mutual interests. Normative systems of social justice have been 
developed to curtail the excesses inherent in idiosyncratic, i.e., 
private or privileged, schemes.
Systems of Social Justice
 In essence, normative systems of social justice are based on 
general rules that set out what constitutes the right thing to do 
and a good life in addition to the institutional arrangements re-
quired for optimizing the attainment of these (Vanderschraaf, 
2011). Despite the importance of achieving this aim, there is a 
surprisingly limited range of available systems. They are to a 
large extent mutually exclusive and posit organizing princi-
ples that not only vary, but may also be incompatible with each 
other, in both theory and practice. There is, as a consequence, 
considerable variation in the substance, scope and outcome of 
social justice afforded by them. At the very least, they can be 
either “thick” or “thin” (Walzer, 1994; Williams, 1995).
 Thin conceptualizations are based on rudimentary and 
commonplace constituents of social justice. Although they are 
undeniably limited and narrow, thin forms of social justice are, 
nevertheless, neither simplistic nor inconsequential. As Mi-
chael Walzer (1994) pointed out, “there isn’t much that is more 
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important than ‘justice,’ minimally understood” (p. 6). Indeed, 
this is justice “close to the bone” (Walzer, p. 6). Thick models of 
social justice, by contrast, are more comprehensive and pluralis-
tic. They attempt to encompass differences in subjective interest 
and cultural expression.
 Thinner rather than thicker schemes become most apparent 
in the face of gross injustice. Deceit, murder, torture, enslave-
ment and tyranny are paradigmatic atrocities recognized as 
unjust in most, if not all, social orders, for reasons unconnected 
with contrasting shades of cultural meanings or shared under-
standings of what is right or good. But, minimalism is not, as 
Walzer (1994) made clear, foundational. “Minimalism makes for 
a certain limited, though important and heartening solidarity, 
but it doesn’t make for a full-blooded universal doctrine” (Wal-
zer, 1994, p. 11). Once again, this constraint serves to narrow the 
range of available options. 
Thick, Thicker, and Thickest Social Justice
“To ask whether a society is just,” Michael Sandel (2010) posits:
is to ask how it distributes the things it prizes—income and 
wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices 
and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right 
way; it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions 
begin when we ask what people are due, and why. (p. 19)
There are essentially three approaches to the question of the just dis-
tribution of goods: virtue, welfare and freedom. Each of these norm-
based models of distributive social justice varies in thickness.
Social Justice as Virtue
 Of the three ideal forms, social justice as virtue is perhaps 
the thinnest. Derived from Aristotelian and Platonic origins, it 
rests on the cultivation of virtues that are deemed excellent and 
merit recognition, reward and emulation. Virtue-based social 
justice attempts to ensure that people get what they deserve. 
Just desert is virtually dependent on one’s character. Thus, a just 
outcome is one in which each recipient benefits in proportion to 
his or her desert.
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The notion that a just society ought to affirm particular virtues 
and conceptions of a decent life based upon these, has an intui-
tive and, despite its antiquarian origins, popular appeal. “There 
is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and 
wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distrib-
uted according to virtue” (Rawls, 1971, p. 310).
 The ascription of virtue to character has served as justifica-
tion for discriminating those deserving access to social goods 
and services from the undeserving. Few, if any, social service 
programs, past or present, are devoid of eligibility criteria re-
quiring value judgments. Workfare programs, for example, 
are particularly discerning about the work ethic of the unem-
ployed. Indeed, there are some in social work who insist on 
the relevance of virtue, and by extension, merit, in ethical deci-
sion-making (Dolgoff, Harrington, & Loewenberg, 2012). 
 This ideal of social justice has inspired political movements 
from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other. As Sand-
el (2010) argues, the notion of virtue is just as likely to find favor 
among the Taliban as it is to the Moral Majority. However, apart 
from the significant difficulty involved in distinguishing merit 
from legitimate expectations, which even ardent conservatives 
like Thomas Sowell (1999) admit is insurmountable, the idea of 
making the distribution of social justice contingent on virtue, 
however refined, would seem anathema to liberal societies, as 
it risks lapsing into intolerance, coercion and blame. Social jus-
tice derived from, and dispensed on, the basis of intrinsic worth 
and moral desert guarantees a maldistribution of social goods. 
It privileges individual virtue and ignores institutional vice in 
remedying cases of injustice (Young, 2011). Surely, virtue is, and 
ought to remain, its own reward?
Social Justice as Welfare
 Approaches to social justice that focus on welfare constitute 
a radical departure from the narrow confines of an exempla-
ry character. They are instrumental rather than expressive and 
rely on reason and rationality as opposed to intuition and aes-
thetics. The most influential account of why and how welfare 
ought to be maximized is utilitarianism (Sandel, 2010). Utilitar-
ianism was founded by the eighteenth century English moral 
philosopher and legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1789/1996), 
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and expounded upon a century later by his successor, John Stu-
art Mill (1859/1979). At the core of this doctrine lies a simple and 
appealing notion. Simply put, utilitarians posit that the highest 
principle of justice is to maximize the overall balance of plea-
sure over pain and thereby the greatest happiness for the great-
est number.
 Whereas Bentham (1789/1996) recognized no qualitative dis-
tinction among pleasures and believed they could all be mea-
sured and compared on a single scale, Mill (1861/1979) believed 
it was possible to discern higher from lower pleasures—to 
assess the quality, not just the quantity or intensity of desires. 
However, Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to recast utilitarianism as a 
less calculating and more discriminating doctrine, carried him 
well beyond the confines of the utilitarian orthodoxy, and un-
dermined its most redeeming feature, that of impartiality. For 
Bentham (1789/1996), it was presumptuous to judge some plea-
sures as inherently better or worse than others. Rather people’s 
preferences were to be taken as given, without passing judge-
ment on their moral worth. To do so would be to return to the 
same problem posed by indeterminate virtues. Thus, all pref-
erences count equally. Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to refine util-
itarianism and prevent it from reducing everything to a crude 
calculus of pleasure and pain inevitably required a moral ideal 
independent of utility itself.
 The pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain has, in es-
sence, retained its potency both as a source of motivation and 
an end in itself. Utilitarianism continues to be a highly prag-
matic doctrine that is entirely focused on promoting whatev-
er proves useful for creating the greatest happiness, or welfare 
in contemporary terms, for the greatest number. The means to 
happiness, for today’s utilitarians, is prosperity (Sandel, 2010). 
Aggregated prosperity makes people better off than they would 
otherwise be as individuals, raises their standard of living and 
makes the provision of social welfare affordable.
 The idea of maximizing welfare by spurring economic 
growth has become firmly embedded in free market societies 
such ours. However, while utilitarianism has led to prosperi-
ty it has been at the expense of deep and widening immisera-
tion. In fact, what was intended to realize the greater, common 
good might be said to have resulted in its antithesis. Econom-
ic inequality, according to Lawrence, Bernstein and Allegretto 
147Chapter TitleTitle: Is It Just Enough?
(2006) is steeper in the United States than in any other democ-
racy. The richest one percent of Americans possess over a third 
of the nation’s wealth, more than the combined wealth of the 
bottom 90 percent of American families (Lawrence, Bernstein & 
Allegretto, 2006). Welfare is undoubtedly becoming less rather 
than more extensive. 
 The fact that utilitarianism lacks moral sentiment means 
that it is indiscriminate about how utility is construed. As Peter 
Singer (2011) recently reaffirmed, “the classical utilitarian re-
gards an action as right if it produces happiness for all affected 
by it than any alternative action and wrong if it does not,” with 
the qualification that “more happiness means net happiness, af-
ter deducting any suffering or misery that may also have been 
caused by the action.” Hence, a utilitarian will judge lying as 
bad in some circumstances and good in others, depending on 
its consequences” (pp. 2-3). What is good and what is right, in 
other words, is not merely coincidental, it can be contradictory. 
John Rawls (1971), for instance, observed that on the utilitarian 
view, “slavery, serfdom, and other infractions of liberty,” have 
historically been regarded as both right and wrong, good and 
bad. According to Rawls (1971):
Whether these institutions are justified is made to depend 
upon whether actuarial calculations show that they yield a 
higher balance of happiness. To this the utilitarian replies 
that the nature of society is such that these calculations are 
normally against such denials of liberty. Utilitarians seek to 
account for the claims of liberty and equality by making cer-
tain standard assumptions. Thus they suppose that persons 
have similar utility functions which satisfy the condition of 
diminishing marginal utility. (pp. 158–159)
Thus, the rejection of institutional “infractions of liberty and 
equality,” should they be recognized as such, are made on utili-
tarian, and not humanitarian, grounds. According to utilitarian 
logic, then, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with torture. 
Any objection to it must show that the consequences of practis-
ing it, will, taken as a whole, cause more harm than good.
 The same turn of logic could also be called upon to support 
a radical redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. With 
so many having so little and so few possessing so much more 
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such a transfer might be calculated to create more happiness 
overall. However, utilitarians can simply invoke the Bentham-
ite maxim that “everybody is to count for one, nobody for more 
than one” (Mill, 1861/1979), in defense of any qualms about 
manifest disparities, and hence, need to redistribute. What mat-
ters most in utilitarianism is to maximize, not equalize, the net 
distribution of welfare. Thus, the principle of utility licenses 
some to forego greater life prospects for the sake of others, par-
ticularly among those who are already less favorably situated, 
without considering this an injustice. 
Social Justice as Freedom
 Like social justice as virtue and welfare, social justice as free-
dom takes the worth of the individual as its starting point. How-
ever, it represents a substantial departure from the former in pos-
iting that each person has an innate right to freedom, irrespective 
of virtue or utility that a just society is bound to respect. Howev-
er, they are deeply divided over the depth of the entitlement and 
value of the liberty conferred. At one extreme are the advocates 
of an unfettered right to freedom known as libertarians.
 Libertarians insist that a precondition for the exercise of 
free agency is the abolition, or at the very least, minimization, 
of anything which might contravene the boundaries of personal 
entitlement and discretion. They are particularly sensitive to in-
trusions into private affairs for the purpose of providing public 
welfare, and are bitterly opposed to the taxation and redistri-
bution of income and wealth earned through individual thrift, 
industry and prudence, to finance it.
 Robert Nozick (1974) ranks amongst the most widely known 
and influential of libertarian thinkers. Nozick (1974) began his 
seminal defence of libertarianism in Anarchy, State and Utopia, 
by declaring that “individuals have rights that are so strong and 
far-reaching that there are things no person or group, including 
the state and its officials, can or may do to them, without vio-
lating these rights” (p. ix). He concluded that “a minimal state, 
limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. ix). Anything more, including being taxed to 
help others, is completely unjust; in fact it “is on a par with 
forced labour” (p. 169). State services, including enforcement 
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and protection, are derived from private contributions. Little 
wonder that Nozick (1974) added that “many persons will reject 
our conclusions instantly, knowing they don’t want to believe 
anything so apparently callous towards the needs and suffering 
of others” (p. ix).
 Yet, critics have been no more acerbic about the tenets of 
libertarianism than Nozick himself. In fact, Nozick (1974) felt 
obliged to acknowledge that “many people who take a similar 
position are narrow and rigid, and filled paradoxically, with re-
sentment at other freer ways of being” (p. x). He realized that 
his kinship with these people placed him in some “bad compa-
ny” (Nozick, 1974, p. x). Indeed, it put him in the same company 
as Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), Friedrich Hayek (1960) and 
Ayn Rand (1961). As “bad” as these views are, they have been 
taken seriously as ideals of socially just states both at home and 
abroad. Indeed, the drive towards realizing pro-market, anti-
government ambitions based on them remains strong.
 Fortunately, there is an alternative to the austerity of lib-
ertarianism that retains the primacy of liberty tempered by a 
sense of fairness. Just states, according to those of a more egali-
tarian persuasion, John Rawls (1971) being the most prominent 
among them, are required to redistribute wealth in order to pre-
serve the basic endowment of liberty. While libertarians con-
sider inequality, unfairness and injustice as the simple facts of 
life and urge us to accept and, indeed, take advantage of them, 
even if only indirectly, Rawls (1971) reminds us of an equally 
unassailable fact, i.e., that the way things are now does not de-
termine the way they may yet be. He added that:
We should reject the contention that the ordering of institu-
tions is always defective because the distribution of natural 
talents and the contingencies of social circumstances are un-
just, and this injustice must inevitably carry over to human ar-
rangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse 
for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce to injustice 
is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural dis-
tribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some particular position. These are 
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the ways that 
institutions deal with these facts. (Rawls, 1971, p. 102)
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 Rawls (1971) maintained that given a genuinely equal 
chance to decide for themselves, people would consent to prin-
ciples of social justice that offered the most extensive, equal lib-
erty for all and mitigated impediments, both random and sys-
tematic, that proved most decisive in utilizing it, especially for 
those most hard done by. Rawls (1971) sought to operationalize 
Kant’s (1785/2002) categorical imperative that no one can ever 
be used as a means to another’s ends, even for a greater good, 
but must always be treated as an end in oneself, and for reasons 
that run deeper than it is an inalienable right to self-possession 
and interest. For Rawls (1971), as for Kant (1785/2002), freedom, 
or more precisely autonomy, was as much a moral as legal right.
 Another distinguishing feature of Rawlsian social justice, 
based again on Kantian philosophy, is that what is right takes 
priority over what is good. This is an essential precedent, since 
conceptions of the good can be expected to vary in ways that 
right cannot. As Rawls (1971) observed, “it is, in general, a good 
thing that individuals’ conception of their good should differ in 
significant ways, whereas this is not so for conceptions of right” 
(p. 447). In the absence of any common agreement about what 
is right, people will have no recourse when things go wrong 
in pursuit of their good, as in cases where one’s good is main-
tained at others’ expense (libertarianism) or is sacrificed for the 
common good (utilitarianism).
 Nevertheless, social justice as fairness is not without its crit-
ics. The most frequent criticism is that Rawls’ (1971) “difference” 
principle does not eliminate inequality. Disparity can occur one 
way (favoring the worst off) or another (advantaging the better 
off) (Dworkin, 2011).  However, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice 
was not premised on “flat equality” (Dworkin, 2011, p. 346). 
Rather, it aimed to ensure that primary goods were distributed 
fairly, not squarely, and that the outcome would be to the bene-
fit, rather than detriment, of the least well off.
 Others have been more derisive in their criticism. John 
Kekes (2007) certainly ranks amongst the harshest of critics. Ac-
cording to Kekes’ (2007):
What Rawls calls justice, denies that people should get what 
they deserve, ignores their responsibility for their actions 
and economic condition, discounts their efforts, … and … 
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systematically deprives people of their legitimately earned in-
come in order to give it to those who have not earned it. (p. 52)
However, Kekes (2007) simply highlights what Rawls (1971) tried 
to remedy, i.e., an unequal concern for all individuals. The antip-
athy of anti-egalitarians like Kekes (2007) to proposals for redis-
tributive schemes of even more modest scope than Rawls’ has al-
ready been noted. Whereas Kekes (2007) focuses on the wisdom 
or folly of individual choices, Rawls (1971) is concerned about the 
interpenetration of choice and circumstance in determining just 
outcomes. As Rawls’ (1971) cogently argued, the basic econom-
ic, political and social structure that people find themselves in 
influences their life prospects as much as their individual trans-
actions. It is important to maintain a focus on the overlap, espe-
cially in view of the general shift towards viewing the causes of, 
and responsibility for contending with, inequality and injustice 
as personal rather than political, in recent times (Young, 2011). 
Rawls (1971) attempted to reassert those terms and conditions of 
the social contract that the traditional welfare state set out to hon-
or, i.e., fairness, equity and justice for one and all.
 Nevertheless, Amartya Sen (2009) claims that Rawls was 
only concerned to describe ideally just institutions and was 
therefore of no use in guiding the comparative judgments that 
need to be made to curb injustice in the real and very imper-
fect world. Sen (2009) proposed “capabilities,” i.e., things people 
can do and be with some assistance (see pp. 18-19) as a more 
useful, down-to-Earth alternative. These capabilities are life, 
bodily health and integrity, sense, imagination, thought, emo-
tions, practical reason, affiliation, play, control over one’s envi-
ronment and other species (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). On close 
inspection, however, capabilities turn out to be far more elusive 
and of less practical value than anything Rawls suggested. In-
deed, Sen (2009) concedes:
even in terms of the Rawlsian characterization of distinct 
problems of justice, capability is a rival only to the use of pri-
mary goods (i.e., ‘rights and liberties, powers and opportu-
nities, income and wealth, and above all self-respect’ [Rawls, 
1971] p. 62)]) in judging relative advantages … and that leaves 
out other issues, including the place of personal freedom and 
the need for fair procedures. (p. 297)
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Contrary to Sen (2009), Rawls’ (1971) principles of justice were 
tailor made for comparative “real world” judgments. Indeed, 
there is a burgeoning literature describing various applications 
of Rawls’ theory to actual concrete political controversies. (Sim-
ply type “Rawls” and a qualifier into a Google search for a sam-
ple of these.) 
 Even sympathizers of Rawls’ justice as fairness complain 
about the shortcomings of his theory of justice. A common com-
plaint is that Rawls’ theory is insufficiently egalitarian. They 
declare that it is better that everyone has the same wealth, and 
so share a common fate, even if that meant less material wealth 
all round (Dworkin, 2011). Rawls (1971) certainly advocated a 
complex, as opposed to simple, form of equality in the distribu-
tion of primary goods. However, these were to be divided even-
ly unless an unequal difference in the distribution of any one, 
or all, of these goods was to everyone’s advantage. Although 
his vision remains hypothetical, it is arguably the thickest and 
most practical conception of redistributive social justice cur-
rently vying for our collective attention. 
Social Work and Social Justice
 The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) consid-
ers social justice to be a core value. Challenging social injustice 
is one of a number of principles listed in the NASWs original 
(1996) and revised (2008) Code of Ethics. The NASW (1996/2008) 
makes it clear that the Code is relevant to all students and practi-
tioners of social work regardless of function, context or clientele 
(NASW, 1996/2008). Although it is not listed in lexical order, the 
NASW does not rank the significance of social justice above or 
below other core values. In fact, the Association points out that 
it is reasonable to expect that the place of social justice will alter 
in the face of value conflicts. Of course, the trade-off between 
social justice and other values makes knowing what may be lost 
and gained as a consequence of the particular approach taken 
to it all the more imperative.
 The NASW (1996/2008) states that in challenging social in-
justice:
Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on 
behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups 
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of people. Social workers’ social change efforts are focused 
primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimina-
tion, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek 
to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression 
and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers strive to en-
sure access to needed information, services, and resources; 
equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in de-
cision making for all people (p. 8). 
 The statement of principle is not definitive about the type of 
social justice that social workers are encouraged to pursue. This 
is a critical omission in light of the relative “thickness” of vari-
ous approaches. While accessibility, partnership, publicity, and 
diversity in challenging a lack of social and political capital are 
alluded to in the statement, none of these values is precluded 
from conceptions of social justice as thin as libertarianism. Even 
the notion of “social change” has limited application insofar as 
it seeks to achieve more awareness of oppression and pluralism 
generally. A conspicuous omission is any explicit mention of re-
distribution. The inclusion of this distinguishing feature would 
certainly reduce any ambiguity. In any event, despite its relative 
significance, no further statement is made about the principle of 
social justice. One is, therefore, compelled to look at the imbri-
cation of other values and parts of the Code to supplement this 
meagre description.
 According to the Purpose	of	the	NASW	Code	of	Ethics, the “prin-
ciples and standards must be applied by individuals of good 
character who discern moral questions and, in good faith, seek 
to make reliable ethical judgments”(p. 7) One might infer from 
this statement that the Association subscribes to a conception of 
social justice that is virtue based. However, this must simply re-
main a possibility since nothing more is said about “character.”  
 The Code lists four other values alongside social justice. These 
are Service limiting workers’ self-interests (p. 8), the importance 
of human relationships emphasising partnerships (p. 9), integri-
ty urging fidelity and ethical conduct, competence focusing on 
professional development (p. 9), and the dignity and worth of the 
person encouraging mindfulness of, and respect for, difference 
and diversity (p. 8). The latter also asks social workers to en-
hance client self-determination (NASW, 1996/2008, p. 10). How-
ever, workers are advised that clients’ capacity and prospects for 
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self-determination are subject to compromise. Such advice be-
gins to chart the direction of social justice. The status accorded 
personal freedom in the principle of self-determination is con-
sistent with formulations of social justice that regard liberty as 
negotiable. Only libertarians hold liberty to be sacrosanct. 
 The standard of ethical behavior expected of social workers 
help to further illuminate the nature of social justice (NASW, 
1996/2008, p. 20). These standards refer to social workers’ ethical 
responsibilities as professionals, in practice settings, to clients, 
colleagues and the profession. The notion of rights is a prom-
inent feature. The standards make it clear that social workers 
have a responsibility to protect and promote clients’ individual, 
legal rights. Rights figure in all but virtue-based theories of so-
cial justice. However, according to the Code, respect for rights, 
like liberty, can be tempered. Once again, only libertarians con-
sider rights to be inviolable. There are, nevertheless, two notable 
points of distinction. Social workers ought to advocate “within 
and outside their agencies for adequate resources to meet cli-
ents’ needs, and allocation procedures that are open and fair … 
and based on appropriate and consistently applied principles” 
(NASW, 1996/2008 ss. 3.07a & b respectively). They “should also 
engage in social and political action to ensure that all people 
have equal access to the resources, employment, services, and 
opportunities they require to meet their basic human needs 
and to develop fully” (NASW, 1996/2008, s. 6.04). Both points 
are, at the very least, compatible with conceptions of social jus-
tice based on redistribution. However, reliance on fairness and 
equal access as distributive principles distinguish this from 
utilitarian forms of social justice. Nevertheless, they still fall 
short of such egalitarian schemes as Rawls’. Access to resources 
is not synonymous with provision, and equality, as has been 
argued, is neither practical nor desirable. In fact, as Rawls (1971) 
and others (Dworkin, 2011 and Young, 2011, in particular) have 
cogently argued, equality rivals fairness in profoundly unjust 
ways. What, then, does social justice require?
Which Social Justice?
 If social work is troubled about falling into bad company, 
and seeks to defy current convention, then it is obliged to pur-
sue the thickest form of social justice available. Social work 
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would do worse than attempt to operationalize Rawls’ theory of 
justice. Rawls’ (1971) model of social justice is one of a very few 
with sufficient substance and promise to be capable of mount-
ing a serious challenge to the minimization of state responsibil-
ity for individual freedom and public welfare. It is, nonetheless, 
still not perfect.
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frustration and prejudices but the nativist sentiments of the public. The 
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 A presidential election has just been won on the strength of 
a nativist philosophy that asserts that the U.S. must build a wall 
of separation with its closest neighbor to the South. President 
Trump’s anti-Mexican statements during the campaign and af-
ter the inauguration have been amply chronicled by the tele-
vision and the press in 2017. The dangers of President Trump’s 
rhetoric and performance are clearer after one year of his pres-
idency than they were before. As he himself states, he has not 
“evolved” in understandings (Sullivan, Haberman, & Davis, 
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2018). When his Chief of Staff attempted to soften some of his 
prior statements, the president responded to his political base: 
“the wall is the wall, it has never changed or evolved from the 
first time I conceived of it … The wall will be paid for directly 
or indirectly … by Mexico…” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 4). He 
was relentless in his contradiction of his Chief of Staff, who had 
said that “a 50 foot wall from sea to shining sea isn’t what we’re 
going to build” (Sullivan et al., 2018, para. 14). The President was 
giving voice to his frustration and prejudices as he captured 
what many citizens still wanted to hear. Given these feelings 
among the public—that many liberals may have thought had 
been overcome—the time is ripe for looking at history in search 
of plausible explanations for such an ingrained anti-Mexican 
sentiment. This paper will examine past and contemporary rea-
sons that might explain the observable antipathy to the Mexi-
can/Latino population in the U.S. today.  
The Historical Roots of Anti-Mexican Attitudes
  Many people associate anxiety about Mexican/Latino im-
migration in the U.S. exclusively with very recent Mexican and 
Latin American migrations. This is not the case. In the 15th Cen-
tury, at the same time that the Spanish were settling in Mexico 
and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and 
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the con-
tinent. The Black Legend about the Spanish “race” as a “brutal, 
sanguinary and sadistic” group of abusers was being propagat-
ed and taking root (Fuentes, 1992, p. 132). Even decades later, in 
the colonial territories, those who were moving inland, heirs 
to the Puritan thinking about the Spanish influence, sensed ac-
cording to De León (1987) “an ‘errand into the wilderness’ and 
felt a compelling need to control all that was beastly—sexuality, 
vice, nature, and colored peoples [sic]” (p. 1).
Order and discipline had to be rescued from the wilds in the 
name of civilization and Christianity. Moving westward with 
this mission uppermost in their minds, whites psychological-
ly needed to subdue the external world—forests, beasts, and 
other peoples—for the rational had to be ever in command. 
(De León, 1987, p. 1) 
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Today, the anxiety and fear of Mexicans persists after centuries 
and many waves of migrants. 
The Spanish Legacy: A Long-focus-lens View
 Spanish explorers were “the first Europeans to traverse 
much of the United States” (Daniels, 1990, p. 96) before the fre-
quently described arrival of the Pilgrims to Plymouth Rock in 
1569. After his ship wrecked in 1536, Cabeza de Vaca walked 
across what is now the western country from Galveston, Texas 
to Culiacan in Mexico. From the city of Santa Barbara in Mexico, 
the Spanish explorers and missionaries were lured north into 
what are today New Mexico and Arizona. New Mexico was set-
tled in 1598 (in fact, before the founding of Jamestown in Massa-
chusetts in 1610). From Santa Barbara in Mexico, “Spain hurried 
to lay claim to Texas” for at least two reasons: to resist threats 
from the French and to Christianize the Caddo Indians in the 
“kingdom of Teja,” ca, 1680s (Iber & De León, 2006, p. 57. See 
also Stewart & De León, 1993).
 The founding of St. Augustine by Pedro Menéndez de 
Avilés in 1565 provided an entry for Spain to respond militar-
ily to French Huguenot settlement in South Carolina (Daniels, 
1990). Florida was in Spanish hands for over two centuries from 
1565 to 1819.  At the same time the Spanish were settling in Mex-
ico and other parts of North America, the British, the Dutch and 
the French were also trying to compete for lands in the conti-
nent. The Spaniards had established themselves in Cuba, where 
“encomiendas” had been developing. Bartolomé de las Casas, 
who had been an “encomendero,” began speaking out against 
the treatment that representatives of the Spanish Crown were 
giving Indians. De las Casas became a Dominican Friar and 
moved to Mexico, where he continued to speak out indicting 
the Spaniards for their behavior. His indictments quickly be-
came the bases for a broadly encompassing Black Legend about 
the Spanish “race.” 
 In 1769, Junípero Serra founded twenty-one missions in Cal-
ifornia and the accompanying regiment to his expedition estab-
lished a fort in San Diego (Daniels, 1990). And these locations 
were only the most significant ones. Except for Florida, New 
Mexico, Arizona, California, parts of Nevada, Utah, Colora-
do, Oklahoma and Kansas remained part of Mexico until 1848 
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when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexed them after the 
U.S. War with Mexico. Florida was acquired after many years 
of disputes and negotiations in 1819. In the west and southwest 
of the U.S., the Spanish/Mexican population was not, for a very 
long time, an immigrant population but rather an autochtho-
nous one. 
 An atmosphere permeated very early that transferred the 
sentiments towards the Spaniards to the Spanish/Mexicans 
once the first had left. The cruelty ascribed to the Spanish col-
onists also existed among other colonists but the fears that the 
Black Legend had spread among Anglos fueled attitudes specif-
ically about Mexicans, which were different from the attitudes 
about other foreign nationals arriving in the U.S. Rosales (1997) 
describes this entrenched Anglo attitude:  
Anglo-Americans held negative views even before confront-
ing Mexicans on New Spain frontiers where the encounter 
itself deepened prejudices and provided at least one import-
ant rationale for ‘Manifest Destiny.’ The violence of the Texas 
Rebellion and the Mexican War further fueled the antipathy. 
(Rosales, 1997, p. 5)
Additionally, with the arrival of African slaves to the new 
world, racism took complete hold of the minds and hearts of the 
White population. Racist attitudes in the U.S. persisted from the 
antebellum South until the Civil Rights movement and beyond. 
Even today, we can easily identify them in many policies, if not 
federal, passed by state legislatures. Racist attitudes and policies 
colored immigration in the U.S. from the start as illustrated by 
the “yellow peril” legend forbidding Chinese immigrants and 
by the internment of Japanese American citizens during WWII. 
 Texas played an important role in shaping the attitudes 
of Anglos toward Mexicans. In 1821 the Mexican government 
granted the Missourian entrepreneur Moses Austin coloniza-
tion rights in Texas. He and his son Stephen and hundreds of 
followers moved into Texan territory. Austin’s ambitions includ-
ed “his sole and only desire … to redeem it from the wilder-
ness—to settle it with an intelligent, honorable and enterpris-
ing people” (Stephen Austin, quoted by de León, 1987, p. 3). 
De León further comments that it was clear that Austin’s and 
other politicians’ desire was to Americanize Texas, “settled by 
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a population that will harmonize with their neighbors on the 
East, in language, political principles, common origin, sympa-
thy, and even interest” (de León, 1987, p. 3).  In other words, the 
Americanization of Texas did not have room for native Mexi-
cans who were deemed neither civilized nor capable of being 
anything other than field hands. However, current scholarship 
shows that Mexicans were never peripheral to their history, par-
ticularly in Texas, where they participated actively in state and 
local government and “undertook a conscious effort to modern-
ize the society of Texas” after the Texas war for independence in 
1836 (Stewart & de León, 1993, p. 99).
 In looking for historical explanations of the disdain with 
which Mexican immigrants are regarded, one cannot ignore 
the early religious clashes between Roman Catholicism (Spain 
and its colonies being the main inheritors) and Henry VIII. The 
English saw the Spanish as heartless, and Spanish and Span-
ish Americans as the embodiment of racial impurity, exempli-
fied by mestizaje with the Moors and the Indians. In Protestant 
Christianity they saw native Catholicism as pagan and demon-
ic. Although the anti-Catholic feelings in colonial America were 
to some extent rhetorical because few members of the public 
had ever seen a Catholic, they persisted with unusual strength. 
By the end of the colonial period in the Eastern border, there 
were “only about 25,000 practicing Catholics … and almost all 
of those in Pennsylvania and Maryland” (Daniels, 1990, p. 109).
 Another major factor that persisted far beyond the colonial 
period, and can even be detected today, is hostility to the lan-
guage. The maintenance of the English language became a much 
stronger issue in the new nation. After the annexation of the 
various Spanish territories in the Southwest, Spanish remained 
predominant in many areas. For example, Rosales (1997) states 
that Texan local politicians delivered speeches in both English 
and Spanish well into the early 20th century, and of course the 
New Mexican legislature conducted business in Spanish un-
til they became a state. Part of the statehood discussions as to 
whether New Mexico and Arizona could be joined pivoted on 
language and what the Arizonians called “racial differences.” 
Arizonian’s fears were summarized in a protest presented to 
Congress in 1906, which suggested that any amalgamation 
with New Mexico had little chance of success. Finally, by 1912, 
after a long and protracted debate over language in Congress, 
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President Taft signed the New Mexico Statehood Proclamation. 
This proclamation settled, at least temporarily, the language is-
sue, as it recognized the state’s constitution, which stated: “For 
the first twenty years after this constitution goes into effect all 
laws passed by the legislature shall be published in both the En-
glish and Spanish languages” (State of New Mexico, 1911/2017, 
Art. XX–12). 
Nativism and Flooding Immigration
 The financial panic of 1873 began an anti-immigrant period 
that was to last almost until WWII. Labor strikes, unemploy-
ment and overall financial distress were serious problems. In 
1894, a group of Harvard graduates formed the Immigration 
Restriction League, a pressure group that argued for funda-
mental changes in the immigration policies. 
According to one of its founders, Prescott F. Hall, the ques-
tion for Americans to decide was whether they wanted their 
country ‘to be peopled by British, German and Scandinavian 
stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Lat-
in and Asiatic races historically downtrodden, atavistic and 
stagnant.’ (Daniels, 1990, p. 276)
Within the spirit of restricting immigration, a large number of 
bills made their way through Congress (1895, 1897,1913,1915), 
sometimes getting to the presidents, who typically vetoed them, 
until 1917. These bills had a common theme, which was literacy. 
Presidents Grover Cleveland, Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson 
stated, as many do today, that the U.S needed labor and that the 
immigrants were here to do work Americans did not want to do. 
(Yet, as we well know today, factual labor needs do not overcome 
the assumptions of loss of even undesired employment opportu-
nities experienced by many in the native populations.) A bill was 
finally passed in 1917, but by then, European immigration had 
decreased due to the war in Europe. The 1917 law was in essence 
a literacy bill that was eventually proven not to have had the de-
sired effect of restricting immigration. (Daniels, 1990; Lukens, 
2012; U.S. Immigration Legislation Online, n.d.).
 In 1910 the Mexican Revolution erupted, and in 1914 WWI 
was declared. American soldiers fighting in the War created a 
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labor shortage in the U.S. and Mexicans that had been coming to 
this country as a consequence of the Mexican Revolution were 
encouraged to work in the USA. The restrictive 1917 Immigration 
Law did not fundamentally affect residents of some countries of 
the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America because, in 
spite of the literacy restrictions in the bill, waivers were given 
for temporary agricultural and railroad workers. However, the 
restrictive measures emboldened the nativist spirit that contin-
ued to prevail. In 1921, the Emergency Immigration Restriction 
Act established an immigration system based on quotas related 
to the percentage of the population who had originated in given 
countries. However, it provided a loophole for many Europeans 
who moved to Western Hemisphere non-quota countries before 
coming to the U.S. This led to the laws of 1921 and finally to the 
Act of 1924 which related quotas and birthplace (McSeveney, 
1987). The way quotas were determined favored the Northern 
European countries that had been represented in the U.S. popu-
lation for a long time. In a recent New York Times article, Stapinski 
(2017) vividly discusses the consequences of the 1924 immigra-
tion Act that closed doors for the poorest and neediest Italians.
 As we have just seen, during the peak of the Nativist de-
bate, Mexican laborers had been granted temporary entry to 
work primarily, but not exclusively, in the fields. However, after 
1924, the Immigration and Naturalization Service tightened the 
enforcement of border crossings, and Mexicans were often de-
ported without due process. The 1929 Immigration Act was a 
victory of nativists and resulted in the deportation not only of 
Mexican nationals but of many native Mexican-Americans from 
industrial cities like Chicago where they had been working in 
the car industries. As the economic situation deteriorated, the 
popular imagery and the political talk often referred to “half-
breeds” and many other racial epithets and criticized their in-
ability to become citizens.
Between 1929 and 1936, at least six hundred thousand Mexican 
nationals and their children, many of whom were born in the 
U.S., returned to Mexico—this represented about one third of 
the U.S. Mexican population. Economic downturns had been 
a constant factor in their lives, but nothing compared to the 
suffering created by this crisis. (Rosales, 1997, p. 49)
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The Bracero Program
 Between 1942 and 1965, a very important development took 
place. Given the scarcity of labor created by WWII, the U.S. and 
Mexican governments signed a formal agreement for the re-
cruitment of workers. There were two types of workers recruit-
ed by the so called Bracero Agreement. Part of the agreement 
was for agricultural workers. As part of the agreement, 4.6 mil-
lion contracts were issued between 1943 and 1965. The second 
part of the agreement related to railroad maintenance workers, 
and 69,000 authorizations were issued between 1943 and 1945 
(Alarcón, 2011). The important thing to remember in relation 
to this government-to-government agreement is that both the 
U.S and Mexico promised to apply the protections of the law 
(labor laws, public health, fair treatment, etc.) to the “bracero” 
workers. The governments also agreed to withdraw a certain 
amount of savings (about 10%) from the workers’ salaries. These 
monies would be returned to the workers at the end of the con-
tract, generally by the Mexican government. However, no sav-
ings were initially returned and the controversy over the issue 
continued until a settlement was reached in a California court 
in 2008 (Belluck, 2008). The final blow to the Bracero Agreement 
was dealt by the U.S and the Mexican governments when, in 
1947, they targeted for return undocumented immigrants from 
California and Texas. Finally, in 1954, through Operation Wet-
back, more than one million workers from the West Coast were 
deported. Many other laws and mass deportations followed in 
the 1950s, targeting undocumented workers, but the impact of 
the “braceros” became indelibly registered in the public psyche.
 Another important variable which was a determinant of the 
historical discrimination towards Mexicans, and to some ex-
tent of their self-perception, was the conflicting messages sent 
by the Bureau of the Census in its counting practices and the 
equally conflicting messages sent by some of the early Latino 
organizations in relation to race among Mexican Americans. 
The first time the Census identified Mexicans in its population 
counts was in 1930. Until 1920, the Census had not identified 
Mexicans; however, the enumerators tended to note the pres-
ence of Spanish surnamed “mulatos” in the Western States 
(Ortiz & Telles, 2012, p. 4). The 1930 Census provided specific 
instructions for the counting of Mexicans, identifying them as 
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a very mixed group belonging primarily, if not totally, to the 
laboring classes. According to Ortiz and Telles (2012), the use of 
‘laborers’ in the first line of the Census instructions “suggests 
that class may have played a role into the use of Mexican in 
that laborers might have been classified as Mexican but higher 
status Mexicans might have been classified as White” (Ortiz & 
Telles, 2012, p. 4). This caused the Mexican government and the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) to protest 
about using Mexican as a racial category, and from there on, un-
til the 1980 Census which allowed for self-identification, Mex-
icans who may have marked “other” in the Census form were 
classified as White. In looking at the LULAC advocacy effort, 
one may say that it was based more on pragmatic rather than 
unprejudiced considerations.
 An interesting significant event, which involved a number 
of well-known civil rights attorneys and LULAC in the post 
WWII period, addressed race/class classification in a criminal 
case which made it to the Supreme Court. The case, Hernandez	
v.	the	State	of	Texas, was about a migrant cotton picker accused 
of murder in a small town in Jackson County, Texas. The lead 
defense attorney, Gustavo Garcia, 
envisioned the Hernandez case as a challenge to the system-
atic exclusion of persons of Mexican origin from all types of 
jury duty in at least seventy counties in Texas. It was not sur-
prising to him when Hernandez was found guilty and the 
decision was upheld by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
(Allsup, 2010, para. 1)
When the Supreme Court finally heard the case in January, 1954, 
under Chief Justice Warren, the defense attorney, Garcia, argued 
that the 14th Amendment guaranteed protection not only on 
the basis of race but of class. The State of Texas contended that 
the 14th Amendment covered only race, Whites and Blacks, not 
class, and that Mexican Americans were White—at least at that 
moment. However, the Supreme Court, ordering the reversal of 
conviction, “accepted [recognized] the concept of distinction by 
class, that is, between white and Hispanic, and found that when 
laws produced unreasonable and different treatment on such 
basis [class differences], the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection is violated” (Allsup, 2010, para. 2). This was a great 
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triumph for the concept of “other white” applied to Mexicans, a 
concept that persisted until the 1970s. 
 These changing classifications fueled Mexicans’ own prob-
lematic definition of self and influenced the public images of the 
group. Given the complex intersection of race, ethnicity, class, 
gender, and other dimensions in the modern world, it is not sur-
prising to find that members of many groups find themselves 
confused by the Census and sometimes the courts, which, by 
default, required until very recently single classifications. The 
question of any individual’s racial classification among Hispan-
ics is left to the individual. “What am I?” a person would ask. 
The answer could be Hispanic and White, for example, or His-
panic and Black, etc. 
Does History Explain the Continued Disdain
and Fear of the Mexican Immigrant?
 Although the history of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. has 
been characterized by complicated policies since there was a 
border, the history of other groups can be said to be similarly 
complex. However, disdain appears to have remained unabated 
for Mexicans even though, in many cases, they had been fluidly 
moving across the diffused southern border of the U.S. since 
1848. It must be recognized that Filipinos, Chinese and Japa-
nese Americans were also victims of discrimination and repa-
triation, but after WWII, and after the Civil Rights efforts, their 
situation was much improved. 
  After WWII, Mexicans and Latinos had continued their 
struggle, primarily in the area of land rights and the labor front, 
struggle that gave rise the most significant Chicano civil rights 
movement of contemporary times. The 1960s was a time of civ-
il rights struggle. The movement involved many leaders and 
many goals, ranging from the struggle for the rights of workers 
(led by César Chávez) to the return of land in New Mexico (led 
by Reies Lopez Tijerina). Reies Tijerina took a bold approach 
with the Alianza	Federal	de	 las	Mercedes that proposed separat-
ism and militancy on the bases of lost land and language. César 
Chavez, the icon of today, a Ghandi-like leader, focused on the 
defense of the work place. Strikes and unionization, which had 
not been the tools of migrant workers before, became the call 
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of Chávez’ resistance. For César Chávez, the Braceros, who 
continued to enter the U.S. providing cheap labor for the agri-
cultural fields, represented an unrelenting impediment to the 
improvement of the living and working conditions of the Chi-
canos already living here. Iber and De León (2006) state that “for 
millions of ordinary Americans, mostly oblivious to the terrible 
plight of migrant workers, the activities and efforts of the late 
César Chávez (and, ultimately, those of the United Farm Work-
ers, the UFW) served as an introduction to the Chicano/a move-
ment” (pp. 266–267). Chicanos had entered the public discourse. 
As long as there were unorganized Mexicans who followed the 
crops in the West, there was plenty of room for disdain, disem-
powerment and rejection. The harsh living conditions in which 
these workers lived and labored insured the perpetuation of 
poverty, poor education, isolation, bad health conditions, etc., 
all of which created a caste-like group, a target of unjustifiable 
rejection. Today, in spite of progress and changing public atti-
tudes, many examples of continued rejection are endorsed from 
the highest levels of government.
 Alarcón (2011) suggests a circular migration pattern for 
undocumented workers across a porous border. The flow of 
temporary workers continued even after Operation Wetback 
in 1954. It was clear that the border was porous and that any 
control of immigration would require legislation. Up to 1968, 
Mexicans were able to enter the U.S. without numerical restric-
tion (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). However, in 1968, the 
Western Hemisphere cap of 120,000 was applied, and Mexicans 
had to compete for a limited number of visas. But Massey et al. 
(2002) also suggest that the hemispheric limitations coincided 
with the end of the Bracero program that had provided tem-
porary opportunities to many agricultural workers. Thus, the 
limitations imposed on Mexicans were felt very keenly, and ille-
gality became a real (and perhaps the only) option for a country 
with a long history of labor exchanges with the U.S. 
 Many other important pieces of legislation followed the 
1968 measures and restricted the number of legal entries from 
Mexico and Latin America (e.g., the 1976 country-based quotas; 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, IRCA, and many 
others). No one expected the dire repercussions of these pol-
icies. Scholars comment on the paradoxical nature of the U.S. 
immigration policies which were not intended “to create a large 
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undocumented Latino population living north of the border,” 
but which unleashed a chain of events with compounding dire 
effects through a succession of positive and negative measures 
(Massey & Pren, 2012, p. 6). The exponential growth of the Lati-
no population between 1970 and 2010 was often ascribed only 
to the undocumented, and that situation caused tremendous 
damage to the legality of Mexican/Latino immigrants. 
 César Chávez’s explanation still provides a valid rationale 
for the negativism experienced by the immigrant Mexican to-
day: as long as there is heavy movement of people across the 
border who can be easily exploited for their labor, it will con-
tinue to be possible to devalue natives, old-time residents, and 
recent arrivals. 
The Latino Threat Narrative
 The large and continued number of Mexicans and other 
Latin Americans entering the U.S, often undocumented, had 
become a preoccupation of the public even before 2001. The Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attack, although not related to Latinos, brought 
about the reappearance of overt anti-immigrant sentiments 
that, while focusing on the Muslim population, quickly spread 
to all immigrants. Immigration problems became recurrent in 
the public narrative. In 2008, the economic crisis intensified an-
ti-immigrant public feelings. Mexicans and Hispanics were as-
sociated primarily with labor areas where unemployment was 
high (construction, hospitality industries, service professions, 
and others). This aggravated the hostility of low paid native 
workers. Yet, the immigrant population, particularly of illegals 
from Mexico and Latin America, continued to grow, and by 
2010, reached 50.5 million. Rather than attempting to find real 
solutions, a demonization of the Hispanic population general-
ly (not exclusively the Mexican) emerged in very public ways. 
These sentiments were exploited to garner political support and 
agency resources, as examples for border security and control. 
The result was a self-perpetuating cycle in which rising bor-
der apprehensions were manipulated to produce a conser-
vative reaction that demanded more enforcement measures, 
which in turn produced more apprehensions, which then 
produced more conservatism and even harsher enforcement 
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measures, which generated more apprehensions (Massey & 
Pren, 2012, p. 6). 
 But as we have discussed, it was not hard to blame His-
panics, whether Mexican or others. Their very presence fueled 
old notions of criminals, sex offenders, drug dealers and other 
people living outside the law. Specific cases of a criminal act 
were reported, and the public clamored for radical measures 
to be taken against this “despised” group which was living in 
the midst of white America. For example, in August 2016, Time 
Magazine reported Trump stating that “When Mexico sends its 
people, they’re not sending their best … . They’re sending peo-
ple that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those prob-
lems [to] us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. 
They’re rapists.” And, attempting to soften the statements, he 
added: “And some, I assume, are good people” (Reilly, 2016, 
pp. 3, 7). The narrative was intense and journalists spoke of a 
drowning of the culture, alien hordes, and the flooding of the 
U.S. (Andreas, 2000; Chávez, 2001). Massey and Pren (2012) have 
suggested that it is not easy to document the rise of xenophobia 
because it is not asked in surveys, but they trace it to the rise of 
border apprehensions and the rise of conservatism in the U.S., 
which are reliably measured. Reporting the results of a recent 
Gallup survey, McCarthy (2015) suggests that “the treatment of 
Hispanics, particularly of immigrants, takes on special signifi-
cance as the nation continues to debate immigration reform” (p. 
4). Very pointedly, he reports on the gravity of the issue which 
has been highlighted by Donald Trump, not only during his 
presidential election campaign, but also as his presidency be-
gan and executive measures were implemented. 
The Current Situation in the U.S.
 According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011), the number of 
immigrants annually leaving Mexico for the U.S. declined by 
60% between 2006 and 2010. A decline was also reported by the 
Migration Policy Institute in 2016, which stated:
In the last decade and a half, the Mexican share among all 
immigrants dropped from 29.5% in 2000 to 27.6% in 2014 … 
Mexico is no longer the top origin country among the most 
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recent immigrants to the U.S. In 2013, China and India over-
took Mexico as the most common countries of origin of im-
migrants who have resided in the U.S. for one year or less. 
Furthermore, more Mexican immigrants have returned to 
Mexico than have migrated to the U.S. since the end of the 
2007–2009 Great Recession. (Zong & Batalova, 2016, pp. 1–2)
This decline, however, did not alter the anti-immigrant public 
discourse brought about by the political campaigns since 2012. 
 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA 2007-
2012) was the immigration policy that allowed some minors 
who entered the country with their undocumented parents to 
receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from 
deportation and to be eligible for work, study or service in 
the armed forces. The cause of these “dreamers,” as they were 
known, was highlighted during and after President Obama’s 
re-election campaign in 2012. These events activated the same 
nativism that had historically plagued the U.S. 
 In July 2016, a document from the Migration Policy Institute 
Transatlantic Council on Migration suggested that anti-immi-
grant sentiment all over the world is not necessarily changed by 
the reality of numbers. Nothing could have been truer for the 
status of the Mexican immigrant in the U.S.
Anti-immigrant sentiment does not reliably correspond to an 
increase in the volume of newcomers, either in absolute or 
relative terms. Sharp reaction—such as significant legislative 
changes, symbolic signs of exclusion (e.g., banning minarets), 
and (in extreme instances) anti-immigrant violence—have 
occurred in places without large or sudden increases in the 
immigrant population. Meanwhile, several countries and re-
gions that have recently received sizeable unexpected inflows 
have not experienced social disorder. (Papademetriou & Ban-
ulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 6)
 During the 2016 presidential campaign, the fear and anxiety 
about Mexican and Latin American immigrants reached peak 
expression in the language of Donald Trump, who aspired to 
tailor his message to large numbers of displaced workers whose 
situation had deteriorated in the past decade. A 2016 MPI re-
port suggested that “economic concerns that lead to the per-
ception of immigrants as competition for scarce resources and 
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opportunities … can be particularly acute in areas less accus-
tomed to migration and where segments of the native popu-
lation are experiencing economic hardship” (Papademetriou 
& Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 1). This clearly played out in the 
election in 2016, as Trump’s message appeared to make an im-
pact upon his intended target audience.
 The nativist discourse of the current President of the U.S. 
is frequently offensive to American citizens’ values, but crowd 
approval of many aggrieved workers fuels his slogans. The an-
ti-immigrant and pointedly anti-Latino views were evident in 
his comments on former candidate Jeb Bush, whom Trump said 
had to “like the Mexican illegals because of his wife” (Kaplan, 
2015, para. 2). Unfortunately, Trump’s constant harping on the 
border wall and his apparent conviction that Mexico would pay 
for it continued to ignite the nativist flames of his followers. But 
beyond personal insults, even before Trump’s election, Mexico 
was the target of inaccurate public speech intended to humili-
ate. Mexican immigrants were framed as usurpers of American 
jobs, even though the business community attempted to correct 
the record, suggesting that immigrants were doing jobs that 
Americans would not or could not do. 
 Another point to which we have referred in the historical 
narrative was that the American public at large had never fun-
damentally acknowledged the contributions of Latinos, par-
ticularly Mexicans immigrants and their descendants, to the 
culture and fiber of the U.S. (Fuentes, 1992; Griswold del Cas-
tillo & de León, 1996; Sheridan, 1986). As César Chávez feared, 
the Mexican immigrant, unlike the European, had been seen 
as a laborer (a bracero) and little else (Rosales, 1997). Even to-
day, Mexican immigrants are seldom the object of admiration 
in the way that other immigrants are recognized when “pull-
ing themselves up by their bootstraps.” Some efforts of Latino 
actors are recognized and gain a level of popular support and 
understanding (e.g., Edward J. Olmos’s Films, such as Stand and 
Deliver [Labunka, Law, & Muska, 1998]) but they are often pop-
ular because of the actor’s stardom. Even the “dreamers” who 
have become well-known because of their accomplishments 
now worry about their future. The issue of ending the protec-
tions of DACA reached unforeseen proportions with the “shut-
ting down of the government” in January 2018. 
172 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Various Forms of Remediation Were Attempted
 During the Civil Rights period, the issue of broadening the 
basis of the Chicano movement beyond the plight of the agri-
cultural workers had been pursued by Reies Tijerina with the 
Alianza	Federal de las Mercedes (1963–1970). The aliancistas had al-
ways been more openly combative in pursuits beyond the rights 
of workers. They wanted lands returned and had some success 
when El Chamizal, the disputed border area of the Rio Grande, 
was returned to Mexico in 1963 through a treaty signed by Pres-
idents Kennedy and Lopez Mateo. Chávez had looked towards 
the unions as support for the field workers and looked to peace-
ful means to solve the problems of workers. On the other hand, 
some members of the Alianza, Tijerina in particular, upholding a 
strong sense of entitlement, believed that confrontation might get 
them further afield. The aliancistas projected self-assurance and 
did not shy away from confrontation. But they quickly became 
associated with violence in the minds of the authorities and the 
public tended to reject the perceived strength of their movement. 
 LULAC (1929—today), the oldest of the Latino organiza-
tions, was committed to a more legalistic agenda and weighed 
in, as we have seen in the Hernandez case, in civil rights cases. 
LULAC attempted to develop a cooperative relationship among 
the various Latino, Black and white groups, to develop an agen-
da for all Latinos and to respond to challenges through a well-
thought out platform of political and legal action that has often 
been compared to the NAACP. In fact, the cooperation between 
LULAC and the NAACP and a number of California attorneys 
advanced greatly the cause of school desegregation which had 
begun with the well-known California case of Mendez	v.	West-
minster. In a recent book about this little known and successful 
case before the CA Supreme Court in 1947, Strum (2010) writes:
All parties agreed that Mexican ancestry, not race … was the 
crux of the matter. But counsel for the many parents who 
joined in the suit laid the groundwork for a far broader as-
sault on arbitrary classifications and discrimination against 
one people because they happened to share a heritage. The 
heritage was not only Mexican; it was also Spanish-speak-
ing. For school boards, assumptions about language skills, 
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cleanliness, ability to learn, and “Americanness” were code 
words for long-established anti-Latin-American prejudices. 
Mendez	exposed these to the light of social science and law 
and found them wanting. (Strum, 2010, p. IX)
What the variety of approaches and philosophies that have been 
involved in the long struggle for Mexican recognition shows is 
that in spite of the efforts and successes, the Mexican-immigrant 
and even the Mexican-American remained more marginalized 
and disparaged than other immigrant groups. 
 While many Latinos were relieved that the 2001 terrorist 
attack did not involve any immigrants from the Americas, the 
term “immigrant” began to escalate public suspicion. The sit-
uation of the Mexican immigrant became further aggravated 
with the economic downturn of 2008. Immigrants became the 
obvious target of hatred, and Mexicans being the closest, most 
numerous and poorest, fitted the public search for a scapegoat. 
 The building of a wall announced during the 2016 Presiden-
tial campaign became a rallying cry for those who had harbored 
not just populist philosophies but xenophobic and chauvinistic 
points of view. Steve Bannon, until recently one of Trump’s most 
influential advisors and driving force behind right wing Breitbart 
News, made no bones about banning all immigrants; his ties to 
the KKK were never hidden, receiving endorsement by its lead-
er, David Duke. In spite of hopes that Trump’s election would 
extinguish the racist fires, now President Trump’s rhetoric and 
anti-Hispanic actions could continue unobstructed. 
 From a post-election vantage point, it has become clear that 
candidate Trump’s campaign views about Judge Gonzalo Curiel 
of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of California, 
or his views on DACA, or the Wall, or for all matters related 
to Hispanics, did not necessarily change after his election. His 
views about a whole cultural and linguistic tradition continued 
to be made explicit in almost daily behavior.
The racism at the core of Trump’s agenda was laid bare when 
he pardoned former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was 
awaiting a prison sentence for defying a court order that 
barred him from racially profiling Latinos. As a result of the 
August 25 pardon, Arpaio, who rose to national prominence 
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for his anti-immigrant tactics in Maricopa County, will never 
be held accountable for his years of unconstitutional conduct. 
(Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2018, “Promoting a 
racist agenda,” para. 10)
Concluding Comments
 Researchers have looked into linguistic differences, reli-
gious beliefs, perceived threats to norms and values of the re-
ceiving society and many elements that can hinder openness 
to immigrants. The general consensus is that no single factor 
can be directly correlated to outbreaks of public dissatisfaction 
with new arrivals of any immigrant group (Papademetriou & 
Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016). And yet, each of those factors appears 
with frequency and is used often as explanation for why a par-
ticular group is not fitting into the nucleus of a specific soci-
ety. What the research literature shows is that a predilection for 
groups that blend easily into the host society has been a histor-
ical and sociological fact. 
 Nativist and xenophobic dialogues have ebbed and flowed 
in the public discourse in the U.S., with different groups being 
targets at different historical periods. These historical periods 
usually were the result of, or predicted, global crises. For exam-
ple, the strength of movements such as the KKK or the Know 
Nothing Party at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
Century was a result of primarily southerners losing their grip 
on slavery at the same time that they were overwhelmed by 
outsiders--Catholics and foreigners, all people deemed differ-
ent. The sequelae of slavery and the unabated fear of Blacks 
has always been a factor that, by extension, served to continue 
anti-Mexican sentiments and behaviors. Mexicans were darker 
and were viewed as a threat to the expectations of the commu-
nity. Spikes or “perceived spikes” of undocumented immigrants 
can “harden attitudes toward immigration … particularly when 
substantial shares … of flow originate from the same country or 
sub region” (Papademetriou & Banulescu-Bogdan, 2016, p. 9), in 
this case, Mexico and Latin America. 
 One can continue to search for explanations of how and 
why the negative perceptions about Mexican immigrants have 
survived with such persistence. We have shown how Mexicans 
in particular have been a targeted immigrant group in the U.S. 
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In spite of the fact that, as the popular saying goes, “they did 
not really cross the border but the border crossed them,” the 
massive size and economic power of the North was a magnet 
that caused large numbers of immigrants to arrive to fill labor 
needs throughout the decades. The constant flow was made up 
of both documented and undocumented persons. Mexico was, 
as Porfirio Diáz, controversial seven-term President of Mexico, 
is reputed to have said, “too far from God and too close to the 
United States.” Mexicans were a constant presence in the host 
country and never appeared to gain stability or to blend with 
the natives. 
 Mexicans/Latinos were not helped to identify as Americans 
with ease. It was not until second and third generations had 
served in the military and received schooling that made them 
feel less separate from peer groups that they claimed more 
readily their American identity. It would appear that Mexicans/
Latinos, if not fully despised, were certainly not highly regard-
ed, desirable or fully appreciated as a community. Recently, the 
current emphasis on “building the wall” and the antagonism 
expressed towards Mexico and its leadership have deepened 
the sense of fear and separation felt by the members of the Lati-
no immigrant group. Thus, it can be said, that the ghost of the 
Black Legend has risen again. Linguistic, religious and social 
differences that fueled animosity and contributed to the dis-
tancing of the early immigrant groups continue today, feeding 
mutual suspicion. The current political leadership and its xe-
nophobic inclinations fuel sentiments that may have been dor-
mant in the general public.
 It is sad to recognize that there are no complete explanations 
for the prejudicial sentiments which U.S. citizens have exhibited 
towards Mexican and Latino immigrants. Changes in attitudes 
will require a profound cultural transformation. However, on a 
more hopeful note, there has been a significant increase in the 
educational, political and business gains made by earlier Lati-
no immigrants and their children. Once the current xenopho-
bic wave passes, this may significantly weaken the historical 
animosity toward the group. The level of political leadership 
exercised by Hispanics today is significant, and combined with 
demographic changes, cannot be ignored.
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Heather Jacobson, Labor of Love: Gestational Surrogacy and the 
Work of Making Babies. Rutgers University Press (2016), 201 
pages, $19.99 (paperback).
 The practice of surrogacy is not new in human history. Giv-
en the needs of parental hopefuls combined with developments 
of new medical procedures, gestational surrogacy as compen-
sated labor is an emerging reality in the United States. It is the 
exchange of money between surrogates and intended parents 
that has made gestational surrogacy much more complicated 
and much more controversial. Important questions now arise as 
gestational surrogacy becomes a commercial enterprise. What is 
the proper way to view surrogates, intended parents, surrogacy 
professionals and their role in society as a whole in relation to 
the work of surrogacy? There is a shortage of empirical research 
to assist us in understanding this phenomenon, especially from 
the perspective of surrogates and their families. 
 Heather Jacobson’s book, as the first ethnographic study of 
gestational surrogacy in the U.S., begins to fill this important 
gap in the literature. Jacobson collected data from 2009 to 2015, 
by interviewing surrogates and their family members, intended 
parents, and surrogacy professionals in Texas and California. 
This was supplemented by disciplined examination of surroga-
cy websites, forums, and blogs. Through her extensive fieldwork 
and rigorous analysis, this book, in six well-written chapters, il-
lustrates the American commercial surrogacy market, presents 
illustrative sketches of surrogates and their families, and further 
examines surrogacy as a shadowy workforce in the U.S. 
 The first chapter introduces fundamental concepts in gesta-
tional surrogacy by illustrating the story of a surrogate named 
Molly. This chapter provides some background to understand 
commercial gestational surrogates from a social and cultur-
al perspective, and further lays the foundations for examin-
ing research questions based on surrogates’ stories. Jacobson 
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reviews the history of surrogacy and describes the emergence 
of commercial surrogacy in the second chapter. Here Jacobson 
also documents the surrogacy rules for intended parents, sur-
rogates, and surrogacy professionals. The rules for each party 
involved in the process demonstrate a mixture of altruistic and 
profit-driven motives and work. 
 The third chapter further examines whether and how sur-
rogates perceive surrogacy as work by asking these women 
how they think of their work, how they interact with others, 
and how they confront negative cultural assumptions about 
surrogacy. Jacobson well captures the inspirations and motiva-
tions of American women to work in this highly contentious 
field. Her research suggests that they are primarily driven by 
altruistic motivation and their own personal enjoyment of be-
ing pregnant. These motives far outweigh the lure of monetary 
benefits. This also goes a long way in helping us understand 
why most surrogates are quite reluctant to characterize surro-
gacy as hired employment or work.   
 The author explores the relationships between surrogates and 
intended parents from the initial contact to postpartum in the 
fourth chapter. Surrogates expect a close, authentic, supportive, 
and respectful relationship between themselves and intended 
parents. However, these relationship expectations, which often 
feel more like friendship, also obscure the reality of surrogacy as 
a paid occupation. If the relationships between surrogates and 
intended parents lack warmth and mutual respect, surrogates 
are more likely to feel like unskilled paid laborers.
 The fifth chapter looks at the experiences of the spouses and 
children of surrogates and the effect gestational surrogacy has 
on the daily life of surrogate families. Benefits to spouses and 
children include compensation and happiness of childbearing. 
Although families receive monetary and emotional benefits, 
family members have concerns about surrogates’ health and 
safety issues. As Jacobson suggests, gestational surrogacy is a 
family contract among surrogates, partners, children, and in-
tended parents. The family contract indicates that surrogacy as 
a form of paid work rests heavily on family members’ active 
involvement and significant sacrifices. Yet these very features 
of surrogacy also work to limit the recognition of gestational 
surrogacy as a form of employment. 
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 The last chapter introduces the rules associated with mon-
ey in the surrogacy market. Surrogates are trained and social-
ized to accept surrogacy as paid work. However, they are not 
allowed to frame it as reproductive work primarily for the pur-
pose of profit or monetary reward. This contradiction makes 
surrogates invisible among the scope of traditional occupations. 
 Surrogacy is a rapidly growing occupation in recent years, 
and acknowledgement of this type of work as an occupation 
still has social, ethical, religious, and legal strictures in Ameri-
can society. This book documents the processes, relationships, 
and structures of American gestational surrogacy and provides 
original and thoughtful insights into the world of contemporary 
reproduction. Overall, this a book of very readable research, 
accessible to anyone interested in understanding more about 
the gestational surrogacy. This book should become a valuable 
reference for policymakers to reconsider strengths, challenges, 
and future of surrogacy in the U.S., as well as the rights of sur-
rogates and other relevant parties.
Yanfeng Xu
The School of Social Work
University of Maryland, Baltimore
E. J. Dionne, Jr., Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas E. Mann, One 
Nation	After	Trump:	A	Guide	for	the	Perplexed,	the	Disillusioned,	
the Desperate, and the Not-Yet Deported. St. Martin’s Press 
(2017), 344 pages, $25.99 (hardback).
 The contention of this book is that Donald Trump’s rise to 
the American presidency produced a crisis so profound that 
the reaction in its wake could be a harbinger of democratic re-
newal. Stated this way, especially if it had come from a group 
of lesser lights, this would easily strike the reader as partisan 
wishful thinking at best, to be dismissed as some sort of naïve 
neo-Hegelian political negative dialectic. But this particular 
group of writers is hardly partisan; they span from center-left to 
center-right, and they all are easily counted among the top ten 
of current American public intellectuals. So without a doubt, 
when they speak with one voice on matters of social policy, 
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even in a consciously non-academic, though well-documented 
forum, such as this book, they do command our attention.
 The Trump phenomenon, they write, did not come out of 
the blue yonder, but has been brewing piecemeal in the Repub-
lican party for decades. If Trump himself represents anything 
of note, it is in his ability to gather together many of the dispa-
rate but increasingly radicalized strands of ideological voices 
presented in one form or another in the Republican coalition. 
These include voices of populist religion, nationalism, nativ-
ism and economic protectionism. Over the past few decades, 
the Republican establishment has been relatively successful in 
playing each of these factions off against one another, with each 
feeling itself heard just enough to remain within the Republi-
can umbrella. Trump reveals the long-term instability of this 
coalition; the Republican establishment has been increasingly 
preparing for its own demise. Trump exposes the Republican 
establishment’s unwillingness to really push the agenda of any 
of these factions to conclusion, while he, Donald J. Trump, is the 
standard bearer for actually doing so.
 In the demise of the Republican establishment, these writers 
see a great opportunity for a new era of democratic renewal. But 
for this to happen, there must be a clear vision set forth of com-
pelling and practical ideas and policies that can rally the support 
not only of those who voted against Trump in the 2016 election, 
but also of that significantly large faction of voters who did vote 
for Trump but are now quite dissatisfied with the results.
 The first and longest part of the book is devoted to analy-
sis of how the ground was prepared for Trump throughout the 
post-War period, but especially since the rise of Ronald Reagan. 
Chapters devoted to the dog whistles of race and class offer sig-
nificant insights into veins of resentment and discontent stoked 
by political and media culture warriors for many years, largely 
under the radar of those not tuned in to it directly. Alternative 
media sources on the right continuously eroded the respect 
and authority for the norms of social reporting based on deep 
research and garnering of factual data. This coincided with a 
growing sense that “minority rule” was not only legitimate but 
even inevitable in the complex world of modern America.
 This aspect of “minority rule” deserves special attention, 
as it has a long history in the American republic. Although we 
Americans think of ourselves as a democracy, and democracy 
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means rule by majority, there have always been compromises to 
this principle. Our sacred Bill of Rights, as well as other amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution, can be seen in many ways as 
anti-democratic in spirit. That is to say, they are explicitly con-
stituted to put limits on rule by majority. Likewise, many of the 
compromises allowing for a United States to emerge at all are 
explicitly tuned to give smaller and less populated states out-
sized power in relation to larger and more populated states.
 An obvious example of this is simply the fact that every 
state has two senators. Thus Wyoming has one U.S. Senator 
representing approximately 290,000 citizens (half of the state 
population) while California has one U.S. Senator representing 
approximately 19 million citizens. In other words, in terms of 
representative power in the federal legislature, a Wyoming cit-
izen has something like 65 times that of a California citizen. 
Similarly lopsided power distribution favoring minority rule 
is found in many areas of government, most notably for the 
Trump election, in the Electoral College. It needs to be empha-
sized that while Republicans and conservatives of late have been 
very effective in efforts to increase their minority ruling power 
through highly gerrymandered voting districts and partisan 
purging of voter registration lists, it has been Democrats and 
liberals who for decades reflexively moved to bypass majoritar-
ian political solutions to social policy in favor of judicial solu-
tions. The point here is not to pose questionable equivalencies, 
but simply to underline that the drift we have seen away from 
the slow process of consensus building and toward the notion 
that a legislative faction of 50% plus one is a sufficient mandate 
to authorize imposition of an even radical social policy agenda 
has been brewing for decades and has been utilized across the 
political spectrum. Trumpism would be unimaginable if these 
practices were not already firmly in place.
 Part Two of this book looks at what can be done in the are-
na of social policy to create new democratic norms and values 
in the near and more distant future in America. These authors 
contend that the absolute bottom line for a way forward is a re-
assessment of our economic system, the distribution of costs and 
rewards within that system, and a strong and steady move away 
from “winner takes all” policies and toward policies facilitating 
more economic equality. We must assume that once we get into 
the weeds, Dionne, Ornstein and Mann would have substantive 
184 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
disagreements on the details. Yet the very fact that this basic de-
mand for curbing current practices is agreed upon by writers 
representing the Brookings, American Enterprise and Manhat-
tan Institutions respectively, is itself an important fact.
 In further chapters, these authors outline ideas for reviving 
an understanding of patriotism based on mutual respect among 
citizens rather than jingoistic nativism, and on reviving and 
expanding more traditional norms of behavior in the political 
sphere. This latter point is quite interesting because, as is shown 
throughout this book, much of what we value most about the 
American social and political system is based not in laws per se 
but rather in the implicit behavioral norms we expect from poli-
ticians. While these norms have certainly been tested at various 
times in our history, appeals to these norms (basic honesty, civil-
ity toward and respect for the integrity of opponents) also have 
carried strong authority in the face of violations. Think, for exam-
ple, of Joseph Welch’s public challenge to Joe McCarthy—“Have 
you after all no sense of decency, sir?”—which historians of the 
era often cite as the turning point in McCarthy’s communist 
witch-hunting. Beginning at least with Republican Newt Ging-
rich’s skillful use of C-Span cameras to launch his “back bench” 
campaign against leading House Democrats, and then on to the 
founding of the so-called Tea Party and Freedom Caucus groups 
among Republicans, it has become an explicit tactic to loudly vi-
olate these “norms of decency” in relation to political opponents. 
Violation of these norms is not illegal, and thus respect for these 
norms cannot be legislated. Trump has been the master at such 
norm violation, turning it not only against Democrats but against 
the Republican establishment itself. At the same time, Trump’s 
flaunting and flagrant violations drive home the point that resto-
ration of norms is an essential component of a post-Trump reviv-
al of democracy and a civil society.
 While I highly recommend this book, especially for those in 
our profession who, even as we speak, are giving serious thought 
to those elements we need to include in future policy discussions, 
I have to say that the phrase going through my mind most often 
while reading this book was “that’s a lot easier said than done!” 
I tend to agree with these authors’ contention that a heavily 
skewed economy lays at the root of our current situation. If that 
means anything, it is that our current situation is contoured by 
decades of neo-liberal exaltation of money as the highest good. 
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According to neoliberal logic then, those who have money and 
wealth will utilize it with increasing precision to create for them-
selves even more money and wealth. This being the case, we are 
not now simply in need of better social and economic policies. 
We are in need of a rather thoroughgoing spiritual revolution, a 
broadly cultural change in values throughout our entire society 
away from neoliberal exaltation of money, profits and wealth dis-
play. Frankly, I don’t see anything nearly so fundamental com-
ing from these authors. They seem confident that the reward of 
a future sustainable and pleasantly civil society shared by all is 
sufficient to maintain allegiance to their vision. I am much less 
confident. It is a replay of the old commons dilemma, in which 
the common good of all is pitted against the selfish good of indi-
viduals. The results when such games are played out in human 
history are not usually very encouraging.
 Nevertheless, we do need to be thinking in terms of com-
mon good social policies, and this book is at least one potent 
starting point for diagnosing our current problems and point-
ing a finger in a positive direction forward.
Daniel Liechty
The School of Social Work
Illinois State University
Geoffrey L. Greif and Michael E. Woolley, Adult Sibling Relation-
ships. Columbia University  Press (2016), 301 pages, $29.99 
(paperback).
 Whether approaching this book as a family therapist, social 
work educator, policy analyst or simply as a sibling, this pre-
sentation of adult sibling relationships is a highly readable and 
accessible contribution to the literature on family relationships. 
The book shares key findings and in-depth case studies gleaned 
from interviews and questionnaire data from 262 siblings aged 
forty and older, with at least one living sibling. 
 The authors provide a comprehensive contextualization of 
the study of sibling relationships, long overlooked in favor of par-
ent-child and spousal interactions within the family, taking the 
reader through a review of relevant studies on family relation-
ships ranging from biology to history, social sciences to culture, 
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and fast-forwarding to families in popular culture. The overarch-
ing framework spotlights themes of affection, ambivalence, and 
ambiguity, which are viewed as intrinsic to adult sibling inter-
actions. Additionally, these interactions are examined through 
a life course perspective in which family history can be seen to 
repeat itself in subsequent generations, and within a theoretical 
perspective focusing on families as systems applying concepts 
borrowed from Bowen’s family systems, Minuchin’s structural 
family therapy, and Satir’s experiential family therapy. 
 Key lessons are drawn from the author’s wide-ranging re-
view of the literature on family relationships. These include 
the importance of sibling relationships as sources of affection 
and support that enhance well-being from middle through late 
adulthood; the need of older siblings to seek reciprocal relation-
ships with younger siblings, and the desire of younger siblings 
to seek comfort and support from older siblings; the impact of 
parental favoritism on both the favored and unfavored child 
and its lasting impact on sibling relationships across the lifes-
pan; the need to create a positive bond between siblings when 
one lives with or faces a significant life challenge (e.g., health, 
disability), as well as a recognition by professionals of the needs 
of siblings serving in a caregiving role; the lasting impact and 
grief resulting from the loss of a sibling at an early age, even 
in instances when the death preceded the surviving sibling’s 
birth; and the greater emotional connection of sisters, which 
creates an opportunity for professionals to develop such capac-
ity among brothers.  
 The author’s findings support ambivalence as an important 
characteristic describing adult sibling relationships from mid-
dle to late adulthood, pointing to a need to further study the 
“components of closeness” (p. 72) to include feelings, behaviors, 
and expectations in an age-informed context. Insights for po-
tential child-rearing best practices were shared, with a nuanced 
understanding of the need for all things in moderation when 
it comes to both children’s behaviors and parental practices. 
The generational context of strained sibling relationships is ad-
dressed, ranging along a continuum from the desire to recon-
nect or to maintain distance, and to feelings of ambivalence in 
between. While opportunities to improve connections later in 
life may occur as a result of an important event in the life of the 
family was noted, it may be necessary for siblings to learn to 
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accept current circumstances and adjust their expectations. The 
experience of siblings in blended families was also addressed, 
with a suggestion for use of genograms and family maps to fa-
cilitate identification of and changes to historical patterns. 
 The book concludes with a review of practice approaches 
suggested by research findings on adult sibling relationships, 
including contributions from practitioners and advice from 
siblings. Practitioners described processes seen while treating 
siblings in emergency situations and over time. A smaller num-
ber recommend therapy for improving boundaries when other 
efforts fail. 
 Siblings focused on the importance of communication, for-
giveness and acceptance, as well as the importance of personal 
effort generally in improving and maintaining positive adult 
sibling relationships. While sensitive to and seeking to avoid 
overgeneralization of cultural considerations, the authors do 
address the level of culture. An in-depth, culturally grounded 
approach would provide important contributions to the litera-
ture on adult sibling relationships. 
 Noteworthy were the voices of adult siblings, through case 
studies and quotations, as well as analysis of qualitative data. 
According to adult siblings in the study, improving challeng-
ing sibling relationships ultimately requires a willingness to be 
vulnerable, acceptance that each sibling has a point of view, and 
a sense of “hope that, with effort, a better relationship can be 
achieved” (p. 243). 
Teri Kennedy
The School of Social Work
Arizona	State	University
Adam Gaffney, To	Heal	Humankind:	The	Right	to	Health	in	History.	
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group (2017), 240 pages, $36.00 
(paperback).
 My interest in healthcare had brought me to this book by 
Adam Gaffney. I wanted to learn more about how the mod-
ern-day health care laws and rights evolved. The book starts 
in the early 1700s and ends at the start of the Trump adminis-
tration in 2017. The debates over whether healthcare is a right 
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or a commodity and whether private or public healthcare is 
better are discussed throughout the book. These debates have 
persisted throughout health care’s history. Although this book 
does not answer these pressing questions, Gaffney provides de-
tailed historic evidence explaining the concepts and ideas re-
lated to these issues. The detail and evidence, such as treaties, 
revolutions and laws, give the reader a greater understanding 
of healthcare, laws, social movements and health organizations. 
Gaffney is an advocate of human rights and healthcare and it 
shines through this book.
 Gaffney has written this book in seven chapters. Each chap-
ter goes into a comprehensive understanding about health-
care and the right to health during a historical period. Gaff-
ney writes about historic evidence from all around the world 
including Chile, China, and the Soviet Union. He discusses 
each era using evidence and facts. Beginning with a helpful 
introduction bringing the reader insight about the book’s top-
ic, the subsequent chapters are written in chronological order 
beginning with the 18th century. The book’s central concern 
is the meaning of human rights as it relates to healthcare, and 
the origins and progression of our ideas about this. He explores 
this topic through both sociological and historical lenses up 
to and including the modern day. As the idea of human rights 
evolved, there is a clear emergence of discussion as to whether 
healthcare should be seen as a right or as a commodity. How 
this question is answered in turn, leads into whether healthcare 
is best served as a public or a private system. The book provides 
insight on why healthcare is being fought for and what it means 
to the economy. 
 The first chapter discusses the ancient world with perspec-
tives from Plato and Aristotle. Gaffney examines hospitals from 
different eras and countries regarding ethics, rights, and health-
care. Does religion play a role in how healthcare is perceived? 
Gaffney makes useful observations on the ways Buddhism has 
played in a role in Chinese hospitals and health care rights, as 
well as how Christianity played a role in health care rights in 
other parts of the world. These religions are seen as acting cre-
atively in the idea of charitable medical care, natural rights, the 
right to health, and universal healthcare. 
 The right to healthcare and human rights is explored in chap-
ter two. Gaffney gives insight on what this concept has meant 
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in particular times and places, such as France in the late 1700s, 
from which came the Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Man	and	Citizen. 
This document states “Men are born and remain free and equal 
in rights” (p. 42). The French Revolution also advanced the ideal 
of the rights universal of human beings, including a right to 
healthcare.
 Chapter three touches on the debate between public versus 
private healthcare, and the impact of each system on those in 
poverty. The traditional poor laws were the public system of 
poor relief and were seen by many to be inadequate for those 
in poverty in industrialized Britain. Therefore, a New Poor Law 
was created, but was left woefully under funded, under staffed, 
and with limited resources. This is largely the system of relief 
that made its way into the twentieth century.  
 Meanwhile, a revolution started in Germany about medi-
cal reform and the emergence of social medicine. There we see 
the development of public health insurance, which only subse-
quently influenced programs in Britain and the United States. 
A chapter focusing specifically on the United States delineates 
the progression of healthcare thinking and policies as these 
developed after World War II. Here again we see the influence 
of the term “human rights,” as it was affected by the war and 
war relief efforts. The 1948 adoption in the United Nations of 
the Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights (UDRH) in many ways 
frames our thinking about healthcare. 
 Gaffney uses the concept of first, second and third worlds 
to categorize ideas about healthcare provision. He explains peo-
ple in the first world are seen as having “a de facto legal right 
to healthcare …” (p. 118). Examples of this are given from the 
United States and Great Britain. The second world is seen as 
illustrating “the mixed legacy of communism with regard to 
advancing a right to healthcare …” (p.118), and here examples 
included stem from China and the Soviet Union. Finally, third 
world examples stem from Latin America, Cuba, and Chile. 
Gaffney suggests that in relation to the third world, “the tides of 
global political change affected the emergence and/or rollback 
of health rights” (p.118). Gaffney compares and thoroughly ex-
plains the healthcare system in each “world” and its effects on 
the population there.
 The final chapter examines the era of neoliberalism. The in-
formation in this chapter gives the reader a better understanding 
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of where we stand today in relation to healthcare policy. Topics 
discussed in this chapter include the HIV and AIDS epidemics 
in America, shock therapy in Russia, and the Affordable Care 
Act (Obamacare). Once again the issue of universal healthcare 
and the continuance of private versus single-payer healthcare is 
raised. Gaffney compares different countries which have both 
types of systems, along with the pros and cons for individu-
als within each system. The book wraps up with the presiden-
tial election of 2016. Gaffney discusses the candidate views on 
healthcare, giving special attention to accessibility and afford-
ability. He ends with questions of whether the nation will con-
tinue to fund Obamacare or see some sort of “Trumpcare” as 
the future of healthcare. This review is being written nearly a 
year into the Trump administration, and quite frankly Gaffney’s 
questions are still to be answered, with solid evidence pointing 
in opposite directions!
 For much the same reason, this book is not outdated, even 
though it was written before the 2016 election. The issues re-
main alive, and Gaffney’s book helps us all understand why 
certain healthcare systems have worked well, why some have 
failed, and what can be done to improve all systems of health-
care. The evidence and data in this book gives us hope that we 
will not simply repeat a history of failure, but rather that, even 
in the Trump administration, we might learn from that history.
Lydia Douglas
The School of Social Work
Illinois State University
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare • June 2018 • Volume XLV • Number  2 
191
Corresponding Authors
Neveen Ali Saleh Darawshy
nevosh78@gmail.com
Benjamin A. Swerdlow
bswerdlow@berkeley.edu
David Becerra
david.becerra@asu.edu
Ferry Koster
koster@fsw.eur.nl
Brittany N. Hearne
brittany.n.hearne@vanderbilt.edu
Kjetil Lundberg
kjetil.lundberg@uni.no
John Solas
j.j.solas@keele.ac.uk
Emilia E. Martinez-Brawley
eemb@asu.edu
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL WELFARE
2018 Publication Information & Subscription Rates
Volume:   XLV
Volume Year:   2018
Publication Period:  1-18 to 12-18
Publication Frequency: Quarterly
Publication Dates:  March, June,
    September, December
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:
     Retail Cost Subscription Agent
Online version only  Individual     
    $54.00  $54.00
    Institution     
    $98.00  $88.00
Print plus online  Individual in U.S.   
        version (package) $62.00  $62.00
     Individual Outside U.S.  
    $74.00  $74.00
    Institution in U.S.   
    $106.00 $96.00
     Institution Outside U.S.  
    $118.00 $108.00
Institutional subscribers can access the Journal’s articles with ip authen-
tication. Please send ip information to swrk-jssw@wmich.edu. Individual 
subscribers can access the Journal’s articles online by contacting swrk-
jssw@wmich.edu for a password. 
Prepayment in U.S. funds. Single year subscriptions only. Subscriptions 
non-cancelable. Free replacement within six (6) months of publication of 
issues not received. Back Issues: $20.00 per issue, plus $2.00 for postage. 
ISSN: 0191-5096. Tax Free Registry No.: A-154961. Federal Tax ID No.: 
386007327. Index: Included in Issue Number 4 (December) at no addi-
tional cost. Web Site: http://www.wmich.edu/socialwork/journal/. Contact 
Person: Melinda McCormick Ph.D., Managing Editor. Journal of Sociology 
and Social Welfare, School of Social Work, Western Michigan University, 1903 
W. Michigan Ave., Kalamazoo, MI 49008-5354 USA. e-mail: swrk-jssw@
wmich.edu. Tel: 269-387-3205 Fax: 269-387-3183. 
